its conceived threat to Turkey's hard-line secularism, which meant that the government feared that its survival could be at risk without the external support of the US. Turkey's excessive economic and financial reliance on the US and the largely US-controlled IMF and World Bank meant, from the spectrum of the government, that outright rejection of US designs might directly or indirectly cripple the Turkish economy. I think that these three factors explain a great deal about why the Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, enjoined the parliament to vote in favour of allowing a large contingent of US troops (above thirty thousand) to use the Turkish territory in order to enter northern Iraq, although the overwhelming majority of the people detested the idea of the US troops invading Iraq, and Turkey collaborating with this hegemonic and aggressive power. Surprisingly enough, the motion tabled before the Grand National Assembly on March 1, 2003 did not get the necessary votes, because some members of parliament from the AK Party voted against the motion alongside those from the opposition Republican Peoples Party. When two years later, the US introduced its Greater Middle East (GME) plan which was designed to inject political and economic reforms into the Muslim World, especially in the Middle East, triggering structural changes in this part of the world, Turkey did not fail to jump on the US bandwagon. It thus supported the plan, albeit distancing itself from its imperial overtones, and became one of the co-chairmen of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue, as part of the GME initiative.

To make an overview of the issues raised in this section, although it is clear that the prevailing view about the policies pursued by the US around the world is fairly negative in Turkey[12] and South Korea, the governing elites in both countries have no intention to abrogate their alliance with the US. This political strategy is commensurate with the pragmatism of the peoples of both countries: In spite of their deep-seated mistrust and misgivings of the US, public opinion in Turkey and South Korea seems to have resigned to the idea of the sustenance of military alliance and the complicated network of other links with the US out of sheer "national interest" considerations.

Respective Perspectives of International Society

South Korea failed to act truly as an "independent" variable in international

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[12] The most recent survey conducted by an American pollster, PEW, indicates that only 12 percent of the people in Turkey approve of US policies in general and 14 percent think positively of the "US war on terror." (PEW Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2006, http://pewglobal.org/reports /pdf/252.pdf)

relations for a very long time. During the Cold War, "South Korea found itself swept over by ideological confrontation as it lacked the capability to function as an independent, sovereign state."[13] The division of Korea into two separate states, South Korea and North Korea, in the aftermath of the Second World War, and South Korea's reliance on the US for protection and integration into the prevalent world economic system, debilitated its capacity for independent action vis-à-vis other actors in international society. South Korea maintained its hope of unification with its northern brethren which was the leitmotif in the overall construction of its foreign policy. This "national cause" was the linchpin against which all other deliberations were to be assessed. The polarization that characterized the international system up until the early 1990s undermined the possibility of a union between the two Koreas, considering that acted submissively towards their respective bloc leaders, namely the US and the Soviet Union. The constraints of the Cold War reverberated, at a micro level, at South Korea's parochial approach towards the outside world.

There is no denying that South Korea does not, unlike Turkey, consider itself as a "Western" state. Rather it tends to emphasize its Asian character and expresses some affinity to developing nations by virtue of its unceasing search for economic expansion. Turkey too occasionally emphasizes its difference from Europe and the US on account of its low level of economic development. However none of the two states has made any tangible contributions to the cause of the Non-Aligned Group of States in the latter's long struggle to achieve a more just and peaceful international order. It is solely out of pragmatic considerations that Turkey and South Korea have paid some attention to the activities of the Non-Aligned grouping. To be able to muster at least a fraction of the support of the members of the Non-Aligned Group of States during the UN General Assembly discussions (and voting) on Cyprus, was a cardinal motive behind Turkey's "warmer" approach towards the group. Similar pragmatism underlined the motives behind South Korea's attempts to improve relations with the Non-Aligned Group "in apparent competition" with North Korea. However even in this case, South Korea tends to emphasize the classical principles of international law such as "the principles of good neighbourliness, reciprocity, and equality"[14], a language hardly palatable to those seeking to force radical changes in the international system and international law. This language strikes a chord with the static and formalistic overtones of Turkish foreign policy that characterised Turkish foreign policy until very recently. Both Turkey and South Korea

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[13] Wolfgang Gieler, Kemal İnat, Claudio Kullmann (eds.), *Foreign Policy of States: A Handbook on World Affairs*, (İstanbul, Tasam, 2005), Sedat Azaklı, "Republic of Korea", 453-462, p.453.

[14] http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12362.html

have been inclined to emphasize rules and principles sanctified by conservative forces which have been, for the most part, shaping international society, while "the language of change" is presumably dismissed as "irrelevant" and "unresponsive" to their national priorities. The ideas and principles espoused by the Western group of states, which are the dominant actors in international society, are taken by these two American allies as truisms in order for the international order to function smoothly.

Today, as in the past, South Korea's international outlook and conception of universal goals very much reflect the US perspectives and priorities. This country seems to be strongly lured into Western liberal triumphalism and is gripped equally by the "phantom of terrorism", the enemy of the civilised world so to speak, which the US and its loyal cohorts have been hyping up since the Cold War faded away. In the website of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, one comes across with statements such as the following:

> "Korea will actively participate in the international endeavour to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism, which pose the greatest threats to international peace and security... The Korean government will actively participate in the international effort to promote democracy and human rights"[15]

However this is not to deny that some significant changes have occurred in South Korean foreign policy since the early 1990s. The excerpt below explains the new dynamism of South Korea well:

> "The most significant change in South Korea's post-Cold War foreign policy is Seoul's emergence from the predominant influence of the US, which has enabled the pursuit of a more multidimensional policy outlook. Following diplomatic normalization with the SU and China, South Korea promoted improved relations with all four of its surrounding powers – China, Japan, Russia and the US– in a bid to create conditions conducive for national security and peaceful unification, while earning non-permanent membership in the UNSC."[16]

Indeed, together with North Korea, South Korea became a member of the UN in August

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[15] The Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Key Diplomatic Tasks", http://www.mofat.go.kr/me/me_a003/me_b010/me03_02.jsp

[16] Azaklı, *op.cit.*, p.454.

1991. It is a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), set up in 1993. This organization has been prompted by the economic motive of seeking to bring about a free trade zone among members of the group at some time in the future. The APEC was pioneered by the US which made it appealing for South Korean participation. A brief regard to South Korea's relations with China and Japan, as the surrounding nations with significant economic and political clout, is timely here. South Korea did not have any diplomatic links with China during the Cold War on account of deep-seated hostilities between the two states dating back to the Korean War when China supported North Korea. South Korea was a staunch ally of the US and the Korean peninsula was a major theatre of rivalry between the socialist and capitalist camps. The parties established formal diplomatic links in 1992 at which time the Cold War was over. Both states are today among the members of APEC and their ties are improving. South Korea's relations with Japan seem somewhat more confusing. Although both states were ardent supporters of the capitalist camp led by the US during the Cold War, lack of trust about Japanese motives underlines the South Korean perception of this country. Japan was engaged in the brutal occupation of the Korean peninsula for about forty years in the first half of the 20th century which is vividly remembered and talked over in South Korea (and, in North Korea, of course). Japan has never brought itself into admitting and apologising for its past crimes in China, Korea, and parts of Southeast Asia. Nonetheless as their membership of APEC and the credits which South Korea receives from Japan indicates, the economic rewards that both nations reap from mutual cooperation are too enticing to be sacrificed for historical frictions.

Similar to South Korea, Turkish multilateral diplomacy has concentrated more on the established norms and principles of international law such as the sovereign equality of states, the right to collective self-defence, and the principle of non-intervention, rather than on the creation of new norms and structures in the evolving process of a new international legal order. Indeed, it has been a party to only a fraction of the multilateral treaties conceived under UN auspices dealing with "progressive" issues of international law. Contrary to an overwhelming majority of states, particularly those belonging to the Third World, Turkey has rarely contributed to legal endeavours pertaining to the codification or the progressive evolution of matters relating to "human rights", "the principle of self-determination", "the establishment of a New International Economic

Order" and so forth.[17] Indeed, the Turkish foreign policy establishment is inclined to see the United Nations as a forum for defending Turkish national interests rather than, *inter alia*, a vehicle for norm-creation. It can therefore be asserted that Turkey is yet to fully accept that the United Nations system in general and the General Assembly in particular are not merely designed to preserve international peace and security as defined in military terms, but are equally entrusted with the task of mobilizing world public opinion on major issues of global concern, such as underdevelopment, food, human rights, disarmament, technology, law of the sea, and the distribution of culture and information.

As suggested earlier, a main conceptual and normative barrier in this respect lies in Turkey's official identification with the Western world that, so to speak, holds the key for Turkish accession into the "gate of contemporary civilisation". Indeed, the western-orientation of Turkish foreign policy justifies a distorted view of the outside world which considers "international society" as synonymous with "the US, Europe and their close associates". Leaving aside a few exceptions of activism and initiative-taking displayed by the present government in the last few years, Turkey has conventionally (after the Second World War) registered its advocacy of international plans, UN Security Council resolutions or international treaties once they have been (almost always) approved by the Western group of states and presented to the world as the will of "international society". For instance, Turkey followed in the footsteps of the US before recognizing Peoples Republic of China as the legitimate representative of China in the 1970s. It declined to perceive the Palestinian issue from the perspective of the self-determination of a people under foreign occupation and, instead, emphasized the Palestinian "refugee problem". It did not hesitate to join in the international sanctions against South Africa from the end of the 1970s for its systematic practice of racist policies. Turkey was actively engaged in the process leading to the independence of Namibia in 1990, a cause espoused by the UN General Assembly. Turkey remained mostly indifferent to the causes, such as disarmament, search for a new international economic order, end to colonialism and neo-colonialism, espoused by the Non-Aligned group of nations simply because these demands were mostly unpalatable for the defenders of Western interests.

With the exception security/military matters, Turkey failed to take initiatives in international affairs during the course of the Cold War. This "bureaucratic foreign policy", as a Turkish professor of International Relations, Mehmet Gönlübol, puts it, fails to respond

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[17] For a review of Turkey's voting preferences on these cardinal issues in the UN General Assembly, see Berdal Aral, "Fifty Years on: Turkey's Voting Orientation at the UN General Assembly, 1948-97", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, Mar. 2004, 137-160.

appropriately to changes in the international system. This Turkish inertia was clearly witnessed during the historic changes that took place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union following the demise of the communist regimes when Turkey passively watched the events as an "outsider".[18] It is only natural that when international society is viewed from the rigid spectrum of 'security considerations', other aspects of international relations – economic, social, cultural, intellectual– are ultimately subordinated to them. Within such a frame of mind, the external world can easily be presented as "threatening".

Turkey's pro-Western inclinations and reflexes have not died out in spite of the new openings and challenges brought about by the demise of old divisions and rigidities that were the hallmark of the Cold War. However this statement must be understood with the caveat that Turkey's present government gives the impression of pursuing a multi-dimensional policy and displaying some awareness of the significance of Asian and African continents. Under the AK Party government, Turkey has taken some initiatives to resolve the Iraqi crisis before and after the American occupation in 2003, sought to create a platform for establishing a meaningful dialogue between the EU and the Muslim world, has indicated deeper interest in the Middle East, Russia, Central Asian republics, China, and parts of Africa, and finally has taken bold steps to bring the Cyprus dispute to an end. These are, in my view, courageous and imaginative moves which have increased Turkey's standing in the world. Having said that, however, this paper argues that the touchstone of Turkish foreign policy still remains that of submissive reliance on the US and the EU as the frame of reference for Turkish foreign policy. It also argues that the present government has chosen to act as an intermediary, as a channel of communication conveying American and/or European messages to the Arab states, to Iran or to the Islamic Conference Organization, to give a few examples. Today, as in the past, Turkey takes pride in emphasizing that it "brings the contemporary standards of democracy, secularism, free market economy, good governance and habitual regional cooperation to the threshold of the Middle East and Eurasia."[19] Finally, this government has not deviated from the previous governments in evaluating major concepts and events in international politics more often than not from the perspective of the Western world.

Indeed when one looks into the Website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs today, one could immediately notice that it is written in a language that is akin to Western

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[18] Mehmet Gönlübol, in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, seventh edition, (Ankara, Elif Matbaası, 1989), pp.631-632.

[19] Official site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Synopsis/SYNOPSIS.htm, July 5, 2006.

perspectives, priorities, goals, and perceptions of threat. In other words, Turkish foreign policy establishment appears to have internalised a western view of the world. In the website, there is no mention of Third World perspective and priorities such as imperialism, neo-colonialism, the inability of existing institutional mechanisms to deal with global problems, the privileged status of the G-8 countries in key international organizations, poverty, unfair international trade, and the search for a new international communications order. While Turkey's links with Western group of states and countries in geographical proximity are accounted in the website, no separate headings are spared for Turkey's ties with the rest of the world. This is in spite of the fact that Turkey is ruled by a government that is assumed to be sensitive about notions such as justice and fairness, about the fate of the Muslim world, and abut the overall plight of the non-Western world.

We may begin with the website's definition of "common threats to humanity". It is said that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, "the world witnessed the emergence of new threats to security, such as ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, irredentism, fundamentalism and international terrorism, giving rise to regional instability and conflicts, and casting a shadow over the initial optimism engendered by the prospects for a new peaceful era···The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is a growing tangible threat in the 21st century."[20] This exposition of threats is hardly indigenous to Turkey's own context. These "threats" are mostly constructs designed to demonise the "unruly and unpredictable Third World", to create new threats to justify militarization, to force the Third World demands and struggle for a better world into greater marginality, and finally to manufacture a new hegemonic discourse so that the dominant actors of international society maintain their privileged positions in international organisations. Turkey seems to be taken in by this hegemonic discourse. There is no mention, in the said website, of the US/Israeli/British aggressions in the world, of hunger, poverty and environmental problems mostly created and/or abetted by the US and other industrial states in the world. If they are not threats to the welfare and well-being of humanity, what can be considered "threats"?!

This Western-centric vision, considered in combination with its own struggle with terrorism inside[21], explains a great deal about Turkey's enthusiastic support for anti-terrorism conventions during and after the Cold War. This is another area that brings Turkey and South Korea closer. Indeed both of these states are parties to nearly all of the

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[20] *Ibid.*

[21] The terrorist groups challenging the authority of the state in Turkey include the PKK (seeking Kurdish separatism), and DHKPC (seeking to establish a socialist state).

anti-terrorism conventions, sponsored mostly by Western governments. Turkey, for instance, boasts in the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about adhering to all of the "twelve UN Conventions and Protocols on the combat with terrorism." Some of the anti-terrorism treaties which are approved by both states are as follows: Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed Onboard Aircraft (1963); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1998); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2000).

Turkey and South Korea also appear as enthusiastic supporters of international treaties on the "non-use of force" which are in most cases sponsored by Western governments. Besides the founding treaty of the UN (UN Charter), the following instruments are worth mentioning: Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols relating to the laws of war (adopted in 1949 and 1977 respectively); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968); Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972); Chemical Weapons Convention (1992); Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1996). In 1999 the US Senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which had been signed by President Clinton. When the US openly declared that it felt no obligation to abide by the terms of the Geneva Conventions in the course of its occupation of Afghanistan (2001-), neither Turkey nor South Korea aired its objection to the US' dismissal of the laws of war which it had adhered to.

Although there is a strong similarity between Turkey and South Korea in the way they perceive international society and the rules and principles of international law, there is an apparent wedge between Turkey and South Korea on international environmental law. It is true that both Turkey and South Korea are parties to the following environmental agreements: Antarctic Treaty (1959); Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989); Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991); Convention on Biological Diversity (1992); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). Unlike South Korea, however, Turkey has not become a party to the Law of the Sea Convention (1982), the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter

(1972), and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997). While South Korea is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977), Turkey has signed, but not yet ratified it. Turkey has no plans to accede to the Law of the Sea Convention because the terms of this agreement conflict with Turkey's perceived national interests. Just as South Korea is entangled in a long-standing dispute with Japan over the possession of some tiny islands known as the Liancourt Rocks (in South Korea and Japan, they are called Tok-Do and Takeshima respectively) in the East Sea, so is Turkey embroiled in border disputes with Greece concerning the delimitation of the Aegean Sea. This convention confers on islands the same rights as the land territories and allows coastal states to extend their territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles. In consideration of the proximity to the Turkish coasts of countless Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, Turkey has refused to participate in this convention. Turkey's failure to endorse the Kyoto Protocol derives from economic considerations. One may hope that, in the course of the EU-Turkish negotiations, Turkey will be hard pressed to adhere to this treaty as members of the EU have done.

Conclusion

During the course of the Cold War, neither Turkey nor South Korea appeared as dynamic and prominent players in international society. Officially they strongly identified with the US and the US perspectives of, and behaviour in, the outside world. Their alliance with the US, and, in the Turkish case, additionally, with NATO, was the crux of their international perspective and foreign policy behaviour on account of security considerations. Both states had a rigid conception of the Cold War, which, in their view, called for an unquestioning loyalty to the capitalist camp. The Soviet territorial demands and call for joint administration of the Turkish Straits in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War provided an ideal pretext for Turkey's pro-Western ruling elites to irrevocably integrate Turkey into the Western world *en masse*. The Korean peninsula, even more so than Turkey, was a major theatre of East-West conflict that produced the Cold War. The devastating Korean War of 1950-53 solidified the demarcation line that had split the peninsula into two Koreas at the close of the Second World War. North Koreans fought alongside the Chinese against South Koreans, the Americans, and contingents from other countries that supported the Western cause. Although there were some grievances

and clash of interests between Turkey and the US on the one hand, and South Korea and the US on the other, as in the case of the Johnson Letter of 1964 and the US arms embargo of 1975-78 which had harmful consequences for Turkey, none of the states in question considered abandoning the American bloc or embarking on new diplomatic initiatives with non-Western group of states to counterbalance its inflexible reliance on the American bloc.

The end of the Cold War removed old certainties and brought about new opportunities that called for new and imaginative thinking as far as the actors of international society were concerned. There is no doubt that both South Korea and Turkey have tried to adjust their foreign policy to the structural changes in the international environmental by pursuing a more proactive and multifarious diplomacy. As old certainties, rigidities and unilateral reliance on the US have disappeared, so has the public support for enhanced partnership with the US has dwindled in both countries, although there is no mass movement in these countries that demands an end to alliance with the said state. US unilateralism and aggressive posture vis-à-vis the outside world, as the occupation of Afghanistan, Iraq, and unlimited support for Israel have all testified, have been condemned and widely criticised all around the world, including Turkey and South Korea, although most governments have opportunistically chosen to collaborate with the US. South Korea has found a new lease of life in its increasing engagement with its immediate neighbours such as North Korea, China and Japan, as well as with distant neighbours such as Russia. Turkey has similarly opened the frontiers of its foreign policy by establishing extensive trade ties and political contacts with states such as Russia, China, and Central Asian republics that used to be in the "enemy camp" during the Cold War. Meanwhile governments in both countries have had to pay greater attention to the protection of human rights which became the catchword of the New World Order as if replacing old ideologies. The two cases of Turkey and South Korea also demonstrate the extent to which the middle sized powers can change the course of their foreign policy and international perspectives when a paradigmatic shift has occurred in the international system. Although both states have somewhat availed themselves from the new opportunities presented by the demise of the Cold War, their alliance with the US and close identification with Western conceptions and perspectives of international society on the one hand and its legal and institutional framework on the other, still endures to this day.

A Probe for Ideology of Asian Community

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1. Introduction

Since eighteenth century, the reason of enlightened age has been turned into technological reason by the development of science. Technological reason from world war I to now followed mankind with tremendous accidents on the world. Terrors such as 9.11, change of weather, air pollution, health-problem, killing and death by gun, the great increase of narcotic abuse, the rising of sensual culture and so on all came from technological reason.

Sometimes we experienced great shock to find the above facts based on western world view. Western world view is standing on dualism. Accordingly that divided the whole into many parts. Body and mind, of course, must be separated. Nature and man are another being respectively. The dualism has treated all things as mechanical belongings. Such a facts led to mankind to exploit nature. But Technological reason developed technical civilization. However Eco-system has been destroyed by dualism. Finally we are facing at crisis of civilization. Materialistic civilization of the West pushed out elegant spirit of human being. So the West turned toward the East to help overcome civilizational crisis. The call for new paradigm is gradually increasing to build civilization of co-existence and harmony. Such a civilizational alternative is there in the secret of Asia. World view of Asia is quite different from the West. In Asian's view, 'One is everything. Everything is one.' Nature and man are not separated from each other. There are systematic relations in everything. The Sky, the Earth and human being are real one. In these context Asian Community is very important for us to help overcome the crisis of nowadays.

In such a meaning we have to produce the ideology of Asian community.

2. Civilization on Crises

Spengler, Toynbee already predicted crisis of civilization of coming future. Now

their prediction came into reality with progressive development of technological reason. Tragic phenomena occurred in the world, pushed us over cliff on civilization. The tragedy of civilizational history all came from world view of the West. Since Descartes the light of reason betrayed God and sought for humanity. But world view of that times essentially led to dualism: *Cogito ergo sum*. These view let people have idea to embrace dualism in every way of life. In the long run we have been falling into crisis of environment. Our body is also separated into mind.

But Body and mind is one. We are able to continue our life by maintaining homeostasis of body. This way of thinking is the very thought of the East. From Karl Marx to Samuel P. Huntington, their theories are on the dualistic view point.

Actually, there are conflict, struggle, and confrontation in their theories. We can not find harmony, co-existence in their ideas. Those theories like the above mentioned incurred war and revolution in western history. There is "power" at the core of theories. It is very dangerous for us to make peace of the world. The eastern world view is still staying in mutual relations of each other. So Eastern people should embrace Western civilization to get over crisis of nowadays. It is Asian's great mission.

3. Oriental Spirit: Response to the West

Light from the East" we have heard this predictive sayings from olden times. Till now Asian countries in general are on developing situation. Of course, a few countries get over poverty and the wretchedness through science and technology of the West. Western view of values permeated into almost Asian undeveloped countries. They lost traditional value from generation to generation.

But they are awakened from long sleeping by chaos of value. they are beginning to secure their national identity. The chaos of their identity let people could not discriminate their nationality based on their national value. They did not know that they are American, French, or English man.

However, the Advent of NICS and development of the countries made a new horizon in the eyes of thinking their own traditional value. They began to deny western value based on dualism. They passionately sought for co-existence and harmony. In all spheres of politics, diplomacy, economy and culture and so on, they are making an endeavor to discover their own values. They are on the long way to put on their own dress. And they are shouting to the West to make a peace of the world. They have great dream to get

over pollution of the western civilization.

The recent war broke out in IRAQ and Lebanon. In the eyes of Asian people, those affairs also came from the western world view grounded on power. Especially after cold war system collapsed, the United States act on the logic of power as only one strong country. From the view of Asia, she is too arrogant in dealing with world affairs. Asian people think they should take a humble action in international politics. But their one sided strategy of power do not accept such a advice. Their strategy of conflict essentially came from western world view. Directly after 9.11 terror, President Bush strongly said to the world. Whether you follow or not U. S. you must select one. However, with this strategy U. S. can never resolve crisis of terror by such one sided arrogant strategy. Reversely terror will produce terror. Rather, solution will be find in value of harmony and co-existence. That is the very view of world which still remains in the heart of Asia. At the same time that is the truth to help overcome civilizational crisis.

The cycle of civilization began to make a preparation to return to Asia. So the forming of Asian Community has a great meaning in changing time of civilization. In order to form good and strong Asian Community, we should create the thought of Asian Community.

4. In Search of Ideology of Asian Community:

Donghak (東學: Eastern Learning - Korean religion)

Catholic began to come into Korean Peninsula in eighteenth century. Many a disciple such as Bishop Kim Dae-gun are oppressed by the Government of Cho-sun dynasty. It is great sacrifice for God. But Catholic is not only our own religion but also the one which Korean produce and many Koreans did not think that as wise alternative to solve pending issues of that times : Bribe, rotten society, exploitation by upper class and so on. One day a great man appeared in the face of Korean history. His name is Choi Jae-woo, founding father of Donghak.

One day he heard voice of Hanulnim (God: 天主) by his long virtuous training. He found Hanulnim within him. Hanulnim said to him that "my mind is your mind, your mind is my mind." Choi Jae-woo said : "Within us there are two aspects. One is visible side(其然), the other is invisible side(不然)." He said that visible side is the world which man lives according to his own desires, needs, love, hate, and passion. After his

holy awakening of Hanulnim he declared with conviction that Hanulnim is man and man is Hanulnim.

Now it is necessary for us to scrutinize the world of learning. His Utopia which he dares to realize is the world being consisted of gentleman(君子). The world is full of peace of mind and magnificent energy(氣) as if spring has come. In order to create such a world we endlessly should make an effort to train our mind and body.

Visible side is the dark side of mind as man act on instinct(其然). Invisible side is mind of Hanulnim. So we can not see and touch with him(不然). He has holy spirit within him. At the same time he has magnificent energy(氣) outside. Holy spirit is connecting with Hanulnim. If the very spirit meets parent's body and receives energy, finally a life will be created. We can find Hanulnim by hard training of mind. This world of non-being is the very Hanulnim who we ourselves choose and attend on. We must attend on Hanulnim to push away dark aspect of mind by purely keeping mind(守心) and musically flowing energy(正氣).

Even though we find Hanulnim by the awakening, if we do not grow Hanulnim every day, Finding Hanulnim means nothing to us. We should attend on and grow Hanulnim with no shake, till our mind will become Hanulnim's one. That is the reason why Hanulnim is the very man. Hanulnim exists everywhere in not only man but also nature. Hanulnim exists in everything. So we should serve to Hanulnim, man and things. From the perspective of Donghak everything is Hanulnim, Hanulnim is everything. So everything is equal. This means pluralistic equalitarianism. We can find humanism, equalitarianism, and universalism in system of 'Donghak.'

In turning point of civilization we have to suggest the thought of Asian Community. In order to achieve this aim, we, at the same time, should establish ideological vision of Asian Community. Asia embraces many countries and various folks. We should respect all countries and all folks in Asia. We should begin to share dialogue with civilization beyond folks. And then we can real off common civilizational element from Asian countries through dialogue.

If we make the ideology of harmony, co-existence, equalitarianism and unity of Asian Community a reality, All countries in Asia should act on virtue. But It is regrettable that China deviated Goguryeo dynasty in ancient history of Korea.. Goguryeo is known to all over the world as inherent history of Korea. Goguryeo is not China's history. I hope that if China will become great cultural state, she must follow the principle of co-existence, harmony and equality. Japan should also play benevolent role for the development of Asia. Their paying visit a shrine made asian people astonished to remember tragic history of the past. This behaviour against hope of Asian people must

fade away to unite all member of Asian countries. If China and Japan act virtuously on the scene of world politics, we will be able to concretely establish Asian Community.

In this context the thought of Donghak may be available for ideology of Asian Community.

5. Conclusion

Nowadays we are in the face of civilizational crisis. Especially, Western civilization shows us limit of development. Of course we can accept one's contention that Science and Technology developed wretched countries. However, Technology produced materialistic civilization. Materialistic civilization have devastated human mind. Man have exploited nature to live on instinct. Nature is developed abusively according to the need for man. In the end man destroyed eco-system. These undesirable phenomena came from Western dualism based on opposition, conflict and struggle. There are no co-existence, harmony and inter-dependence in Western world view. We are on the brink of extermination of mankind. So the cycle of civilization is now moving toward East. Oriental civilization is quite different from Western civilization, especially in world view.

In such a meaning Donghak which is original root of Korean thought may bring the ideology of unity, co-existence, and harmony to Asian people. 'Donghak' is oriented toward humanism, pluralistic equalitarianism and the relation of inter-dependence. Someday these ideas will flow into the Sea of Asian heart. The light of new civilization will come from the East.

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A Study on the Japanese Verb Ending *-ru*

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Summary

Since I started learning the Japanese language 16 years ago, I have had a feeling that the Korean and Japanese languages are very similar in grammar and phonology and that the origins of the two languages must be the same. I decided to prove the point linguistically and, fortunately, I was able to publish a book titled *You Are Koreans!* in 2004 with the help and guidance of Professor Kiyoshi Shimizu, an expert on West African (especially Nigerian) languages. Since I started working on this research project seriously in 2002, Professor Hyun Bok Lee has supported me with kind advice and encouragement. With much gratitude and appreciation, I contribute this article to his Festschrift.

I started working with the assumption that the present-day Korean and Japanese languages retain 'genetic relations' in their vocabularies, and I have been able to find over 10,000 words, including derived words, that I am convinced are from the same word roots. Here in this paper I am considering the Japanese verbs ending in *-ru*, which I believe show the close relationship between the two languages.

이 현복 선생님의 고희기념논문집을 출간하게 되신 것을 진심으로 축하드립니다. 2002년, 본격적으로 한국어와 일본어를 비교연구하기 시작하면

서 선생님의 많은 협력을 받으며 성장해 왔습니다. 이번에 보잘것없는 논문을 싣게 된 것을 영광으로 여기며 감사드립니다. 앞으로도 선생님의 많은 활약을 기대하면서 늘 행복하시길 기도드리겠습니다.

今から16年前、一生の決断である日本への留学の決心から始まった日本語との出会いは、2004年清水紀佳先生と共著で出版した『あなたは韓国人』で一段落した。1　日本語を学びながら感じたことは、韓国語と日本語の文法や音韻が非常によく似ていることで

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1 清水紀佳/朴明美「あなたは韓国人！」精神世界社　ソウル　2004年
(Shimizu, Kiyoshi and Park, Myoung Mi：[You are Koreans！] Joengsinsegyesa, Seoul 2004).

あった。そこで私が思ったことは、韓国語と日本語の起源は同じではないかということ
だった。しかし、それを言語学的な観点から分かりやすく証明している本はあまりな
かった。それで、いつか私がそれを言語学的な観点から皆が納得できるように証明して
みせようと決心した。

　このような決心が実を結ぶことができたのは、清水先生のご指導のおかげだった。主
にナイジェリアの言語をフィルドワークで探録し、記録し、それをもとに文法の体系を
立ててきた先生のノウハウを借りて韓国語と日本語の比較研究に適用した。研究の方法
は限られた昔の記録に依存することではなく、現に誰でも使っている現在の韓国語と日
本語を比較することにした。それは言葉にも遺伝子が伝わっていると信じたからであ
る。このような仮説を立てて始めた韓国語と日本語の比較研究は、予測を越える氷山の
成果をもたらした。同じ意味の範疇に属する固有語(非外来語)を音韻対応を通じて比較
した結果、同語根であると確信できる単語が派生語を含め一万語を越えている。

　2002年、本格的にこの研究を始め、最初からLee Hyun Bok先生のアドバイスや協力を
頂戴しながら成長してきました。この度、先生の古稀記念論文集が出されることを心よ
りお祝い申し上げます。これからも末長い先生のご活躍とご健康をお祈り申し上げま
す。そして、この拙い論文を載せていただくことをとても光栄に思い、関係者の皆様に
心より感謝し、お礼申し上げます。

1. Introduction

In this paper I am going to make some observations concerning the Japanese verbs
ending in -ru. In Korean both verbs and adjectives end in 「-다[-ta]」. In the case of
the Japanese verb ending 「-る」[-ru], some verbs drop the consonant -r-, and some verbs
do not.

One of the rules I found while studying Korean and Japanese languages comparatively
is the one on the dropping of this -r-. The sentence final form of a Japanese verb ends
in -u or -ru. Among them there are quite a few verbs made up of a Korean noun of CVC
structure followed by the ending -u. Especially outstanding are the verbs ending in
sentence final -ru, which drop or do not drop the consonant -r-, as I have found out,
depending on their relationship with the cognate Korean root. Thus if the original
Korean root has the root final -r-, the cognate Japanese verb does not drop the -r-.

Although this is not 100% the case, this correspondence does not seem to be by
chance.

It is not intended in this paper to compare comprehensively Korean and Japanese

phonemes found in the vocabulary given below, so please consult the paper by Kiyoshi Shimizu in this Festschrift for specific sound correspondences. The words given in the examples below, however, are chosen as much as possible, from those which show good consonantal phonemic correspondences.

In section [2-1] of the main part of this paper, those Japanese verbs are gathered together which do not drop the -r- in their conjugation, if the corresponding Korean roots have -r-. In section [2-2] are put together those verbs which have -ru in their sentence final form even if their Korean counterparts have no -r-, but which drop it in other conjugational forms. And in section [2-3] those nouns and adjectives, etc. are presented both of whose Korean and Japanese cognate forms have -r-, although this may deviate a little from the main arguments of this paper. Finally in section [2-4] those cognate forms are compared in which Korean -r- is weakened and appears as an approximant w or y in Japanese.

Below the exemplified words in orthographic forms are accompanied by their phonemic transcription, and if the pronunciation differs from it this will be shown in brackets [ ] phonetically (Romanization of Japanese follows the KuNrei-shiki). The meaning is given only if it differs between Korean and Japanese cognate words.

2. The main arguments

2-1. Words in which both Korean and Japanese roots have -r-

If a Japanese five-step conjugation verb ends in -ru, the -r- in it does not drop when it is conjugated. This seems to have to do with the Korean original. For many of the Korean nouns of the C^1VC^2 structure, cognate with the verbs which do not drop the -r-, also has -r- as C^2. The sentence final form of a five-step conjugation verb is made simply by attaching -u to it. Another case is the original Korean verb with -r- as C^2, which also appears in the cognate Japanese verb as -r-. Thus it has become clear that, when a Korean word root contains -r-, this -r- does not drop in the cognate Japanese word either. In the examples below those words are compared which have -r- both in Korean and Japanese. In some cases, such as 「怒り i-kar-i、怒る o-kor-u」, a Korean noun root appears both as a noun and a verb in Japanese. Furthermore a Korean noun is frequently formed from a verb root with the suffix -i just as in Japanese. In some examples given below, such as 「別れる wa-kar-er-u」、「怒り i-kar-i」、「踊り o-dor-i」、「守る ma-mor-u」 the initial sound does not coincide with that of the

Korean cognates. This can be interpreted that the Japanese forms have some prefixed elements.

The modern Korean word corresponding to Japanese 「水mizu」 is 「물mur」, which ends with the C² -r. But it is known that in 『三国史記Samguk Sagi』「地理誌 Chiriji」 edited in the Koryo Era the word 'water' appearing in place names of Koguryo is written by Chinese characters such as 「買me、米mi」 etc. and in the Unified Shilla by 「勿mur」. This may lead to a conjecture that there were slight differences between the northern Koguryo and southern Shilla language. But it is also a fact that in Modern Korean the 「mi」 form remains in such words as 「미더덕, 미꾸라지, 미나리」 to express the vocabulary which has to do with water.

「미더덕mi-tɔtɔk」 is 「柄海鞘えぼや 'water-'」 and its naming can be regarded as based on the word 「더덕tɔtɔk, 釣鐘人参、ととき totoki」 for the plant 'Codonopsis lanceolata' which is found in the mountains. It should mean something like ' Sea-Codonopsis lanceolata'. In the cases of 「미꾸라지mi-kʔuraci, どじょう 'a loach, mudfish'」 and 「미나리mi-nari, せり 'a Japanese parsley'」, too, the initial 「mi-」 should be the word to express 'water'.

In view of the fact that present-day Korean word stems are in general made up of roots from the Unified Shilla era, the differences between the languages in the north and in the south can be seen as those between dialects. In addition it can be presumed that the word 「みず mizu」 was made earlier than the word 「漏る mor-u, 'to leak out'」. It should be after the word 'water' changed its form from 「買me、米mi」 to 「勿mur」 in Korean that the Japanese word 「漏る mor-u」 came in. In the case of Korean, too, word final -r can be traced back to -t.

Thus by comparing Korean and Japanese in detail, I think the relative chronology of Japanese words can be reconstructed. The paper we read in an academic conference in Korea last year concerns the labial correspondences and changes $m-p(b)-h$, through which we tried to reconstruct the relative and absolute chronology of Japanese words[2]. I think it is also possible to reconstruct the relative chronology of Japanese words making use of the consonant -r, which is discussed in this paper.

In Korean the words which have to do with the nature of water such as 'fragile, thin, transparent' are derived from the 'water' root, whereas in the case of Japanese the range of meaning has now widely spread out from the word 「漏る mor-u」, which originally meant 'for water to leak out', to 'for light, gas, secret, the true

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2 清水紀佳/朴明美 「比較言語学における相対および絶対年代再建への序説 (Prolegomena to reconstructing relative and absolute chronology in comparative Korean)」。第22回ハンマル研究学会国際学術大会。2005.7.韓国、春川

intention, etc. to leak out'. Even the word 「もろみ mor-o-mi 'unrefined wine'」, which is produced in the process of making rice wine, seems to have been derived from it based on the nature of water.

例

갈리다 <글 kʌr-	別れる wa-<u>kar</u>-eru
칼<갈 kar 刃物類	刈る kar-u 베다, 자르다
고르다 kor- 選ぶ	凝る kor-u 고집하다
골(내다) kor 怒り	怒り i-<u>kar</u>-i, 怒る o-<u>kor</u>-u
구르다, 굴리다 kur-	転ぶ <u>kor</u>-o-bu.
굴 kur 穴、トンネル	刳る kur-u 파다
궁글다 kuŋ gɯr-	潜る kugur-u
끄무레하다 kʔɯmur-	曇る kumor-u
cf. 구룸 kuruɯm 雲, 그림자 kɯrimca 陰	cf. 黒 kuro
나란-하다 nar-a-	並ぶ <u>nar</u>-a-b-u
다다르다 tatarɯ-	到る i-<u>tar</u>-u
다물다 tamur-	黙る damar-u
(자금이)달리다 tar-	足る tar-u
덜다 tɔr- 減らす	取る tor-u
털다 thɔr- 取り払う	取る tor-u
돌다 tor- 回る	踊る o-<u>dor</u>-u춤추다、踊り o-<u>dor</u>-i 춤
뒤끓다<끓다 tui-sgɯr-	滾る tagir-u
들다 tɯr-上げる、つり下がる	吊る tur-u
말다 mar- 丸める	丸 mar-u、毬, 鞠 まり mar-i
말(古.똥, 오줌) mʌr 排泄物	放る mar-u(古.누다),
	cf. おまる o-<u>mar</u>-u 오강.
	尿 yu-<u>mar</u>-i、yu-<u>bar</u>-i 오줌
	尿 i-<u>bar</u>-i、<u>bar</u>-i 오줌
몰다 mor- (動物を)追立てる	守る ma(目)-<u>mor</u>-u 돌보다, 지키다
(乗り物を)運転する	古: 守る mor-u
cf. 소몰이 so(牛)-mor-i	守り mor-i 子守. 燈台守り
무르다 mur-ɯ-	a.蒸れる mur-eru(푹 익어서) 물러짐
	b.熟れる 'ur-eru (語頭子音脱落)
	(과일 등이) 익다
	c.蒸らす mur-as-u 찌다
cf. 몰랑-하다 mor-	d.脆い mor-o-i 무르다

물 mur 水   漏る mor-u 물이 새다
                         cf. 漏れる、漏らす、

바다<바룰 pada <parʌr. 海   航る, 渡る watar-u 건너다
바르다 par-ɯ-   貼る har-u
빨다<쏠다 sbʌr-   a. しゃぶる siabur-u
                        b. 啜る susur-u 후루룩 마시다

벌리다<불다 pʌr-   開く hir-a-k-u
(세도를)부리다 pur-i-   揮う hur-u-h-u.
뿌리다 pʔur-i-   降る hur-u
불 pur 火   炙る a-bur-u 살짝 굽다
빛깔 pic-ggar[pikʔar]光、色   光る hikar-u 빛나다
사라지다<술다 sar-   去る sar-u
쓿다(精米하는것)sɯr-   精げる sir-ag-eru
씨부리다 sibur-   喋る siaber-u 말하다
                        cf. おしゃべり o-siaber-i 수다쟁이

아슬아슬하다 asɯr-   恐る、恐ろしい osor-
알다<술- sʌr-   知る sir-u
cf. 슬기롭다 sɯr- 聰い
열다<녈다 jɔr-<njɔr-   実る mi(実)-nor-u
울 or 織目   a. 織る or-u(천을) 짜다
                    b. 織 or-i 짜기, 짠짓

울다 ur- 泣く   潤 ur-u-u 눈물이 고이다
이르다 ir-<닐오다 nir-   a. 古. 宣る, 告る nor-u
                 祈る i-nor-u 기도하다
                 b. 呪う nor-o(h)-u 저주하다
                 cf. 祝り i-nor-i 기도
                    祝女 のろ nor-o 샤먼
                    祝詞 のりと nor-i-to 축사
                    狼煙 のろし nor-os-i 烽火

일 ir 仕事   要る ir-u 필요하다
cf. 일없다 要らない
일다 ir-   煎る ir-u
(바람이나 파도가)일:다 ir-   揺る yur-u 흔들리다   cf. 揺れる
 (風や波などが) 起る
(마음을)졸이다 cor-   焦れる zir-eru
파랗다 phar- 青い   晴る har-u 맑음、晴れる har-eru
팔다<폴다 phʌr-   売る 'ur-u(첫자음 탈락、語頭子音脱落)

힐다 hɔr-	a.すり減る(suri)-her-u
	b.古い hur-u-i cf.滅ぶ
홀리다 hor-	惚る hor-u, 惚れる hor-eru
흙 huɯr-k- 土	抓る, 彫る hor-u 파다

2-2. Those verbs which have -ru in their sentence final form, but which drop it in other conjugational forms

Both upper and lower one-step conjugation verbs drop the

-r- included in their sentence final form 「-る -ru」 in their other conjugational forms. If we compare it with Korean, an interesting fact becomes apparent. Thus when the cognate Korean root has no -r- and only Japanese form has it, this -r- drops in the other conjugational forms other than the sentence final form. So if one sees through examples 2-1 and 2-2, one cannot think it purely accidental.

例

가다 ka- 行く	離る ka-ru.
	來る ku-ru(熊本方言「行く」) 오다
깨다 kai-[kʔɛ-] 目が覚める	起きる o-ki-ru 일어나다
깨다<째다 sgai-[skɛ-] 割る	裂ける sake-ru 터지다
고개 kogai[kogɛ]	越える koe-ru(고개를) 넘다
깃, 깁 kis, gib 生地	着る ki-ru(입다) cf.生地 kiz-i
낚다<났다 nag- 釣る	投げる nag-e-ru
닫다 tat-	閉てる tat-e-ru
담다 tam-	溜める tame-ru
대다 tai-[tɛ-]	当てる a-te-ru. 古.あつ a-tu
(불을)댕기다 taiŋ-gi-	付ける tu-ke-ru
떨다<뻘다 pdɔr-	震える hur-u-e-ru
돋다 tod-	(芽,日が)出る de-ru 古：出ず i-du.
	立てる、建てる、起てる tate-ru.
cf. 해돋이<히돋디 hitodi	日立 hitati
=마냥 manjaŋ -のように	真似る mane-ru 모방하다
	cf.真似 man-e 모방, 흉내
	学ぶ man-eb-u 모방해 배우다
먹다 mɔk- 食べる	儲ける mooke-ru 득보다
	(古：儲く mauk-u)
	cf. 賄う mak-a-na-u 식사 제공

메우다 mɔi-u-[me-]　　　　　cf. 食む ha-m-u,蝕むmusi-ba-m-u 좀먹다
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　埋める u-me-ru

목 mog cf.손목, 발목　　　　曲げる mage-ru(古; 曲ぐmag-u) 굽다

무리 mur-i 群れ　　　　　　　群れる mure-ru 무리를 짓다

바꿔다 pak?-　　　　　　　　化ける bake-ru
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　cf. 御化け o-bak-e 도깨비

벗기다 pɔs-gi- [pok?i-]　　剝ぐ hag-u, hage-ru

cf. 벗다 pɔs-　　　　　　　　外す haz-us-u

숙이다 sug-　　　　　　　　　下げる sage-ru

스미다 sɯm-　　　　　　　　染める some-ru 물을 들이다
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　滲みる simi-ru
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　cf.染まるsoma-ru 물이 들다, 滲み simi.얼룩

익다<닉- nig-　　　　　　　　煮える nie-ru<*nig-er-u、煮る ni-ru

입김 ib-kim[ik?im]　　　　　生きる iki-ru 살다
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　cf. 息む i-ki-m-u 힘주다

잠매다 cam-　　　　　　　　　締める sime-ru

잡숫다<닶- tab- 召し上がる　食べる tabe-ru 古. 食ぶ tab-u

죽다 cug- 死ぬ　　　　　　　過ぎる sugi-ru 지나다

지다<디다 ci-<ti-　　　　　　落ちる o-ti-ru

해<히 hai[hɛ]<hi 日、太陽　干る hi-ru (햇볕에)마르다

2-3. Korean and Japanese nouns and adjectives, etc. with -r-

Compared here are those words both of whose Korean and Japanese cognate forms have
medial and final -r-, although this may deviate quite a little from the main arguments
of this paper.

例

(색)갈, (빛)깔 -kar　　　　　柄 -kara, -gara

고을 ko-ɯr　　　　　　　　　郡 こおり koori

cf. 골 kor<곳kos　　　　　　　-くり、-こし、-ぐち(山口)、山古志村、

괴롭다 koir-w-[kwer-]　苦しい kuru-si-i

납 nab</乃勿 namɯr　　　　鉛 namari

노루 noru　　　　　　　　　　獐 のろ noro

느릅-나무 nɯrɯ-b-　　　　　楡 にれ nire

느리다 nɯr-　　　　　　　　　鈍い nor-o-i

cf. 느릿느릿 nɯr-　　　　　　のろのろ noro-noro

느림보 nɯri-m-bo	鈍間 のろま noro-ma
닭<둙 targ 鷄	鳥 tori
더럽다 tɔrɔ- 汚い	泥 doro 진흙、더러움
탈 thar	面 つら tura
돌 tor 石	鳥居 tor-i-wi.
cf. 늙	cf. 鴫居、吸居、本居
두루미 turu-mi	鶴 turu cf. 鶴見 tur-u-mi(地名)
두릅 turɯb	楤 tara
마을, 말mar<ᄆ술 mʌ-zʌr 村 mura	
말다 mar-	まる mar-u
cf. 좁아지고 말았다 狭まった seb-a-mat-ta.	
무리 muri	牌 mure
바늘<바룰 parʌr 針 はり hari	
벌<볼 pʌr	原 はら hara、-わら -wara、
	-(ん)ばら (-N)para、-ばら -bara、
	cf. 九州、神靵: はる haru、-ばる -baru.(地名、人名)
(바퀴)벌레 -bɔrrɔi[bɔr-re]	ごきぶり (goki)-buri
부르르(떨다) purɯrɯ	ぶるぶるburu-buru(振える)
(새)부리 buri	唇 kuti-biru(입술)
새롭다 sai[sɛ]-ro-	新、更さら sara
cf.새로이 새롭게	さらに
소름 sorɯm 鳥肌	恐れ o-sore 공포
어리석다 ɔr- cf.얼간이, 어리다	愚か or-o-ka
(돼지)울 ur, 우리 uri	檻 <をり ori<wori
자갈 cagar	沙利 じゃり jar-i, ざり zar-i、
절<뎔 cɔr<tjɔr	寺 ter-a
젓갈 cɔs-kar	塩辛 sio-kar-a
(눈)초리 -cori	(目)尻(me-)ziri、尻 siri 엉덩이
	後ろ u-siro 뒤

2-4. Words in which Korean -r- is weakened and appears as an approximant w or y in Japanese.

Whereas the first root consonants correspond regularly, the second consonants often undergo sound changes. This is considered to be due to such phenomena as assimilation, palatalization, nasalization or de-nasalization of a labial consonant. Sometimes the deletion

of the second or the third consonant occurs. Looking at the pairs of Korean and Japanese vocabulary, the weakening of a consonant appears in the order of 「t>c>s>r>y,w>vowel」 in many cases. Given below are those examples from among them, in which the −r− as discussed in this paper changes to w or y by weakening.

例

가람 karam	川, 河 kawa
가렵다 kar-i-	痒い kayu-i
걸다 kɔr-	肥える ko(y)e-ru 古. こゆ koyu
기르다 kir-ɯ-	飼う kawu
나릿-하다 naris-	萎える na(y)e-ru 古. なゆ nayu
바람 par-am 風	南風 ha(y)-e, 疾風 haya-te
빠르다<쌔르다 sbar-	早い haya-i
부르다 purɯ-	吠える ho(y)e-ru 古. ほゆ hoyu
불 pur	小火 ぼや boya
비름 pir-ɯm	莧 hiyu
살 sar	沢 sawa
야릇하다 iar-[jar-]	怪しい aya-si-i
야리다 iar-i-[jar-]	柔い yawa-i
어르다 ɔrɯ-	あやす aya-su
어질다<어딜다 ɔdir-	穏やか odaya-ka
얽다 ɔr-g-	結わく yuwa-ku
여리다 iɔr-i-[jɔr-]	弱い yowa-i
엷다 iɔr[jɔr-]-b-	淡い awa-i
주름 curɯm	皺 siwa
질기다<딜기다 tir-	強い tuyo-i
파리 phari	蠅 ha(y)e
피리 phiri	笛 hu(y)e

3. Conclusions

In the above discussion about the Japanese verb ending 「-る[-ru]」 we have made an attempt to find out how it is related to Korean. It has now become known, not only that Korean and Japanese grammars are very similar, but also that a large number of word

roots of the indigenous vocabulary are the same, too. About 1500 words from among them have been compared and published with the title "You are a Korean" in 2004 in Seoul, Korea. After that separate papers were planned to be written on parts of its contents. A deeper understanding has been achieved, I hope, by the attempt in this paper to compare the two patterns of $-r-$ appearing in the sentence final conjugational form of the Japanese verbs with Korean, namely the case in which the $-r-$ drops with the case in which it does not drop.

Thus in [2-1] in the main arguments we have made it clear that if there is $-r-$ in the Korean root form, the Japanese counterparts do not drop the $-r-$ either in many cases. In [2-2] it has been shown that if a Japanese sentence final verb form has $-r-$ and the cognate Korean form has no $-r-$, this drops in other conjugational forms. In [2-4] it has become known that the r in a C^2 position of C^1VC^2- sequence undergoes a sound change to the approximant w or y by the phenomenon of weakening.

But, as a future research theme, the words which differ in the dropping of r have to be studied in the framework of more widely used vocabulary, too. Finally I would like to add that I will also continue to study hard from now on, so that I shall be able to present the solutions to the problems concerning these words one by one linguistically in a form that everybody will understand.

Asian society national traditions in the past and present time

(Traditions of the Kyrgyz nation serve an example)

Kyrgyz people - the nation of the Kyrgyz Republic, like all the nations in the world have their own material and spiritual culture and their own customs and traditions. (see.: Abramzon S.M " Kyrgyz people and their historic- cultural ties" Frunze., 1990 p.411-413)

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Kyrgyzstan is one of the Central Asian countries. It is located in the center of Central Asia. It borders with such countries as Tajikistan, China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It's a mountainous country (90% is occupied by mountains). Territory-198.5 square km, population-about 5 million, more than 80 ethnicities, the main part of them make up Kyrgyz people (64%), Uzbek (14%), Russian (13%) and others., national title- Kyrgyz. Kyrgyz people are among the first settlers in Central Asia. By their ethnic name and genetic origin, Kyrgyz people are part of Turkic nations, one of the Turkic nations. Kyrgyz people like all other nations of the world, lived in tribes. Approximately in the 16th century the nationalization process came to an end in the territory of the present Kyrgyzstan. During the Soviet Government (1917-1991), there were dramatic changes: illiteracy was eliminated, production, agriculture, science and culture was developed. In 1991 it gained its Independence and became a sovereign state. At present it's building a democratic, civil society.

The term "tradition" may be defined differently in literature. The most wide-spread definition of this term is (comes from the Latin word *traditio* which means "to hand down" or "to hand over.") the elements of social and cultural heritage, passed from generation to generation and kept in certain societies and social groups during the long period of time. Tradition covers social heritage (material and spiritual values); and the process of social inheritance; and its ways. Various social codes, norms of behavior, values, ideas, customs, and ceremonies may stand out to be as traditions descended from generations. (Philosophy encyclopedia M.1983, p 692)

Kyrgyz people lived by nomadic way of life till the middle of the 19th century. (see

Semenov-Thyan-Shansky. "Travel to Thyan-Shan in 1856-57" M., 1946 p.172, 178; Valihanov Collected works. V.1 p. 327). The process of tradition, custom and rite formation of the Kyrgyz nation took place in close interrelation with Turki-Mongol ethno-cultural environment and had passed through the complex historical development. In search of beautiful and picturesque pastures and water sources Kyrgyz people together with their families changed one pasture for another, where they could stay and made new ties (trade, family) with both related tribes and strangers as well.

There was an exchange with the information, cultural values, skills, mutual enriching of the culture. At each stage of development there were essential changes. The whole culture, way of life and universe perception of people constantly renewed and perfected with every passing day.

At the same time it is important to note that the most valuable and rational aspects of life of our ancestry was saved because of the strong family, ancestral and tribal ties.

The process of turning to the settled way of life started in the south part of Kyrgyzstan which was the result of close relations with the Uzbek and Tajik nations who already kept settled way of life. In the north part of Kyrgyzstan settlements appeared only at the end of the 19th century when they become the part of Russia and due to the influence of the Russian resettles (see Abramzon "Kyrgyz people and their historical-cultural ties" Frunze 1990. p. 126).   After the October Revolution (1917) the process of turning to the settled way of life strengthened and resulted in collectivization in 1930[th.]

It should be mentioned that the spiritual life of Kyrgyz people like all post-Soviet nations was held in capture of communist ideology and political codes without taking into consideration the variety of national peculiarities and traditions.

In the Soviet Union, a great attention was paid to the keeping and developing of revolutionary, labour, patriotic traditions, which ensured the internationalization process in all spheres of life of different nations. Thus, for instance, during the Soviet period in all 15 Soviet Republics the New Year was celebrated (according to the Gregorian calendar), Soviet Army day – 23 February (1918), and 8 March was celebrated as International Women's Day, 1 May as International labour Day, 9 May- as the Victory Day, 7 November –Great October Revolution (1917).

Keeping to the above mentioned traditions during more than 70 years had brought to the formation of the international society, in other words -"soviet nation". International, collective society was much more valued rather then individual or national. Ethnic features of people were out of sight, were taken as of minor importance. In fact, this had resulted in the decrease or loss of moral impact of national traditions, customs and moreover had brought to the break of the historical ties with the ancestors.

As a result of the Soviet policy many nationalities, especially those nations who were named as 15 soviet republics lost or were about to loose their own national traditions. Moreover, national traditions of some nations, Diasporas were considered as reactionary; obsolete (remains of the patriarchal- feudal relations).

Actually, the fact that Russia is considered as "the prison of nations", where the national cultures, traditions were destroyed, and where the pressure of society and violent assimilation prevailed, predominates in literature (Nahaylo B., Swaboda V. Soviet Disunion. A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR/> London, 1990. p. 14;

According to the data of scientific research works also empirical observations, during about 70 years in all 15 Soviet republics including Kyrgyzstan there was held purposeful policy of russification. Such policy has impact of two kinds. On the one hand, there were some positive sides, in particular learning of Russian culture, also through which it was possible to get acquainted with the European civilization, preparation of highly efficient national specialists. But on the other hand, negative consequences had come out of the russification policy. These were reflected in the denationalization of ethnic peculiarities of small nations, who didn't pass the industrial phase of the social development.

Finally, the russification policy had brought to the loss of national self-consciousness, national identity, and some of the national traditions. For instance, in the times of the soviet reign clothes, meals, household utensils of all the nations lived in Kyrgyzstan were identical, uniform, and all people talked the so-called international language -Russian. National values and traditions were considered as obsolete, reactionary. Representatives of the national intelligentsia who tried to revive traditions of their own nation were taken as nationalists and representatives of the reactionary movement, i.e. taking care only about their own nation.

Interest in the spiritual values, customs and traditions of the nation of Kyrgyzstan

awakens only after gaining the sovereignty in 1991 and since the day of building civil society and the government, also with the rise of self-consciousness of the nation.

The introduction of the democratic values in all the spheres of the society life helped to renew and give life to the original Kyrgyz national traditions. There have come to life such Kyrgyz national traditions which reflect the whole period of life of the Kyrgyz people (birth, marriage, funeral rituals)

In the life f the Kyrgyz nation like all other Asian community, family traditions take special place. These traditions built centuries, reflect the wisdom and way of life of our generations. Patriarchal system which prevails in the Kyrgyz family greatly influences the relationship between parents and children, and also conjugal. Nowadays, as before, in the majority of Kyrgyz families man is the head of the family, and father is an example for children rather than mother. At the same time one can observe that relations between conjugal are based on the principles of respect and understanding, relationship between parents and children is based on the democratic principles.

Notwithstanding to the fact that there was an inequality of rights of women and men, Kyrgyz women showed excellence in everything, and independence in keeping household and even outside her household. -Compared with the women of the settled nations in Asia, Kyrgyz as well as Kazakh women took better positions in the families.

She was not treated as slave, she didn't have to hide her face, and she had the right to be in men's society (if there were not persons whom she had to avoid according to the tradition). Researchers every time prove the fact that Kyrgyz woman is an excellent rider, very industrious, skillful and essentially hospitable. In the history of the Kyrgyz nation there were cases when women took an active part in social life. Vivid example for this is Kurmanjan datka-queen of Alai. - Nowadays, when Kyrgyzstan is building democratic country and the civil society, Kyrgyz women show social activity as never before.

Profound respect of the younger generation towards older, especially towards parents, readiness to lend a helping hand to each other, to support each other at difficult periods of life and again hospitality are a small list of distinguishing features of Kyrgyz nation. Many family traditions are based on religious and some magic rites. Thus, for instance, on the occasion of child birth, one of the outstanding and happy events, relatives give presents

for the person (herald) who brings such joyful news "sujunchu". After forty days parents arrange a special holiday " jentek toi", and treat their guests with the delicious meals "jentek" which consists of oat flour and butter. A first step of a baby is also a great occasion where all the relatives and neighbors are invited. Feet of a baby are tied together by white and black sheep threads, all guests stay at a certain distance from a baby. At the command guests start running, so who reaches the baby fist and cuts the threads, wins the main prize. This custom is called "tushoo-kesuu"

At present, in general, Kyrgyz people follow all these and other traditions.

The custom of name giving in the Kyrgyz family was and is still very important. In ancient times a child was named by "moldo" a person who considered as educated or "muedzin" ("azanchy"-a person who reads aloud a prayer "azan"). Nowadays, naming of a baby is much simpler: a baby is usually named by the mutual consent of family members within the family. Kyrgyz names usually reflect the fortune of a man.

But it should be mentioned that both in the traditions of Asian community and Kyrgyz traditions as well gender assimilation can be traced. This can be vividly observed in names of boys and girls. Parent naming their children, to some degree, determine their future: for girls they wish family happiness. As for boys parents wish them to be the head of the family, and to achieve spectacular results in his career.

After 40 days since the birth of the child parents put him/her into the cradle, but before they wash him/her with warm water (40 spoons of water of course!) cut his/her hair, prepare 40 scones and present them to children. To protect children from evil eyes people use amulets ("tumar"). All these traditions presently are of just symbolic character.

Among Muslim traditions very important role plays circumcision of the boys at the age of 3-7. This ceremony ("kol adaltatuu", "sunnet"), especially of wealthy people is usually accompanied by national games such as "kurosh", "at-chabyh" and many other games.

Kyrgyz traditions concerning marriage and family relations raise great interest. It was wide-spread phenomenon when parents expecting child birth already proposed their child to somebody as a wife or husband ("belkuda"); engagement of young (often who are still in the cradle) ("beshic-kuda"). Also there were such traditions when woman-widow should

marry one of the brothers of her dead husband; or widower should marry the sister of his wife. This tradition helped to keep the family hearth. Moreover, this tradition taught people to be stronger, even in case of the loss of the close person and only relatives can help to cope with the difficulties.

Also there were such traditions – exchange marriage, in other words "kaichy kuda"; abduction ("kyz ala kachuu"). In ancient times people resort to this tradition only in cases when parents were against marriage of the young. As a rule this was done by the consent of the bride. This tradition still takes place but is considered as discrimination on the ground of sex. All the above described traditions concerning marriage existed before (some of them still exists) not only among Kyrgyz nation but also among other nations of Asia.

Today engagement before the birth of children did not exist and as for the cases when widower has to marry his wife's sister are very seldom. Parents of modern time are more democratic and arrange wedding ceremonies taking into account both modern and religious aspects. But the religious features went through changes and new aspects are introduced.

In fact, wedding ceremony consists of three stages: before wedding (choosing and engagement), wedding ceremony and after wedding ceremony. Wedding games, presenting of "kalym", bride's gifts, exchange with clothes, presents between new relatives and many other rituals were kept strictly before and today they revive a little bit changed.

Almost all funeral rituals of Kyrgyz people had experienced great impact of pre-Islamic or Islamic traditions. These rituals are followed by brining into sacrifice of horses, cows. The most important and essential part of this ritual consists in the respectful attitude towards the dead. Relatives and friends of the dead should come on the day of his/her funeral and put handful of soil into his grave. Mourning continued about a year.

Calendar traditions and customs of Kyrgyz people endowed the elements of different epochs. Gradually permitted traditional holidays during the Soviet periods have come to our life after Kyrgyzstan's gaining sovereignty (1991). Kyrgyz nation, first of all, gained the opportunity to celebrate the New Year "Nooruz" ("Nooruz" means "New day") –21 March – on the day of autumnal equinox.

After a long winter days, people invite summer with pleasure. On this festive day "Nooruz" every family, communities prepare "sumolok" made of wheat and other things. Also there arranged various national sport games. After receiving Islam as the main religion many pre-Islamic customs and rituals experienced great changes and some of them were rooted out and changed by Islamic traditional rituals and customs. These are five commandments, absolution, fast during the period of "ramazan", "orozo-ait", and holiday of bringing sacrifice- "kurman-ait".

According to the results of social research works, held by Assembly of nations of Kyrgyzstan (2006) it was revealed that the majority of Kyrgyz people try to keep to traditions and customs (59,5%); 28,1% always keep to the traditions, and 12,4% keep to customs and traditions depending on the circumstances. The representatives of the European nation who keep to the national traditions and customs are quite a few, only about 8,3% of Russian and 6,7% Jews always follow national traditions.

One of the predominant reason which prevents from keeping to the national traditions and customs (48,6% of questioned) is the lack of knowledge, skills and ability to build their life taking as the basis these customs and traditions. There was also mentioned economic contraction (29,5%). In fact, arranging of some activities requires financial means. It was found out that superfluous expenses spent when arranging some activities has become the main reason of poverty in Kyrgyzstan. It is interesting to note that the nation is well aware of this fact, but they are afraid of the public opinion, of being blamed by their relatives, friends.

It is proved in practice of the history, that every generation when following this or that traditions choose not only their future but also positive features of the ancestry. Thus, traditions are deeply rooted in our life in the new historical conditions. In other words if we destroy our traditions and won't replace them with the new once we can break all the ties of the society, in general we can destroy the whole nation.

MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAM AND THE WEST

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The historical conditions on which the western-style democracy and its derivatives like human rights and freedom of expression had developed on different paths in the Islamic and Western worlds. While these concepts emerged to some extent on natural grounds in the West, they could not turn further than being just a travesty of their origins in the Muslim countries. The inventors often deride these grotesque and absurd misrepresentations of democracy, human rights, and freedoms in other countries. Moreover, they do not stop at their derision but go further to "test" the understanding of freedoms in countries that had been trying to imitate the West. The recent cartoon case is the latest example of these kinds of tests.

In this article, the mutual and mostly hostile perceptions of the West and the Islamic world shall be explored in the light of historical facts and a conclusion will be drawn on the latest events. For variety of reasons, ignorance is perhaps one of the most important; the West has feared Islam since its emergence and especially since the time of the Crusaders. Overall, the so-called "Muhammad cartoons affair" also started with such a fear as the Danish newspaper *Politiken* ran an article entitled *"Dyb angst for kritik af islam"* ("Profound fear of criticism of Islam", September 17, 2005). I definitely think that the contemporary negative image of Islam and Muslims held by Western people dates back to the earlier representations of the Muslim peoples. If one has ever seen an old map of the world, one will surely remember some ridiculous monster drawings on others' --rather, 'unknown'-- lands (see R. Kabbani 1986). Of course, one cannot be sure of the mapmaker's real intention in putting monsters on foreign lands, but such a negative attitude clearly shows the kind of hostile feelings held toward people whom one does not know. Most importantly, the Western attitude towards the people who live today in these unknown lands remains unchanged. Anthropology, a modern science which tries to overcome such feelings, I feel, is not successful in improving these attitudes, since the dominating and colonialist disposition of the anthropologist toward his or her field subjects has enhanced the hostility between two culturally different worlds: the anthropologist's modern and technologically advanced world and the field subject's culture of a Third World

country. Nevertheless, if and when anthropologists have adopted a relativist attitude toward other people's cultures; in other words, when they consider all the cultures of the world population to be valid and coherent in themselves, the condescending attitude of Westerners towards others would begin to change.

Furthermore, the West should also stop promoting its values in other parts of the world. Since telling others how to live is a dangerous and risky game, it could easily be manipulated and turn against oneself. Anthropologists know this issue very well; teaching a tribe how to make an axe where only the chief has the legitimate right to carry one would become a dangerous weapon in the hands of others. Or else, if the West is trying to create an enemy for its own sake of the self-declared thesis of "clash of civilizations" then they are on the right path.

The Western understanding of history as linear developments of events following one another has led them to concur that the humanity has reached the end of history. The public proclamation of the victory of Western-style democracy, however, was not welcomed in many parts of the world especially by the peoples who had been struggling against the Western colonialism, occupation, and domination. How could they accept that democracy and the freedoms it brings are good when they have always worked against them and when the "bombshells of democracy" were raining on them? The argument of the "end of history" meant nothing but further domination of the West for the people who have been suffering a humiliation in the last three centuries. Little by little, they have become used to these concepts but the result was totally unexpected by the Western powers as the colonised and dominated have started to demand their rights in a language that they learned after a painful experience of living in the West. The "burning of Paris by the children of the Maghreb" was not any "clash of civilisations" nor caused by the problems of integration into the secular French society nor unemployment or marginalization in that society as many have perceived it but it was a demand of rights that had been denied for centuries.

The encounter of Europe with Islam dates back to the old times as the armies of Tariq bin Ziyad reached at the Spanish shores in 711. Despite the fact that the Andalusian Umayyads had reigned the most of Spain and some parts Portugal for some 800 years the subject of Muslim presence in Europe today has been considered mostly as problematic or suspicious at best. Islam is the fastest growing religion in Europe today; even according to some resources, it is the second largest religion in terms of its followers in Europe. If one considers all the Christian denominations, this would be a very assertive charge; since the number of Muslims is only 13 million among the one-billion Europeans.

The European mind has developed a hostile attitude towards Islam for various reasons. Among the sources of this negative image lies the fact that Christianity has seen Islam as a rival, in other words, there has been a competition between Christianity and Islam since the birth of this new religion. The rapid expansion of Islam especially in its formation years and the positive impressions of the returning Christian soldiers from the Crusades on Islam and its civilization have caused the Christian Church to scare from that religion. As both religions had been giving a universal message the Church hierarchy would start a campaign of defaming Islam and its prophet in order to resist the unavoidable expansion of Islam. Under the influence of such campaigns, both parties have developed a prejudiced attitude towards each other throughout the centuries and have entered into a process of mutual misunderstanding and misconception. The physical threat of the Ottoman State and the Andalusian Omayyads to Europe was another source of fear for the Europeans who had encountered Islam in their own lands for the first time. Inasmuch as facing with the wealth and advanced technology of the Muslims at the time they were driven to an inferiority complex and tried to prove the superiority of their religion instead in the ensuing wars in addition to emphasizing the importance of the Greek and Roman civilizations to downplay the Muslim contribution. It is a well-known fact that the Europeans have had racist attitudes towards the blacks, the third world countries, the colonies and the non-Christians in general and Muslims in particular throughout the history. The image of Muslims that had been drawn with the help of the One Thousand and One Nights stories and the "orientalist" approach were quite useful in the conception of Islam as a religious, physical, and militaristic threat.

The foundation of the state of Israel after the Second World War, oil's enormous influence on the world economy, and the gradually increasing the geo-political importance of the Middle East vis-à-vis the Soviet Union have caused some political tensions among the forces that wished to keep the region under their control. In the meantime, the anti-colonial, nationalistic, and religious movements have increased their potential in the Islamic world and as a result, emerged a version of Islam that has been called as "fundamentalist". The groups that have a fundamentalist tendency have attracted the attention of the West more so than other groups that try to establish better relationships with the West in general and Europe in particular. Above all, when these groups have realized such activities as sabotaging the relatively weaker targets as civilians and taking hostages or hijacking airplanes, all have affected the Western mind negatively on the image of Islam. On the other hand, the old struggle between the two superpowers has taken a new dimension after the disestablishment of the Soviet Union and the remaining

superpower has started to create a new other, enemy, and opposition for itself. The idea of crashing civilizations had been one of the most important elements in this process of creation a new other. This new enemy has enjoyed a wide approval due to the already existing mutual prejudice and especially the negative attitude of the West towards Islam.

The media, on the other hand, have contributed to the negative image of Islam especially when they had covered the news on the Muslims and their countries in a condescending manner as portraying them as people prone to violence because of their religion, religious fanatics, backward, and anti-West and Western. The West, in this way, has emphasized its more positive elements and turned a blind eye on the civilizations, especially the civilization of the Muslims that it had been colonizing for a long time. The underlying reason of such an attitude is to reduce the culpability of the ruling elites in the process of colonization of these countries. The negative image has continued in the media as it has in the cinema films and television serials inasmuch as the directors of these films tried to act in an objective way, no film has yet to emerge with a positive Muslim image.

As a result of their tolerance towards the *Ahl al-Kitab* (People of the Book; that is, Christians, Jews, and other religions with revealed scriptures) the Muslim societies have always been pluralistic in the sense that they have been multi-national and multi-religious societies. Yet, the Islamic world had faced a new and unfamiliar situation that it has begun to lag behind the West from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards. Due to colonialism and the immigration of workforce the Muslims, for the first time in their history, had begun to live as minorities in the societies that governed by other religions. Since they were not used to such an experience it was inevitable to emerge some problems for both the hosting community and state, and themselves. In fact, when one looks at the non-Muslims' experiences living in the Muslim lands, for example, the Catholics in the Ottoman State were living, what we can call today, an Ottoman Catholicism. Unfortunately, we do not possess sufficient documents concerning with the experiences of such groups on the discussions about, say, the differences between the Ottoman Catholicism and the Spanish Catholicism.

We must also not forget that when the religions, which are categorized as world religions that have a universal message, have expanded into the lands from their birthplaces must cooperate with the local cultures and gain a new outlook in the process. What is essential in this syncretism process is that the world religion must adapt and conform itself to the new cultural environment. Especially due to the fear of insufficient number of new converts, the authorities of that religion have tried to include, rather than reject, some local elements into their religion perhaps with some little changes. The

differences between the Spanish and Latin American Catholicism could be attributed to the syncretism process.

As a consequence of being experienced in different cultural regions one could talk about many different cultures of Islam from Malaysia to Morocco despite the fact that there is only one Islam in essence. Since the so-called *al-Adilla al-Arbaa* (Four Sources; the Koran, the traditions of the prophet, analogical reasoning, and the consensus of Muslim scholars) defines only the principles and applications of the faith; the Muslims, no matter where they live on the earth are bound with the same belief system. Yet, there are no clear-cut statutes concerning the daily life of Muslims; instead, the local culture or the *Urf* (generally accepted practice, custom, or usage) has been added to the *al-Adilla al-Arbaa* as a fifth source as a flexible caution. Today, the Muslims living in Europe or other non-Muslim countries could educate their own intellectuals, scholars, and elites in order to interpret the prevailing conditions and come up with their own solutions instead of waiting a scholar coming from a Muslim land and tell them what they must do and live according to the conditions of his country. Therefore, the old-age notion of "Islam in Europe" must be rejected and the phenomenon of "Europe and Islam" should be accepted by not only the Muslims living in Europe but especially also by the Muslim authorities that try to regulate the religious life Muslims living in diasporas.

The Muslim response to the cartoon crisis is just another example of this demand. Therefore, the argument of Flemming Rose, the culture editor of *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten*, is misleading as he remarks in an explanatory text accompanied 12 cartoons depicting the Islamic Prophet's face under the headline of "Muhammeds ansigt" (the Face of Muhammad):

Some Muslims reject the modern, secular society. They demand a special position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious feelings. It is incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech, where you must be ready to put up with insults, mockery and ridicule. It is certainly not always attractive and nice to look at, and it does not mean that religious feelings should be made fun of at any price, but that is of minor importance in the present context (September 30, 2005).

It was not easy for Europeans to achieve their "modern and secular" society, especially when one considers the hegemony of the Church in the Middle Ages. It certainly was a painful experience from intellectual perspective[1]. Today the West seems to have

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[1] An extensive quote from Franck (1997: 609, footnote 100) on the Salman Rushdie affair and the law of blasphemy in Britain aptly summarizes this process: "English attitudes toward blasphemy and

forgotten its own past and watches the Muslim demonstrations against the Danish cartoons as if they were an exotic carnival. Alternatively, these events, perhaps, represent for the

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heresy have their roots elsewhere in the West, particularly in ancient Greece, Palestine and Rome. There was not much in any of those societies to distinguish their values from those of contemporary instances of communitarian intolerance. Alcibiades, one of the commanders of the Athenian army, was condemned to death for impiety, in 415 B.c., while fighting Sparta. Aristotle was convicted of the same offense a century later. According to the Old Testament, a person 'who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death; all the congregation shall stone him'. If liberal democratic autonomy and conscientious liberty are peculiarly Western blossoms, they surely were not planted by our mother Athens or father Jerusalem. Toleration was not a sentiment familiar anywhere in Europe before the sixteenth century, certainly not to the Roman Catholic hierarchy or to the Christian monarchies of Europe. By unrelenting persecution, the Church attained and long kept its catholicity. Its monopoly as the only recognized and established religion was built on murder as well as on the exclusivity of its control of salvation. Punishment for heresy and blasphemy was seen by both church and state as therapeutic. The more severe such punishment, the better, because toleration of conscientious dissent endangers the unity of society" and "failure to punish the blasphemer might lead to public disturbances. Flogging and stoning became the lesser penalties for conscientious dissent in the Judeo-Christian tradition, with death the more common remedy. Heresy, the charge leveled against obdurate objectors to the Christian creed formulated by the Council of Nicea in A.D. 325 and to the Trinitarian theology confirmed by the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451, largely replaced blasphemy as the charge brought against conscientious dissent. The tolerance of the Eastern church was no greater than that of Rome. In the Orthodox Christian church's Byzantian realm, Emperor Justinian's Code in 529 made provision for putting blasphemers to death, since failure to do so tended to cause famine, earthquake and pestilence. This repression of dissent was endorsed by Charlemagne and his successors upon the founding of the Holy Roman Empire in A.D. 800. Augustine advocated death for heretics, but was careful to insist that the state, and not the church, be the one to carry it out. While this kept the ecclesiastical hand technically unbloodied, it linked it firmly to that of the temporal power, assuring that for at least 1200 years such views as those advanced by Roger Williams and Thomas Jefferson would be expressed openly only on pain of burning, hanging, ripping out of tongues, gouging out of eyes, cutting off of ears or lips or various creative combinations of these typically "Western" answers to the free thinkers' provocations. According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, heretics 'by right . . . can be put to death and despoiled of their possessions by the secular [authorities], even if they do not corrupt others, for they are blasphemers against God, because they observe a false faith. Thus they can be justly punished more than those accused of high treason'. The Reformation in Europe did little to introduce greater tolerance. Calvin, in the sixteenth century, burned dissidents in Geneva, and Luther called for the burning of synagogues and for cutting out the tongues of Jewish blasphemers".

Westerners a return to the Middle Ages. On the other hand, the Muslims have not had the experience of living in a Christian country as a minority until recently. The intellectual encounter between the Europeans and Muslims is again a new phenomenon (Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798) except some Muslim authors' polemical works defending Islam against the attacks of the Church throughout the history. Yet, all the recent encounters took place when the majority of the Islamic countries were either occupied or colonised by the European powers. So, under the feeling of humiliation the Muslims tried to reject almost anything European on the grounds that they were against the basic principles of Islam. For instance, secularism has been associated with 'temporalism' as in one of the works of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, *al-Radd ala al-Dahriyyin* (The Refutation of the Materialists[2]). In his attack on the positivist ideologies of Europe at that time, he consciously used the term *dahr* (time); by doing so he had classified them with the unbelievers who contend that the course of time is all that governs their existence. They were so called because of a reference to them in the Qur'an, in which they are repudiated for saying, "There is no other than our present life; we die and we live and nothing but the course of time destroys us" (45/al-Jathiya: 24). The association of secularism with unbelief later on even led, among intellectual circles, to the use of the term *ladini* (areligious, non-religious). This wrong choice of the term also caused further detachment of the Muslims from the West. Despite this unfortunate terminology, Islam is perhaps the closest religion to the modern ideologies, as Ernest Gellner evaluates the form of "high Islam" by admitting that it "is endowed with a number of features --unitarianism, a rule-ethic, individualism, scripturalism, puritanism, an egalitarian aversion to mediation and hierarchy, a fairly small load of magic-- that are congruent, presumably, with requirements of modernity or modernisation" (quoted in Huntington 1993: 19). Yet, the imposition of the culture of the Western powers in the ninetieth century did create fear and doubts among the Muslims. They thought that not only their freedom was in danger but also their culture and faith were under threat. On the other hand, not the Americans but many Europeans also feel that their "European values and freedoms" are under direct threat due to the increasing Muslim immigration. They think that the Muslim minority would demand them to adjust their lives according to the Islamic rules. Furthermore, they have difficulty in understanding the reason of death threats over a book by Salman Rushdie, a film by Theo van Gogh, an opera about Aisha, the youngest wife of Muhammad, etc. The Muslims ask for respect and Europeans perceive it as a demand for "submission" (literal

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[2] The English translation of this work was published in Keddie (1968).

meaning of Islam). The mutual misunderstanding does not stop here; it continuous with such statements on the Muslim side like "what if we published similar cartoons depicting Jesus as a terrorist?" or the Saudi interior minister's demand of the Vatican to stop the publishing of the cartoons. The Muslims are far from understanding the fact that "for the past three centuries, western societies - unlike Muslim-majority countries - have grown accustomed to critical, ironical - even derisive - treatment of religious symbols, among them the pope, Jesus Christ and even God. Even though Muslims do not share such an attitude, it is imperative they learn to keep an intellectual distance when faced with such provocations and not to let themselves be driven by zeal and fervour, which can only lead to undesirable ends" (Tariq Ramadan, *Guardian*, February 6, 2006). They must also accept the fact that the Vatican, a supra-religious institution, does not and would not have any influence over a largely secularized European society.

The concepts of democracy, freedom of speech, human rights and similar others are Western origin and they are not perceived exactly in the same way in non-Western societies; the reason is not as the West claims, they are not ready or suitable but because these concepts are imposed on these societies. Onuma Yasuaki (1996) also refers to this reality that has not been rightly grasped by the West for a long time. He states that "··· discourse on human rights is part of the Westcentric intellectual discourse that dominates the entire world. This ··· is foreign to many developing nations because of their diverse civilizational backgrounds ··· [and it engenders] a strong resentment against the political, economic and military hegemony, as well as the imperial and colonial history, of Western powers and Japan" (quoted in Franck 1997: 593-594).

So, the Muslim overreaction should be understood, as a case in which disempowered people are trying to regain their self-respect since protesting is the last resort for the hopeless and powerless people. Similarly, the plane hijackings, suicide-bombings, death threats, and bloody demonstrations are the ways for these people to show the world how much they are suffering from being treated as being non-human. Of course, the Muslims and not only the radicals but also those who are moderate have felt offended from the cartoons published in Denmark first and then in other European papers. They might have reacted more calmly over the first publication but the subsequent re-publishing them day after day in other papers has made them suspicious of the real intention and many conspiracy theories about the siege of Islam by the Western powers.

For the Muslims their Prophet is dearer for them more than their own parents and siblings. There are ritual prayers to be recited whenever his name is mentioned and they hesitate if they wish to give his name to their male children as someone might swear or

insult the namesake. In some cultures, like the Turkish one, a symbol or a metaphor such as "rose" is used to represent him to avoid uttering his real name in the profane everyday speech. Since rose represents him the ritual payers are also recited when it is mentioned and many Muslims add the word rose to the ordinary names of their children. The West should not be expected neither to understand nor to appreciate these attitudes. As to the drawings of the Prophet or any other living thing are not allowed in the Islamic culture on the grounds that they may lead to idolatrous temptations. Yet, the Muslims should understand that they cannot impose their rules on others.

My argument on the real reason of the overreaction is grounded on the assumption that if the Prophet himself were alive today he would definitely not allow his fellow Muslims to do such violent demonstrations that have taken place in Muslim countries. It is a historical fact that the Prophet was subjected to far worse insults, humiliations, and even death threats coming from his own fellow tribal people. He would never demand an avenge on those people; on the contrary, he prayed for them. So, today's Muslim reaction, despite their ultimate love of the Prophet, has little to do with the Prophet but it has more to do with the overall situation of the Muslims and their painful experiences of humiliation in the hands of the Western powers. I also believe that the West allows such incidents in order to define themselves against the "other" that they are trying to create after the Cold War. This also is difficult to understand by the Muslims as it draws a line between an individualistic and a traditional communitarian society; since the Muslims do not need an "other" but they could define themselves with their membership of the society.

As was pointed out by Hugh Goddard, who has produced a well-researched work among the writings of Muslims, that a sort of positive improvement in the dialogue between these two world views is recorded especially when Muslim authors write about Christianity they tend to treat that religion with more positive terms if they "have individual Christian friends and some of them at least have been involved in formal dialogue between Christians and Muslims. This has clearly had a significant impact on both their knowledge of and their attitude towards Christianity" (Goddard 1996: 173–174). Therefore, it is the task of intellectuals of both sides to improve their relationships with each other through organising formal dialogues like symposia, panels, discussion groups, or teaching other religions in their respective schools.

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On the Transformation of the Asian Community in terms
of its Confucian Heritage and Globalization

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ABSTRACT

The following essay is of a preliminary nature, because the complexity of the topic at hand needs a more careful and detailed analysis. However, we don't have the more specific knowledge base, on a global scale, in order to say anything definitive at this point. Yet, relevant questions and the direction of research and inquiry mandate that we deal with the question at hand that Max Weber formulated at the beginning of the previous century: to what extent did the heritage of the teachings of Master K'ung (551-479 B.C., known in the West as Confucius) have any bearings upon the economic motifs, psychology and incentive of the so-called "Four little Dragons" (Singapore, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Japan)? Needless to say, we now have to include the Peoples Republic of China. Our aim in this presentation is not a strictly political, economic, social, or religious one for that would be more of a specialists undertaking. Ours is more complex, since we are trying, following the spirit of Weber, to see how the interacting and interweaving patterns, habits and activities, such as religion and economics, relate in the lives of Asian peoples. We are aiming at finding out how meaningful the teachings of Master K'ung and its traditions (such as Neo-Confucianism) are in the actual living experience of Asian peoples. We are aware, of course, that other religious traditions such as Buddhism, Taoism, or Shinto left its mark upon the cultural ramification of East Asia. Yet, for the sake of brevity and economics of space and time we concentrated merely upon Confucius, its tradition, as well as Weber's specific study on China and East Asia. The critical comprehensive work on Weber's leading questions and Asia still needs to be written in the future. At this point we are more modest and merely hint at the possibility of such an undertaking. The full historical dimension of East Asia needs to be better known, especially, to western educated minds. There are also blind spots within the historical scholarship as to the religious dimensions and economics, considering that Sir Arthur C. Lyall (1835-1911), Jan J.M. de Groot (1854-1921), Marcel Grant (1884-1940) and, not the least Max Weber (1864-1920) were the first serious scholars taking the special causality between religion (as practiced in Asia) and

economics, serious (see Maurice Freedman, " On the Sociological Study of Chinese Religion ", in: The Study of Chinese Society, Stanford University Press. 1979, pp. 351-369). Thus, we can see that intensive research is needed, considering that it had only been a short century, since we are asking these questions as to the subtle relationship between belief-systems and economic activities. Recently, in 1965, a much acclaimed book by C.K. Yang entitled Religion in Chinese Society, based on critical and extensive fieldwork and archival research, shows paradigmatic aspects between religion and East Asian, particularly Chinese society being intertwined. Of course, the monumental work by Joseph Needham since 1956, on science and civilization of Chinese and the East can't be neglected, as well as the superb work by Toby E. Huff on the rise of early modern science (1993), on a comparative level between Islam, China and the West, on behalf of Weber must be considered (especially on Science, social organization and civilization in China, pp. 240-324). As a supplementary assessment to the study of the impact of Confucius on South-East Asia and its economic performance the essays by Maurice Freedman are paramount.

The present essay comes to terms with Max Weber's treatment of East Asia as a sociology of religion, with some philosophic underpinning; to be more specific, Confucianism and to some extend Buddhism and Taoism, as belief-systems in East Asia. The essay extrapolates the question: to what extend did these belief-systems transform themselves, from ancient to modern times, as to have a decisive influence and constitute a basic metaphysical belief-system that invigorated the economic emergence of the "Four little Dragons" and China on a global level ? For those who are more at home in philosophic terminology and Hegelian world history: to what extent did the respective religions empower East Asia to appear on the world stage? These questions derive from the spirit of Hegel and more specifically from Max Weber's famous thesis known as the "Protestant Ethos and the Spirit of Capitalism" (1904/05). To what extend did Confucianism and Protestantism coalesce in their moral teachings and practice? Yet, why did China break with its past the way the West did, or better, did the implementation of Master K'ung's teachings prohibit the kind of break with tradition as to not foster the modern type of life style (Weber's Lebensführung, better rendered as life-guide)? Thus, there is a need, as we argue, for a comprehensive assessment of religious belief-systems and economic activity that goes beyond East Asia. The time is not ripe to assess, on a global basis, such a comprehensive undertaking. At this point we keep our aim on a preliminary level and suggest a direction to be taken in research of the respective topic in order to make more sense of a world transformed on a global scale.

INTRODUCTION

This presentation is exploratory and participates in the "debate in progress", since the 1980s, as to how the "miracle" of rapid economic and social development in South-East Asia and the Far East was possible. More specific, how was the sudden rise of "The Four Little Dragons", namely Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, possible in a relatively short period of time? At this point we should add mainland China since the 1990s. Normally these topics are discussed by economists, political theorists, or Asian studies experts. Not to neglect the research results produced by these disciplines, our perspective puts some light on the respective question, in terms of the cultural heritage, sociological foundations and philosophic-empirical experience.

The present author didn't focus on the question because of exclusive academic concerns. His personal interest in the area stems from his travels and living experience in Japan (1984), a visiting professorship in Malaysia (1995,1996) and short periods of visits to Singapore (1995,1996). Already at that time he wondered why Japan, Korea and the "four little dragons" developed in a quite different way, in speed and "philosophic attitude", from the Middle East. The "four little dragon" question, in terms of Malaysia, is especially poignant, since Malaysia's majority population claims Islam as its heritage; yet, a sizable portion of Malay society is of Chinese background and claims Confucius as part of its heritage (instructive, see " The Chinese in Southeast Asia ", in: The Study of Chinese Society, pp. 3-231).

Returning to the more specific academic question we subject the whole economic and social development of SE Asia and the Far East to the cultural and philosophic question: to what extent did the Confucian heritage promote the modern development of Asia? This more specific question will lead us to the academic discipline of the sociology of religion and Max Weber. Weber along with Emile Durkheim are considered to be the founding fathers of the sociology of religion and promoted in their respective writings cross-cultural studies (at the time when the term didn't exist) that highlight the subtle interplay between economics, sociology, politics, religion and ethics. The reason why both didn't achieve the distinction of being "household names" is simply because of the ideological and political successes of Karl Marx, the Russian revolution and the establishment of socialist states in Eastern Europe, not to mention Chinese communism of Mao Zedong style. The fall of the Soviet Union, the reforms of post-Mao China, and the reemergence of

religious fervor, especially in communities with predominantly Islamic background, favored especially the sociology of religion of Max Weber. Thus, the topic is explainable in that it concentrates to relating a cultural heritage to several Asian countries in terms of the work of Max Weber, upgraded by recent research, and the author's personal experience of Asian peoples and their heritage.

Max Weber's widow Marianne Weber, a well-known activists for political rights of women in Germany in the 1920s, published her husband's monograph "Confucianism and Taoism" in 1920 (the year of Max Weber's death), alongside studies on Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam, in three volumes of collected essays entitled "Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie" (republished in paperback edition by J.C.B. Mohr Siebeck UTB, 9th edition, 1988). These collected essays consolidated the sociology of religion as a serious academic field. They were the outcome of Weber's broader project entitled, "Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Vergleichende religionssoziologische Versuche" (Economic ethos of world religions: A comparative sociology of religions) in which Weber tries to sort out the interplay between religious belief and economic activity among various cultural communities, on a world scale. Needless to say, the debate and critical discussion is still going on, since the 1920s, and have not subsided, concerning Weber's claims. Of course, Weber's fame rests on his monograph "Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus" (The Protestant Ethos and the Spirit of Capitalism, first published in German in 1904/05; in English translation in 1930 by Talcott Parsons). Last year the world of the social science and beyond celebrated the centennial anniversary of the "Protestant Ethics" and lead to the intensification, considering world events within the last decade, to deal with Weber's work anew. Weber's claim that the protestant ethos, the inner-worldly asceticism, personal discipline, thrift, hard work, and the conscious methods of life style promoted by the puritans (Weber's term is Lebensführung), provided favorably for a kind of modern capitalist system of economic ethos. What is important to catch is that Weber never claimed that Puritanism and the West discovered capitalism (this is the half-educated version we hear usually about Weber), but that in western Europe the modern version of capitalism did emerge, alongside with a very conscious sense of leading a specific type of systematic life style, namely modernist. This claim, interestingly, connected a specific kind of religious ethos, with a specific type of economic and personal life style, that we didn't find in any other world community. As anyone can imagine, the controversy continues and seems to increase, promoting an explosion of research and publications about religious communities, their symbolic values, and life values. What

makes Weber claims special is that he demands an objective methodology (not ideology) that gives reasonable insight into the infrastructure of respective religious community's world wide, or contemporaneously, on a global scale. The question relevant to our present concern, again, is, "How relevant is Weber's claims in terms of the Confucian heritage applied to present-day South-East Asia and the Far East"? This question had been on the mind of the late LSE professor of economics Michio Morishima (1923-2004) who, in his Cambridge University Marshall Lectures as early as 1981, followed exactly this sort of Weberian question, namely, 'Why has Japan 'succeeded'? Western Technology and Japanese Ethos (Cambridge University Press, 1982). In the Preface we read, we set "… out the problem in a Weberian manner." During the 1990s the "Weberian manner" was continued by Harvard University Professor Ezra F. Vogel in his Reischauer Lectures of 1990 and published as "Japan as No. 1: Lessons for America" in 1999 (it reached the New York bestseller list during that year).

In light of these developments in research and empirical reality, within the last decades, we follow the leading questions: How was the astonishing economic success of South-East Asia and the Far East possible in terms of its Confucian heritage? What lessons can we learn from "the Weberian manner" and questions applied the Asian community? What transformations took place in these communities? Or, what transformation was the heritage subjected too? We can't, of course, solve all these question as once, anything related to human activity can't be spoken of in certainty, but we can enlighten and promote the leading questions that give us insight into human activity, on a global scale, that slowly dawn in our consciousness.

WEBER'S PROJECT: "ECONOMIC ETHOS OF WORLD RELIGIONS"

The idea of seeing the relationship between economics and religious belief   was entertained by Weber around the turn of the century, from the 19th into the 20th. By 1904/05 he published his monograph "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" that made him an internationally recognized figure in the social sciences. In the ensuing years the monograph was published in numerous languages that established Weber world fame. Yet, this was not enough for him; he continued to press on his leading questions into other belief-systems such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Judaism and Islam. By studying these religious systems Weber thinks of them as cultural configurations,

more in the sense of Gestalt psychology (with which he was familiar). Religious systems are cultural entities and take on varies patterns and configurations (Gestalten). Weber himself was not religious, his background was protestant, yet he recognized the importance of religious belief and activities that have high significance to people cementing together their communities. The "opium" of which Marx spoke may have some truth , however, it's only half of a truth. The existential situation of human beings is so fragile and precarious that religious aspects, or whatever we may call it, have importance and play a significant part of people's everyday life. Although Weber was a man of the enlightenment and open to new forms of knowledge and insight, for instance, he was quite open to Freud's work and understood the cultural significance thereof, considering the Freud had only recently published his Interpretation of Dreams in 1900. Unfortunately, early death cut short Weber inquiry into the erotic dimensions of religiosity that appear in some texts, unedited. Thus, Weber's inquiry as to the causality of religious belief and economic activity in terms of motifs and psychology must be understood as cultural studies on a global scale. Considering the fact that we, at present, actually live in the very process of a modern globalization makes us aware of the significance of Weber's work. The received opinion by many who may not be that familiar with the original work of Weber is that he leans towards positivism and that he was Eurocentric. These are opinion either slanted from a Marxist or a post-modern ideology. Weber was never a man one could use for ideological campaign, he is too complex, too subtle and to much aware that human affairs are never simply ideological. Any close and serious reading of Weber (in the original German) makes clear to the reader that he thought that the western world did come up with a certain kind of rational life style (Lebensführung), but that it was not unique, in the sense, that it was the only kind of rationality in the world. He was, however, aware that historically speaking something did happen in Western Europe that did not happen to the rest of the world. The significant question is , what exactly was it? Many contemporary history books that deal with the first confrontation between the West and Islam, or East Asia, will tell us about the military and technological superiority of western nations, as the encountered lands beyond Europe. Very rarely do we read anything about the intellectual or cultural encounter between Europe and other lands. Even today, public opinion in many so called "third world countries" or, the more polite term is "emerging economies", holds that Europe and North American are only superior in terms of technology and science, but not in cultural or moral values. It is this sort of misunderstanding that Weber wanted to make clear. It is doubtful whether science, the military, or technology, exclusively, made the West "superior" to other nations. The more

significant questions that can give us a lead into a more critical assessment, as to why Europe turned out differently at a specific stage of world history, may have something to do with questions such as, why was there no Socrates to be found in other cultures? Why no Galileo? At this point we need not recount the stories of Socrates and Galileo since most people, who can read and write, are familiar with the broad outline of their story. Thus, the question why the West turned out different from East Asia, at a particular turn of world history, is a relevant question in terms of Weber. Likewise, the question, why East Asia (lead by the so-called "Four little Dragons") emerges on the world stage, in a most impressive economic performance and dynamic social potentiality in the late 20th century, and continues this performance into the early years of the 21st century? Why did the "economic miracle" not happen in most countries on the African Continent ? Why do countries such as Turkey, Tunisia or Malaysia function much better than most other countries with Islamic background? These are open secret questions that many ask who actually know and experienced these countries in comparison to Arab speaking nations. The simply answer does not lie in military technology or science, but in a much more complex configurations that deal exactly with the kind of questions Max Weber proposed in his work. Thus, we need to rediscover these questions and, if necessary, refine and adopt them to our present-day circumstance of the early 21st century. Our contribution is a small down payment for such an enterprise. Many more specialists, experts and generalists, but not ideologically motivated work, as was the case in the last decade is needed, in order to sort things out. The world will not be saved through ideology, but through serious work and honest moral purpose in order to make events a little bit more meaningful to rational beings.

The original idea of publishing the essay on the sociology of religion, encompassing the socio-economic-religious ethos of world religions, as part of Weber's monumental "Economy and Society " (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft) did not materialize. We now know that Weber's widow, Marianne Weber, a leading spokeswoman of the German feminist movement at the turn of the century, edited the forbidding manuscript and published it in 1920. A revised 5th edition was published by Johannes Winckelmann in 2002. An English-American version was published by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich in a three volume set in 1968. Of course, this was untimely since Marx, Mao Tse-Tung and his little Red Book were the center of discussion of academic youth in the West, instead of Weber. Yet, in 2005, on the anniversary of Weber's "Protestant Ethic" a new expanded reader was published by Stephen Kalberg, Max Weber: Readings and Commentary on Modernity

(Oxford: Blackwell), as well as Max Weber's Economy and Society: A critical Companion, edited by Charles Camic et al. (Stanford University Press). Weber's essays on the sociology of religion (Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie) were published by Marianne Weber in 1921, after Weber's death, in three separate volumes. The 8th edition of the three volumes was published in 1988 in paperback format. The Collected Works of Max Weber (Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe, edited by Horst Baier et. al.) are nearly completed. The recently published biographies by the historian Joachim Radkau, Max Weber: Die Leidenschaft des Denkens (M.Weber: The passion of thinking, Munich: Hanser, 2005), as well as Michael Sukale's Max Weber: Leidenschaft und Disziplin (M.Weber: Passion and Discipline, Tubingen: Siebeck, 2002), supplement comfortably the classic works by Marianne Weber, Reinhard Bendix, or Eduard Baumgarten, on the life and work of Max Weber. According to Weber, in a long-drawn-out footnote in the Introduction to the essays on the sociology of religion, he points out that due to his military service as a hospital administrator in Heidelberg, during the First World War, he decided to publish the original essays on world religions in the newly founded Archives of Social Sciences, between 1915 and 1920. In fact, during Weber's life time his most brilliant work and ideas were published in Journals and not in book form. This is one of the reasons why it took some time to find translations of Weber's work, for instance, aside his "Protestant Ethic" essay translated into English and published in 1930 by Talcott Parsons, his other works were published in English in the 1950s and 60s. Again, since Marx and Marxism controlled the ideological market, supported by the Soviet Union and East Germany, Weber was not "in" as the saying used to go. Weber's works were not available in reasonably priced paperbacks in the 1960s, but only in expensive and bulky hardcover editions. Marx and Marxist literature was easily available to any student in Europe in the 1960 and sold quite inexpensive Student Unions of many West German universities. I couldn't have imagined that Max Weber would lend itself to shouting choreography alongside Marx, Mao and Marcuse. It is only in the 1990s that Weber's most important texts became available to German students in the well known and inexpensive Reclam editions. And with the unexpected resurgence of religious consciousness, alongside the electronic mass communication revolution within the process of globalization, it is no surprise that Weber's potential for understanding complex interacting processes (world wide) would be rediscovered. Globalization means to rethink the local situation in global terms and this means readjustment of many presuppositions, patterns, configurations and paradigms. We are now in the midst of the new research potential and reformatting of local consciousness. Weber, so it seems, has an important role to play in this enterprise.

In the introduction to his Collected Essay of the Sociology of Religion (Volume One) Weber gives us important hints as to the specific focus on special themes the essays will treat. The specific title of the sociological essays on world religions is "Die Wirtschaftethik der Weltreligionen" with the subtitle (normally not translated) "Vergleichende religionswissenschaftliche Versuche" (Comparative attempts at scientific religious investigations). Thus, Weber's work has to be understood as a work in progress, or an open-ended research program, in the sense of American philosopher C.S. Peirce. Weber's work was never to be understood as definitive, but an ongoing process, from generation of researchers to the next. In the long run, as Peirce would say, we would find some truth that is relevant to the situation, but then be supplemented by further research and the previous results adjusted, accordingly. This was an ongoing dynamic process of truth-finding. Absolute truth had no place in this kind of research program. Weber's studies are sketchy, at times, but there are forceful, synthetic and full of surprising insights. Despite some shortcomings his studies are still valuable in that he suggests and hints at areas, in the emergence of East Asia into the modern age, that are basically not well known; precisely, the subtle relationship between religion and economics.

The editor, Yao Xinzhong, of the recently published Encylopaedia of Confucianism (in the Routledge Curzon Series on World Religions, 2 Volumes, 2003) points out, " If Weber's theory is to be extended to include late 20th century economic development, these transformations of Confucianism its status and influences must be taken very seriously." (Volume one, p. 105) Maurice Freedman pointed out in his anthropological study, cited previously in our introduction that, " Confucianism had very prominent non-religious, secular features." (Freedman on the study of Chinese Society, p.104). We can see that the Weber question is alive and searching for research results. The Confucian ethos and late 20th century economic development in East Asia needs to be addressed. The normal television opinion is that the Far East is an excellent imitator of western technology and some intake of western values of efficiency, hard work and administration made the "miracle" possible. No mention is made of the indigenous culture of the Confucian ethos, as well as Buddhist elements, not to mention Taoist and Shinto aesthetic values. Instead of simple minded television opinion, and apparent surveys from the "streets", we should become serious and address Weber's questions within a transformed context of the 21st century in terms of East Asia. How did the teachings of Master K'ung play out, historically, in the Asian communities that comprise the Far East? To what extend did Buddhism (wandering from India to the Far East) affect Asian communities? How did Taosim and

Shinto, especially in Japan, shape the emotional and aesthetic aspects of peoples' lives? These are the questions that must be posed and set within the context of economic development. Special studies have been offered, but very few even hinted at the cultural (religious) elements of social-economic resurgence of Asian communities. There are plenty of ideological studies offered, but none are viable. It is not enough to merely talk about "Asian values"; what we need is, specifics, facts and serious historical research with competence in economic history as well as religious institutions. This may be an enormous enterprise, as Weber realized, and suggested that research teams, over generations must work at this. Truth is not to be had by a push of a button, but hard work, and it takes time. Time can be abbreviated and speeded up, but truth can not, since human life is part of this truth. For, otherwise, why bother searching for truth? We don't want to belittle some "western influence" in Asia, especially in the 19th and 20th century, but religious forms of life has their own time framework and their own psychological disposition. The framework and disposition has an impact of the normal everyday life of ordinary people and citizens in a longer span of generations than a quick assessment of a newscast. Television pictures may tell us a lot of a moment's event, but doesn't tell us anything about the disposition of the soul of those making up the event. Let us return to Weber's basic position in his Introduction (Einleitung) to the socio-religious essays.

Weber's forty page introduction presupposition his central thesis of the "Protestant Ethic" that Calvinist Protestantism was the central source for the promotion of an ascetic modernist capitalist spirit. More specific, that the inner-worldly-asceticism of the western European, for instance, world-denying psychology in which profit is made in order to safe or reinvest for more profit, as a sign of God's bestowing good fortune of humankind. Here again, we find the curious mix of rational efficiency and irrational motifs that Weber pointed out, more and more, in his later texts. This is an extremely important point since it dispels the idea that only European rationality is the only rationality that qualifies as legitimate ways of seeing the world in a rational manner. Weber emphasized numerous times that other nations had developed forms of rationality, but that it was only in the western (northern Europe, predominantly Calvinist Protestantism and Lutheranism) cultural context that modern "Wissenschaft" and the phenomena of the "Fachmenschentum" (a species of experts), as well as the modern civil servant (Fachbeamte), as well as rational chemistry, or freely contracted labor emerged (see "Vorbemerkung", Remarks to Volume one). Again, this shouldn't be interpreted that the West was better than the rest of the world, but simply, that socio-economic-political-religious patterns developed that were, at

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a point, significantly different from other world communities. It is exactly this point, in a comparative way that must be more carefully research on a global level. What is needed is to connect theological doctrines with religious life-attitudes and institutions and legal bodies that support these relationships within the context of the relevant political forces. In the English-speaking world R.H. Tawney, professor of economics at the London School of Economics, published a well known work entitled, "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism" in 1925. This longish essay in book form was critical of Weber, but weberian in manner. Weber had set the tone and direction in the social sciences, competing with Marxist oriented literature.

How does Weber understand "World Religions"? He treats in separate monographs, between 1915 and 1920, Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, as well as Judaism, although the latter, strictly speaking, is not considered a world religion. Weber felt that, for historical reasons and its relation to Christianity and Islam, Judaism should be included in his socio-historical analysis. Yet, he must have been interested in the respective theme for some time, since the secondary literature relating to the world religions show dissertations and special thesis published in the late 19th century, many of whom he must have discovered in the university library of Columbia University in New York City, during his St. Louis Exhibition visit, in 1904. A careful perusal of the numerous footnotes throughout the essay will support this observation. Moreover, we notice that many works cited indicate a practical aspect reporting, or providing information, on how religious activities were lived in everyday life. Almanacs, prayer books, guides, or practical orientation brochures can be found cited, upon careful inspection of the many footnotes provided to support Weber's contentions. He defines these religions as life-systems, legitimized by religious doctrines, regimented and conditioned by habitual seasonal enactment, symbolically or otherwise, of major strands embedded in the system. It is important to identity religion as a system of life-guiding-orientation (Lebensführung). We shy away from simply using the more popular term life style (imported from Ferdinand Tönnies and Georg Simmel into the English language), since the term doesn't necessarily convey a presupposed legitimate-moral mandate. A "Lebensführung" according to Feyerabend's "anything goes" is a contradiction. Life style may signify an aesthetically appealing life rhythm, according to marketing criteria, but this doesn't make it a guiding principle presupposition moral and legitimizing institutional framework. A life orientation includes tradition and future oriented projects, with respective existential decisions, relating to a curriculum vitae and anything that relates to elements between birth and

death of an individual, or generation. Thus, the economic ethos, which includes the ethics and anthropological aspects embedded in an ethos (Wirklichkeitsethik is Weber's term, an ethics of actuality), constitutes a life-guiding-system which is underpinned by psycho-pragmatic considerations, demanding social action. Social actions don't appear in a vacuum, but exhibit structures, patterns and values. This conceptual ethos demands meaningful interpretation which Weber called "verstehende Soziologie". The ethos of meaningful sociology (rationally conceptualized) must be grasped in terms of "innere Momente" ("prehensive moments" of the inner life), which conditions a human being towards the world. Again, this is an important point and often missed by a careless reader: Weber reiterates throughout his text, in his sociology of religion, that the spiritual and "innerliche Momente" (see Volume One, p. 238) are decisive in Lebensführung (life-guiding-principles). For instance, Confucianism is identified as an "estate ethic" (Standesethik), promoted by Chinese literati, structured in a worldly-rationalized bureaucracy and class community. The secular aspects of this elite ethos, despite its religious undertones, had a decisive imprint of Chinese culture and beyond its border in Korea and Japan. The decisive inner moments, that is to say, the subjective meaningful feelings of an individual, a group, or a generation supports the socio-economic factors, mixed with functional political forces, promoting a specific Lebensführung. Weber disagrees with the standard Marxian version of an economic situation mirroring the religious sentiments, or class of peoples. He seems to be more sensitive to the reality (Wirklichkeit) of everyday life of people and their respective emotional and spiritual needs. Moulids are festivities in honor of a saint in which many Egyptians participate, Christians and Muslims alike, and satisfy the emotional needs of people to honor ideals, according to which they want to models their lives. The saints, in the weberian manner, operate as ideal types that provide regulative normative functions (to borrow terminology from Kant) that people can incorporate in their respective Lebensführung. Prayer and devotional action, public religious celebration reinforce annual bonding in the community, have historical and theological sources, but satisfy the basic religious needs of various kinds of people.

The phenomena of sickness, bad luck, misfortune, or death are topics that Weber's tries to put into perspective of the world religions. The non-prophetic, non-revelatory religions, such as Confucianism and Buddhism, emphasize the salvation of humankind in terms of "this-worldly-goods", such as health, wealth, and a long life. Salvation is treated as a theory of suffering. Different methods and techniques are introduced in the history of

humankind in order to relief people from suffering, pain and a nasty, brutish life. In ancient Egypt we celebrate the pyramids as one of the wonders of the world symbolizing the religious spirit, transcending the finality of life. The pyramids also symbolize the perennial tension trying to transcend this-worldiness in awe of the vast cosmos. The ancient Egyptian revelation was not empowered in a prophet, but in the process of transcendence, such as mummification and its rituals, between the pharos and the heavens. The stars were to be the guides to the other-worldiness. The pyramids were designed as orientations points for the transcending journey of the pharos from this to the other-world. A prophet or seer, developed by Semitic religions was not necessary, since the ancient Egyptians applied natural knowledge, especially advanced in astronomy and medicine, to their religious needs. Economics and religion found each other in the pyramidal work project that exhibits highly efficient administrative and organizational talent. The ancient Egyptians were less interested in doctrinaire aspect of religiosity than practical results for the living. In ancient Egypt we find more practical rationality than in Semitic religions that stress revelatory reason. The perennial problem of evil is highly relevant to Weber's project. How do world religions come to terms with the phenomenon of evil in the world . The Europe of 1755, meditating the destruction of Lisbon in an earthquake, confronted the Christian faith and the apparent all-powerful and benevolent God. Leibniz postulated how evil is meaningful in the best of all possible worlds, while the 21st century is looking out for a new Leibniz, not yet in sight. For Weber, prophets have a specific function and obligation towards their people, namely to provide a systematic-rational world-view in order to explain convincingly why suffering and evil exist in the world. Again, we find a redirection by Weber of the concept of rationality: Faith and belief-system produce different sorts of rationality focusing on revelation, suffering, evil, goodness, or salvation. This sort of rationality is enacted through special techniques and methods, such as prayer, meditation, or fasting. The cleansing of the body from sin, by wondering and roaming in the desert for forty days is such as technique and method. The life of Islamic thinkers, such as Al Ghazali, or Mulla Sadra tells us about this intellectual cleansing ritual. Many mystics, yogis and Sufis experience the purification of the soul preparing for other-worldiness. Annual celebrations and rituals, as well as modern national holidays, take on the role of national therapy, reconciliation or reenactment of hostility with the enemy, real or imagined, with have religious overtones. Celebrations of Shams el Nessim (spring equinox) or Norouz, are ancient events that still have meaning to present day Egyptians and Iranians, celebrating wherever they might be. These are celebrations of enacted return to roots that promote identity, well being, and at times therapeutic function. Natural

seasonal events, such as Halloween or carnival hold the imagination of European and Latin American peoples amidst prophetic religions. Thus, the practical aspects of everyday religiosity was of great interest to Weber, since we can see thereby the actual acting-out of religious sentiment that provides the energy for appropriated social action. Economics from this point of view is not simply textbook economics by Paul Samuelson, but basic psychology. It is no surprise that Weber was fond of the work by William James, especially his "Varieties of Religious Experience". A science of sociology of religion needs to be a "Wissenschaft" of "Wirklichkeit" (a science of reality as he understands economics, religion and psychology). Weber's discourse operates contrary to dialectic materialism and Nietzsche's "slave morality" on the basis that there is such a phenomenon as religious rationality. Here too, there seems to be a metaphysical need for the more intellectual class of people for a rationally purified religiosity that we find in an Ibn Khaldun, or Ibn Rushd, or Thomas Aquinas, or Maimonides. Religiosity is not denied, but there must be some sort of meaningfulness. There is a need for the proof of the existence of God, in Semitic religions, for some the logic is important, for others the belief in the logic. Yet, the actual celebrations take on varies forms in which all partake, irrespective of logic or belief. In a globalization process this state should not surprise us.

ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROTESTANTISM AND CONFUCIANISM

Weber's comments on the affinities and differences between Protestantism and Confucianism are instructive and enlightenment. Yet, we need to focus, at this point, less on specific historical strands, rather than on the consequences of Protestant and Confucian configurations in the late 20th, early 21st century. For the sake of brevity we shall enunciates several aspects that are directly relevant to Weber's comments in his respective sociological essay on East Asia. We understand Calvinist Protestantism and classical/neo-classical Confucianism not in the manner of history textbooks presentations, but as an unconscious psychological attitude, prevalent among numerous peoples in the Asian communities, providing the basis for a normative life orientation. In the West the question appears on varies occasions, like Christmas or Easter, to what extent is the classical form of Christianity relevant to Europe's population? This is a typical post-modern European question, but not an American one. In the heartland of the United States, that Weber traveled in the summer and fall of 1904, we find a population that still believe in the simple version of hard work, community service, and a steadfast believe in moral

goodness in the name of Jesus. This can be explained in terms of an immigration society (formerly the poor and destitute of Europe) that bursts alive in their suppressed energy to "make it in this world" and follow the will of the Christian God. The genre of the Cowboy Western cinema and the idea of the "Wild West" conveys the belief-system that America is the chosen land, in which all are free from the shackles of the oppressor in Europe (referred to as the "old country"), and get their chance of making an "honest buck". That business enterprise mix with the showdown of law and order, and the ladies appears either, as pious churchgoing women or prostitutes, kindly called "saloon girls", is instructive for America's puritanical streak, foreign to French or Swedish cinema. The world appears in black and white, good and evil, believers and heathen, rich and poor, and anything else that doesn't agree with the time honored doctrine of George Washington (the founding father), motherhood, and apple pie, is the work of the devil. The America in the early phases of the 21th century is somewhat more complex and colorful, yet, the themes at hand are still very much alive in the subconscious of America's heartland. We need not to stress and go into detail, at this point, what sort of consequences this kind of puritanical attitude has, if applied beyond the heartland, not to mention beyond America's coastlines. We should not forget, and this Weber sensed, that the United States is the first immigration societies that attained the status of a world power.

Contemporary East Asia, especially China is a very old cultural entity and civilization. Asian communities had their ups and downs, and some were colonized by Europeans. We need not tell the story here. Yet, the basic foundational elements of Buddhism, Taoism, Shinto, and not the least Confucianism, remained in the collective memory of Asian peoples, despite Marxism or any other ideology, contrary to the time honored belief systems. The Confucian ideals functioned as a point of orientation, especially of the elite of China and beyond. Of course, we know the story of the contact with the European 19th century powers, the missionary activities and modernist transformations of respective societies in Asia. The focus, however, has always been heavily economic and military, and very little on the cultural framework and underpinnings of Asian societies. This was reserved for Asian western experts called anthropologists. However, the time has come to ask serious questions, to what extent was China's transformation of a traditional Confucian society into a socialist state possible? Why was Japan, and later Korea, able to adjust to a modern kind of societal structure, despite occupation and colonization? To what extent did moral traits in these respective societies reemerge, from time to time, in order to invigorate its population? Confucianism is used, at the point, only as an ideal type (in Weber's sense) to

show the basics of a life-guiding-orientation (Lebensführung) of ancient cultures don't disappear. They fade and reemerge as needed, from time to time. Contemporary China is an excellent example whereby a selective memory discards useless cultural baggage, i.e. the cult of Mao (for the time being), and reminds itself of he traditional teachings of Master K'ung, that is supported in children's curriculum by the State (a State based upon the doctrines of Marx and Mao). In the West educated people ask how? Of course, educated Asian people may ask how Hitler was possible in a country, as modern as Germany in the 1930s.

The Confucian incentive to learn and adopt natural knowledge to practical affairs is quickly picked up and transformed into a modern form of zealous acquisitive scientific knowledge. The Confucian set of mind needed time to adjust its knowledge of nature to modern scientific knowledge by adaptation of "Dutch learning" (as it was called in Japan), imitation in the traditional understanding of the Master's teaching, and revision as events arrive for the application of respective contemporary needs. The amalgamation of the teachings of the American education master and philosopher John Dewey with the moral precepts of the Chinese master was not lost on the audience in Japan and China during the former's lectures in 1919. Dewey spoke of the necessity of a "new philosophy", while his audience thought of a new restructuring of their society. This attitude seems to be very much a fundamental element in Confucian heritage operating in the subconscious of its respective peoples. We are not totally wrong if we see a strange mix of Marx, Dewey, and Confucius operating in a transformed way on the mind set of Asian peoples. Needless to say, if we think Turkey, we immediately think of Dewey (who visited Ankara in 1924) and Atatürk, or Ibn Khaldun, Comte and the French socialist Jean Jaures, whom the founding father of modern Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, admired. We can think of many more amalgamations, but the basics always seem to prevail in the peoples' collective memory.

There are ecological concerns as well as structural differences between the modern city and rural areas in contemporary China. We see that Weber's disenchantment-process does not to be a one-way ticket to modernity. He never thought about the possibility of re- enchantment, promoted by traditional studies and scholars like Professor S.N. Nasr. The disenchantment with the cult of Mao and the Little Red Book (this author still has his from the 1960s student days) and the disenchantment campaign against the "Gang of Four" (including Mao's widow), we see that Chinese pragmatism, with a Confucian slant, is a subtle way in the process of transforming an agricultural based society into a dynamic

modern state. The cost may be very high, yet Europe also paid a high cost in its two world wars. Modern day Shanghai may exhibit some window dressing, as the saying goes in the West, but the seriousness of pushing China ahead onto the global stage of world history, by the State, is obvious. It is important not too stress economics as the exclusive motor of China's will to succeed in its endeavor to become a leading modern society. What is needed is more research into details of the cultural aspects of Asian communities (and not just those of Asia), with the intend to come to understand how indigenous cultural elements were used as chemistry to mix with non-indigenous elements (like "Dutch learning"), in order to transform native communities into modern states. This complex process is not that well understood, considering the speechlessness of some more developed countries when they hear "nation building". Nation building is not simply imitation or blind adaptation, but a subtly handling of native elements and tradition with a pragmatic touch from the foreign, in such a way, that the native transforms itself into the new embedding borrowed elements from any other cultural entities, if it fits into a contemporary situation. This lesson has not been well understood by some policy makers in the West. The Literati in East Asia may be gone, those in the West have vanished, because the socio-economic platform that supported them is gone, but the ideal of normative rules as to modern ways is very much in demand, be it environmental concerns, be it world wide web electronic communications. To put matters a little rough, socialism and capitalism in contemporary China need not be a contradiction, but just another face of the possibility of the teaching of Master K'ung. The West must deal with its own transformation; yet, whether Calvinist Protestantism will be able to provide the backbone for a new horizon remains an open question, for the simple reason, that mere secularization may not be sufficient to satisfy the need of people. That is the reason why some scholars and thinkers in the West have advocated for their own nation to learn new lessons from the Far East.

CONCLUSION

In this essay we focused specifically on Weber's treatment of East Asia in terms of the contemporary situation at the turn of the century, from the 20th to the 21st century. Weber gave us guidelines as to where to research and what kind of questions may be fruitfully employed in our present-day situation. This preliminary essay by nature didn't intend to give the reader a minute by minute account as to what Weber said about the Far East. We

leave this up to those who are seriously interested in the subject matter and care as to how the process of modern-day globalization will play out. Nevertheless, we did encourage a scholarly approach as to come to terms seriously, without ideological concerns, about the emergence of the "Little Dragons", Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, and lately the "Tiger", namely China. The normal path is exclusively economic and military consideration without sensitivity to the cultural aspects and its historical underpinnings that are still at work in the unconsciousness of peoples' souls.

We concentrated on Weber's specific concerns in his essay in sociology of religion treating the world religions, respectively, and the geographies of East Asia. What are, indeed, the specific historical-cultural conditions under which a RATIONAL MODERN LIFESTYLE (a normative guiding-principle) is possible? Those familiar with Kant will notice immediately the family resembles between Weber and Kant, rightly so. Weber doesn't pose a transcendental question, as Kant did, in his famous first Kritik, but he does introduce a subtle kantian theme into the arena of research in the sociology of religion. What are the specific conditions in the Far East, or any other geographic region, that we can identify as being relevant to our concerns (economic consequences of religious attitudes)? What particular cultural form or pattern or paradigm is required to lead a RATIONAL EXISTENCE OF LIFE? Can the rational modern lifestyle claim universality? We must remind ourselves that Weber never maintained that the western modern rational life style is the best of all possible worlds for the rest of humankind. In fact, Weber towards the end of his life, was rather skeptical about such statements. Weber is only Eurocentric (some criticism from post-modern ideologists) in the sense that he uses his original European analysis of the relationship between protestant Christianity and western capitalism as a focal point in order then, to move to other geographic areas and cultures in search, as to what can be found in the causality between religion and economics. Weber's Eurocentrism is not normative, but operates as a regulative principle (in the kantian sense) which he uses as a foliage in order to come to terms with , as he used to say, "Was ist", i.e., what is factual and objectively truth to be found in the geography and memory of the Far East.

We must ask about the causality between the religious sphere and the respective economic system called capitalism. How can communist China call herself socialist, promote for its current generations the positive aspects of Confucianism, yet, in everyday economic life promote a sort of Manchester Capitalism, as Engels used to call the 19th

century British economic system, at the zenith of empire? To what extent is the Chinese garden disenchanted? Is the inner-directed ethics necessary for a normative ideal that transcends this-worldliness? The world of rationality is a world full of contradictions. Contradiction, as Hegel taught us, is part of the real world. The protestant ethic, in view of Weber is such a rational world, whereby irrationality plays a meaningful dialectical role in the affairs of people. The founders of the Frankfurt School of Philosophy, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno had reemphasized this theme in their celebrated work entitled The Dialectic of the Enlightenment. Not many had noted that Horkheimer, in his early years, was an admirer of Weber and was one of the students present in Munich when Weber presented his famous lectures Science as a Vocation and Politics as a Vocation (Wissenschaft als Beruf; Politik als Beruf) in January 1919. Hence, we must find out what sort of element are decisive in varies belief-systems promoting and expressing a modern rational life style. Weber presented such as program called the Economic Ethics (Ethos) of World Religions. We can build upon such a program and supplement his finding with our new analytical tools and methodologies and research materials. A key to unlock the "rationality of religion" as a meaningful (sinngebend) world-view is Kant. The kantian motif in the first Critique (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) is transferred into Weber's analysis dissecting the economic ethos of Protestanism, then the world religions. Yet, if we take Kant out of the research game what have we got? A God , or Deity who functions as a sacred story for the populace, meaning the enchantment process (Verzauberungsstrategie) in a pre-kantian world, that rediscovers the magic garden, after the experience of disenchantment of modernity turned out to be a rather harsh reality. Goethe's Doctor Faust may give us a hint: if you are ready to sell your soul to the devil for unlimited knowledge, you must be ready to pay for the consequences.

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THE IMPACT OF THE ISLAMIC FOUNDATIONS
ON THE ENGLISH TRUSTS

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What is a waqf?

How did it function?

What was its importance and role in history?

How did affect the other civilization?

Waqf is the system wherein a privately owned property is endowed to the common use in perpetuity. It is a legal agreement abolishing all the rights of the owner over his property. The endowed property is considered as God's, hence; it is not legal for any political power to claim ownership or benefit the endowed property. "The principle behind the vakıf is familiar to modern economies— rich may donate their property to a foundation that supports good causes, and the proceeds of the property are not taxed so long as they continue to be sent on charitable causes." (McCarthy, 116) It had become so widespread that it is very likely to see the traces of waqfs in any destination from Pacific to the Atlantic that had been introduced with an Islamic civilization. (Çızakçı, 1)

It is known that this system came into existence and got an influential place in the 7th century after the first Islamic state had reached a certain level of wealth. (Akgündüz, 66) It is interesting to note that though the Islamic state was becoming considerably richer, in that period, capitalism did not exist. Some historians explain it in the case of Ottoman Empire as follows: the waqf system urged the rich Empire to the distribution of the capital instead of capital pooling. (Çızakçı, 49) Had the waqf system not exist, capitalism without any doubt would be born on the Ottoman lands and would have another flow of story different than today.

Well, how this system functioned in the Ottoman Empire and to what extent it had an impact in economic and social sphere? It can be asserted that almost all the philanthropic activities had been conducted under the waqf system. When a person wants to endow a property or some money, first, he prepares an official document explaining how and to

whom the money will be used and what the other conditions are. He can give permission to his family to benefit the endowed property on his own consent. This kind of waqfs is generally called "family waqfs". The management of the waqf is given to a committee of trustees: "Thus there are four major components of any waqf: the founder, the beneficiaries, the trustees and the endowed capital corpus itself."(Çızakça, 15) It is observed that royal and rich people founded the big-scale waqfs while middle and ordinary people established small-scale waqfs, which outnumber the latter. Another interesting information in the statistics is that women seemed to be very active and eager in philanthropic activities. For instance, the women coming from rich families established 40% of waqfs in İstanbul.

Waqfs contributed to the Islamic states in two ways: one in economic and the other in social aspects. It could be helpful to have a look at some figures to understand the role and efficiency of waqfs named as Third Sector today. According to the researcher Nazif Öztürk, waqfs ran 15.7 % of the Turkish Economic life. (Öztürk, 25) Almost all the roads, bridges, hospitals and many other things in the Ottoman Empire were built thanks to the waqfs. Even the first electric installation was accomplished in a mosque by the Ministry of Waqfs. All these services, which are called as Municipality Services today, were rendered through the money endowed by the Muslim philanthropists. Again as far as we learn from Öztürk's book on waqfs, apart from these, big shopping and resting centers were built in every 30-40 km on the trade roads and lots of stores in small and big sizes, and many restaurants again were constructed for the use of the traders and artisans. (26) Waqfs also financed the health services by opening hospitals. Some documents demonstrate that some people who were damaged in certain work accidents were paid by the waqfs, and wives and kids of those who died at the accidents were given salaries at a time when there was no type of security or insurance services. Therefore, as stated by Prof. Çızakçı, since waqfs provide some fundamental services in health, education, and municipality, this causes "a massive reduction in expenditure" which results in "a smaller budget deficit and a reduction in the rate of interest" and consequently the system leads to the private investment and growth. (Çızakçı, 2)

Ottomans, having reached an empire power, started to establish cash waqfs after the second half of the 15th century. This kind of waqfs can be likened to the Banking Sector in modern world. Generally they were run with 15% interest for the needy people: "It is observed that the number of these waqfs increased dramatically. In the 19th century,

56.81% of all the waqfs were cash money waqfs." (26) In the 15th century when there was no banking sector, the service conducted by the cash money waqfs prevented the way of usury and protected the debtor from being oppressed under the obligation of the usurer. (26)

Another significant contribution of the waqfs is seen at employment rates. "12 % of the staff employed in 1910s, 15% after 1923, and 1% in 1990s were employed in waqf system." (27) From the figures above, it is easy to say that, waqf system lost its importance and parallel to this, its contribution to the economy depleted at the second half of the 20th century.

The impact of the waqfs on the increase of cultural activities cannot be overlooked. The most beautiful pieces of Turk-Islam arts were practiced with the provision of the waqfs. As for the field of education, all schools except the military and technical ones were financed by the philanthropic endowments. (Öztürk, 31) At this period, since there were only boarding schools, which were free for students, all the education expenses were rendered by the waqfs donated for educational services. The salaries of the staff charged at the education services also were supplied by the waqfs. Hence, the state was paying totally nothing for these services. Another contribution to education is seen on the field of libraries. Waqfs significantly supported the maintenance of the libraries. According to an Ottoman scholar named Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, in 1914, there was just one library affiliated to the state and it was not equal in his capacity to the worst of the library supported by waqfs. (Öztürk, 31)

As a result, the solidarity created by the waqfs, which protects the poor, the needy, the disabled and orphans by providing education and health services can be considered as one of the most important causes preventing the possible social conflict inside the Empire. Through the system, the people trusted in the government more. However, the magic in the system began to vanish through the end of the 17th century as the economy started to go bad. The most fundamental reason of decadence in the system surely resulted from the bad economy, yet there were other reasons too, such as the mal-management of trustees and the government's embezzling waqf properties and illegal sales. Looking at the worsening situation of the waqfs, some researchers find the reason of the economic and military failures of the Empire in the waqf system asserting that the system itself produced a class of jobless lazy people always living on others' money and help. (Öztürk, 20) But

this is not the right judgment since evaluating the system by just examining the last period of the Empire would not be so objective.

Having stated the role and function of the waqf in Islamic civilization shortly, going back into the origins of this system will be illuminating for the rest of this study. How did such a fast-developing and fruitful system come about and which civilizations influenced it? Philanthropic activities and foundations existed even in the oldest civilizations. Babylonian, Egyptian, Greek, German, and Roman laws give us the idea that some philanthropic foundations existed in old times. Also, as far as we learn from Prof. Ahmet Akgündüz's book, in Uygurs, which is an old Turkic state, there were some Buddhist foundations. Which of these civilizations, to what extent affected the formation of the Islamic waqfs is still a big question, which is beyond the confines of this paper. However, recent researches admit the influence of the Babylonian, Sasanid, Jewish and Buddhist cultures while rejecting the Western effects except the Byzantium. (Çızakça, 5)

The faith in Islam developed and institutionalized waqf system, which had been influenced by other civilizations. The Holy book Koran contains lots of rules commanding solidarity and social charity for each individual. Moreover, the practices and words of Prophet Mohamed paved the way for the system. For example, the words of the Prophet below explain the causes urging Moslems to forming waqf institutions. "When a man dies, all his acts come to an end, but three: recurring charity, or knowledge(by which people benefit), or a pious offspring who pays for him." (Müslim, 1992: bab3, hadith14) Prof. Çızakça states that the aforementioned word fits well with the goals of the system and he explains: "The waqf fitted the criteria. It indeed, assures ongoing, recurring charity for many years···it can finance scholars whose lasting works will benefit mankind for a long period···finally the management of waqf can be trusted to the offspring of the founder so that he would pray for the deceased since, thanks to his waqf, he or she is not destitute. (6)

The waqf system traveled to the West from the East during the Crusades. In the Western sources examining the influence of waqf system on the Western institutions, we see the fact that the foundation named as "College des Dixhuit" founded in Paris in 1180 was greatly influenced by waqf system. A similar case is seen in the philanthropic institution established by the Spanish pilgrims in Rome. A recent research done by Monica Gaudiosi focuses on the influence of waqfs on English trusts while creating a new agenda.

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Gaudiosi tries to refute the thesis telling that the English trusts were formed under the influence of Roman and German laws. And she tries to prove that the legal structure and social use of the trusts were transferred from Islamic waqfs. Prof. Çızakça's book, based on Gaudiosi's thesis, gives us the principal similarities between the trusts and waqfs. We will touch upon the most striking ones here.

First of all, to the historical facts, there were no such institutions having complicated and developed legal structure and economic power before Islamic waqfs. To the documents, the period the trusts appeared meets the second half of the 13th century when the interaction between Islamic countries and Europe increased the most. For example, Franciscan Friars, who was the first person transferring the waqf system to Britain, had lived in Jerusalem between 1219 and 1220, and got a chance to observe Islam culture and civilization closely. Consequently, Çızakça states: "All the conditions necessary for the transfer of waqfs, i.e. contact, detailed knowledge about the way the institution to be borrowed functions etc., already existed.(10)

Other than the historical facts, Gaudiosi's thesis is also verified by the similarities between two institutions. Prof. Çızakça indicates that both systems preserve the property and the revenue is spent just for philanthropic goals. The revenue cannot be spent for a different objective and cannot be possessed by someone else. The founder can endow his properties disregarding the laws relating inheritance. These are the principal peculiarities of Islamic waqfs. Needless to say, the two systems are not alike in all points and, they differ in several items. In English trusts, the founder continues to own the endowed property. This constitutes at contrast to the philosophy behind Islamic waqfs, which supposes the endowed property as God's.

Comparison of the documents ensures us that, although there had been some differences between two systems, we have persuasive evidence for the thesis that Islamic waqfs helped the formation of the origins of English trusts. In addition to all these, Monica Gaudiosi's research provides another striking evidence for this argument. Walter de Merton who founded the Merton College in Oxford was a clergyman in the 13th century in England holding the high position of the Chancellor of England. In 1266, after having determined the statutes of his college, Merton College was given to the service of the community. The statutes written by Merton first announce the goals of the foundation as in the tradition of an Islamic waqf. Then, he puts his conditions determining to whom the waqf

would serve and help and under what conditions his family would benefit the waqf, which is exactly the same as a family waqf in Islam. Monica observes that: "the structure of Merton College fulfils a number conditions necessary for the establishment of an Islamic waqf and does not violate any of the stipulations of the Islamic waqf law···Were the Merton documents written in Arabic rather than Latin, the statutes could surely be accepted as a waqf instrument." (12)

CONCLUSION

Waqf system contributed a lot to the Islamic states in social and economic sense. The recent researches indicate that the system, having well developed and highly complicated laws, was transferred to the West during the Crusades. Monica Gaudiosi opened a new agenda as to the impact of the East upon the English trusts. Gaudiosi's research has been given importance by Prof. Çızakçı and supported with further examination regarding the similarities and differences between the two systems. Both academicians concluded as follows: the origins of the English trusts can be traced to the Islamic waqfs in the light of the historical facts and the serious similarities in their laws and structures.

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Early Pan-Islam. A Contemporary View

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The historiography of such political phenomenon as Pan-Islamism appear simul-taneously with the appearance of Sultan Abdulhamid II and his political and religious life, as a proponent of a unified Islam as the best defense of Ottoman sovereignty-albeit indirect and more of a propaganda war waged against the West throughout the Muslim world as we will see. The first scholarly works, the truth, not critical, have appeared at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth century. Authors of these articles and books very frequently express only opinions sometimes far from the truth. They differ concerning Pan-Islamism: from sharp criticism and aversion before unconditional support. We shall consider in this historiographical review practically all accessible researches up to this moment. In this article we shall not consider the person of the Sultan in detail. We are interested more with his political steps and their estimation.

We shall begin the review with a historiography of the nineteenth century.

George Percy Badger emphasized in his article that the word Kalifah occurs twice in the Quran[1]. Synonymous with the title of ' khalifah' , but indicating more especially the religious primacy of ' Imam' , whose office, *anglice* ' the Imamate' of Islam, is always supposed to be included in the Khalifate. Friday visits of the Ottoman Sultans to one of the principal mosques at Constantinople, albeit they no longer discharge, personally, the functions of Imam, delegating a *Naib* or one to act in their stead[2].

In 1896 in ' Contemporary Review' Ahmed Riza published article entitled ' The Caliph and His Duties' [3]. In this article he analyzed duties of contemporary caliphs in historical perspective. In his opinion Sultans appear to Occidentals as clothed with all power, absolute

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[1] *Badger G.P.* The Precedents and Usages Regulations the Muslim Khalifate. ' *The Nineteenth Century*' . 1877. Vol. II. P. 274.

[2] Ibid. P. 274f. *G. Badger* says in his article that in modern practice is strongly condemned by some Muslim doctors, who hold that it is incumbent upon the Imam himself to discharge its duties, constituting as they go to the highest dignity of the supreme Imamate, and only real and legitimate title to that office. P. 275.

[3] *Riza A.* The Caliph and His Duties. ' *Contemporary Review*' . 1896. Vol. 70. P. 206-209.

masters of the lives and property of their subjects, a king or Roman dictator invested with unlimited authority[4]. He claims that the Sultan is the only person who profits by this false conception, and that the spiritual and temporal power of the Caliphate belongs to the successor of Mahomet, and to be true and faithful to tradition is the duty of the Caliph and to be observed[5].

According to Ahmed Riza, Mahomet did not name a successor, and the Caliph was, in principle, a dictator freely chosen, clothed with absolute power, but responsible to people of all races. Even at this time, when a new Sultan was invested with sovereign power, it was necessary that he have the sanction of the people, a consecration which is given in the ceremony called *biat*[6].

Wilfred Blunt in his books says that the Koreysh was first a title of the Caliphate; but we may reasonably suppose that within the limits of his own dominions, and even to the masses and the vulgar, the Ottoman Emperor' s sublime proceedings met with approval[7]. In his opinion orthodox Musulman writhers recognize four distinct phases which the office of Khalifeh has undergone, and four distinct periods of its history[8].

Khalifeh is derived from the Arabic root, Khalafa.

Sir J. Redhouse in a small pamphlet analyzed the Sultan title of Caliph. In his opinion, the role of the Sultan of Turkey as assigned in the constitution accords with that of the Caliph in the world of Islam, and with how this is understood by the great majority of the Muslims themselves in all parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Simultaneously, he quotes the opinion of a Member of Parliament who says that the Sultan is no more the head of the Muslims than the Tsar of Muscovy is the head of the Roman Catholics or Protestants[9]. He also claims that for the forty million or more Muslims said to be subjects of Her Majesty, ' *Qaisar-i-Hing*' , the majority, probably, will be orthodox Sunni believers, and accept the claim as a cherished

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[4] *Riza A.* Op. cit. P.206.

[5] Ibid. P.206.

[6] *Riza A.* The Caliph... P. 206.

[7] *Blunt W.S.* The Future of Islam. London, 1882. P. 50.

[8] *Blunt W.S.* The Future... P. 53

[9] *Redhouse J.W.* A Vindication of the Ottoman Sultan' s tittle of ' Caliph' . London, 1877. P. 3. The statement about that the Sultan is not Caliph completely nothing is argued. The matter is that the author of these words obviously has not understood that the caliph generally is spiritual, instead of the political leader. The Islamic religion in the spiritual plan is more uniform, than Christianity divided into Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Therefore certainly orthodox, in other as well as the Catholic leader cannot be the leader of all Christian society.

article of their faith[10],

Importantly, the title of Caliph is indissolubly Pan-Islamic in its conception. A. Vambery in his article asked important question long ago in this regard: ' Is Pan-Islamism a scarecrow invented for political purposes, or is it a real danger to our civilizing efforts in Mohammedan Asia, and particularly to England as the Power which rules over the largest number of Mohammedan subjects in the world?' [11]. In his opinion, if Pan-Islamism denotes a religious community, in strong opposition to unbelievers, animated by a proselytizing zeal and thus declaring war on all those who intend to destroy it through some political action, then we must look upon it as an old way and very old association, sanctioned by the Prophet, and that the fundamental principle is religious not political--all true believers are brethren, and why the Hadj is so important, as a holy pilgrimage and annual meeting of true believers in Mecca and Medina, and one of the pillars of Islam[12].

Hans Kohn discusses in depth the phenomenon of Pan-Islamism as having roots in the needs of the Turkish Empire, but also in the revival of faith initiated by the Wahabis, but also in the example of the West and its imperial tendencies and practices--but at bottom an impulse to resist and repulse the attacks of European powers[13]. Indeed, the chief architect and defender of the Pan-Islamic idea was Djemal ed Din el Afghani, an Iranian in whose veins flowed the blood of the Prophet-as the title ' Sidi' suggests[14]. In Kohn' s opinion, Afgani found support for his ideas at the court of Sultan Abdulhamid II. who was among the first to institute a Pan-Islamism as a kind of foreign policy and thus return to the original idea of the Caliph as the chief protector of all Mohammedans[15]. The first Ottoman Constitution more or less supports this. Carlo Nallino, quoting the Ottoman Constitution, underscores the fact that "the distinguished Ottoman Sultanate, which the supreme Caliph of Islam holds, shall be occupied by the eldest of the race of Osman, in accordance with ancient relations. H.M. the sultan, in that he is Caliph, is protector of the Moslem religion. He is Lord (Hukumdar) and Sovereign (Padishah) of all Ottoman subjects"[16].

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[10] *Redhouse J.W.* Op.cit. P. 5.

[11] *Vambery A.* Pan-Islamism. ' *The Nineteenth Century and After*' . LX. 1906. P. 547.

[12] Ibid. P. 547.

[13] *Kohn H.* A History of Nationalism in the East. New York, 1929. P. 38.

[14] Ibid. P. 38.

[15] *Kohn H.* A. Op.cit. P. 39.

[16] *Nallino C.A.* The Caliphate. ' *Extract from Arab bulletin*' . Kairo, 1918. P.12. and see the first translation of the Ottoman constitution into the French language *Ubicini A.* La Constitution Ottomane. Paris, 1877. P. 20-21.

However, as C. Nallino points out, Abdulhamid II considered it essentially outside the bounds of Islamic or Sharia law to presume that the Caliphate should exercise such political power or religious authority over the great majority of Moslems, and was content to go achieve something akin to this in a variety of more indirect ways. One of the means used, for example, was to print collections of *khutbas* in Arabic for Friday prayer in which his name would appear. These *khutbas* in his honor were recited in Indian and Malaysian Mosques, giving the impression that the Turkish Sultan was indeed the supreme monarch of Islam. Above all, Abdulhamid II pains to appear to be the sole protector of Moslems everyone, even if they were subjects of European Governments-not unlike France for so long, taken upon herself the role of protector of Christianity in the East. Turkish Consuls, playing on the European belief in the religious character of the Caliphate, moreover, had considerable success as a consequence, acquiring a high degree of influence--both religious and political — over Moslems in other states, especially in Britain[17].

Lothrop Stoddard considered Abdul Hamid II to be among the strangest personalities of modern times. He emphasizing his spiritual headship of the Mohammedan world rather than his political headship of the Turkish state, and how he endeavored win the active support of all Moslems and, by doing so, discourage European powers from aggressively pursuing an assault upon the Ottomans. Before long Abdul Hamid II's brilliant Pan-Islamic propaganda campaign, moreover--and which used a number of secretive and, sometimes, tortuous methods - Constantinople was a Mecca for a number of fanatics and anti-Western tutors like Djemal ed-Din. And so from Constantinople there went forth literally swarms of hand-picked emissaries, and disseminating to the most distant reaches of the Islamic world, the Caliph's message of hope and deliverance from menacing infidel rule[18].

In conclusion, and quoting Dwight Lee as Pan-Islamism and the revival of the caliphate are linked with the whole problem of the reaction of the Islamic world to the impact of the Occident, a satisfactory and fundamentally sound historical treatment can be made only if Islamic sources can be studied. Furthermore, in such a study of Pan-Islamism not only must

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[17]Ibid. P.23. Turkey by now was the only Mohammedan State capable in any way of withstanding the Christian Powers, and to who the Sunni Moslem reaction against European extension - an extension which was slowly swallowing up Moslem territories and attempting to impose its wishes on the few still independent State - could look with any degree of faith. Thus, with the assistance of European ignorance, Abdul Hamid II began his well-conceived Pan-Islamic policy. (Ibidem).

[18]*Stoddard L.* The New World of Islam. London, 1932. P. 54f. In this monograph the author expresses own opinion concerning this problem. The decision of it is categorical, but it does not maintain criticism.

the intellectual and political developments in all the various Moslem countries be clearly understood, but also the international relations of the great powers toward one another and toward the Islamic countries must be taken into account. Only after such a study can one definitely decide whether an effort to translate the "tendency" toward Islamic unity into an actual movement was a phantasm or a reality and whether Pan-Islamism was a genuine Moslem reaction to Western encroachment or merely a weapon of imperialism, conceived by Western brains and forged by Western hands[1].

In this we see how many-sided and problematic the history of an idea can be, in this case that of Pan-Islamism and of religious and political unity in general. The problem of the Occident and the Orient as inventions by their opposites also becomes clear, and that presents perhaps the greatest problem of all.

All listed works have common fault. Researchers in these articles reflect only own opinion. It very much is frequently far from true. And opinions of authors are frequently groundless. They do not prove to be true authentic sources. These researches should always be verified with the data of sources. However applying the critical approach researchers can use these articles in the researches.

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[1] *Lee D.* The Origins of Pan-Islam. ' *The American Historical Review'* , Vol. 47, No. 2, pp 286-287.

ENGENDERING MYHTS AND ANDRO-GENETICS
OF MISOGYNY IN THE WEST

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This paper discusses the strategic and misogynistic representation of women in ancient myths as temptresses, and thus a threat to patriarchal order, and how it helps create gender spheres.[1] The paper also intends to figure out the way patriarchal narratives understood, assessed, treated, oppressed, described and stereotyped women for centuries and the reasons why women have come under the control and rule of absolutist patriarchy through a discourse of hegemony.[2] The study will use three hypotheses: that myths are important in understanding the society's attitude towards women, that Western myths, in particular, are often misogynistic, and that ancients myths and their view of women do not die out, but linger on in the minds of later writers.

Gender issues have always been a crux of attention for philosophers, religious groups, lawmakers, and literature of societies from the very onset of cultures. Gender is defined as the set of all cultural expectations, attributes, and behavioral and even communication patterns assigned to individuals of both sexes.[3] Therefore, while biology refers to the differences between males and females, and constructs the potential behavior of men and women, gender refers to the socially designated characteristics that are associated with masculinity and femininity.[4] The objectification of women by men of literature and thinking have often led to the representation of women in literary and cultural spheres as physically and mentally weak, inferior, incapable, dependent, and above all prone to temptation.[5] In addition, thanks to the myths created about their invaluable nature and mental insufficiency, men have been able to hold women in subjection, repressed them, and politically, ideologically and economically identified them as "the other."

Granted, women have almost universally have had to go down on the gender seesaw in order for men to go up, but it has been more so in the West from the canonical texts to the contemporary.[6] The gender-oriented approach in the West has subjected women to patriarchal authority. This has been effective in defining the borders of both political and cultural life of women.[7] Let alone literature, language also constructs gender biases. To name but a few, the very expression "woman" ("wife-man") in English is derivative, of

"man," which illustrates both the subordinate, and ancillary position of women in the Western cultural and historical context. Physically speaking, according to the Bible, woman was created out of Adam's rib, and is his derivative. Etymologically speaking too, "woman" is derivative of "man." This stems from the cultural roots of Western thought, Greco-Roman, and Judeo-Christian. [8] The Hebrew "ishah" ("woman") is similarly derivative of "ish" ("man"), used to refer to Eve and Adam respectively. Woman is also the "manna" of man, whom the latter can enjoy. A good etymological dictionary will tell you that "man" is related to the root "to think," which, pushed a little further, implies that only the male exists and thinks. While "the man in the street" is the average or ordinary man, the woman walking in the street is a streetwalker; i.e., a prostitute! Man is a human; woman is a humanoid! While "man" implies power, virility, courage, and can readily stand for human beings of both sexes; woman can only stand in relationship to man because she is etymologically a "wife-man." Furthermore, such an expression as "The bus was manned by thirty people" does not care an iota about the existential and gender status of women. The usage of "to man" in the sense of "to crowd" is another example of ignorance by men of women, again; it shows the nobodiness of women in the patriarchal language and unconscious. In other words, this is not a simple linguistic feature, but a telling cultural indicator of how women are conceived by the members of a certain culture creating and using such expressions.

From the moment of birth, every individual's life is governed by invisible rules and expectations set by a particular society, language and culture, which shape his/her identity in the course of life. [9] The normative sense of masculinity and femininity is also constructed in the same way. [10] Although it seems to be so, societal sex role expectation is not a recent issue. [11] Sex role expectations of men and women are indeed a long historical process during which the concept of masculinity and femininity has always been subjected to shift. [12] Politics, economy, ideology and religious beliefs cooperate to turn biological differences into a gender war where women have been the battleground as well the losers. [13] Assigned sex roles of the society have led men to have an advantageous position over women in every sphere of life throughout history. One of the most significant reasons why man has had a superior position is that most of the cultures have been patriarchal. [14]

Both biology and sociology have attempted to decipher the components of gender in order to clarify what is biological and what is sociological. [15] Sometimes historical evidence, and often psychology, especially Freudian, has been evoked in an attempt to reveal the depth of manhood and the elements that could not be explored in the unconscious

otherwise.[16] This other includes many of the qualities men have churned out about women, sometimes legitimizing misconceptions and biases through religion and mythology, sometimes mythologizing and mystifying medical findings about women's body as well psyche.[17] Patriarchal psyche and all that it represents has resulted in the ontogenesis of an androcentric language, literature and exegesis—to the disadvantage of women.[18] Therefore, women, among other negative attributes, have epitomized the "Unclean; taboo. The Devil's Gateway," and she had to be "three steps behind;" buried alive "with the lord, burned alive on the funeral pyre, burned as witch at the stake. Stoned to death for adultery. Beaten, raped. Bartered. Bought and sold. Concubinage, prostitution, white slavery. The hunt, the sexual prey. Domestic confinement. Illiterate. Denied vision. Excluded from council, ritual, activity, learning, language, when there was neither biological nor economic reason to be excluded."[19] Patriarchal myths and their patriarchal interpereters have participated in the process.

Traditionally viewed, a myth is a story, which originates in a certain culture, and which is derived from primitive beliefs, presenting supernatural episodes to explain cosmic forces and the natural order.[20] However, there is more to myths that the definition reveals: myths are dynamic forces in human societies. Leeming states that such scholars as Emile Durkheim, Franz Boas, and Bronislaw Malinowski, who have done intensive studies concerning the origins of myths, see the society "as the shaping force behind the mythology of a given culture."[21] Myths are, in this sense, the archetypes of the cultural unconscious. In fact, Campbell considers that myths show "how the society nourishes certain mythic archetypes within its structure."[22] Therefore, myths are ubiquitous in time and place in their treatment of communal and collective motifs and crucially important for a culture. The primitive mentality does not does not concoct mythological tales, it actually lives them in terms of a worldview. They both constitute and are constituted by the society's cultural values enshrined in "the collective unconscious" just as dreams reflect unconscious desires and anxieties of the individual.[23]

The dominant view in myths sees woman as a temptress, evildoer and a threat to the male hegemony, which stems from mythic patterns of millennia ago. As Northrop Frye argues in "Archetypes of Literature" that "the myth is the central informing power that gives archetypal significance."[24] Portrayal of women in myths will map out the case here. Since they are originally male-made, and patriarchal in nature, myths are essentially misogynistic. Western myths such as those of Pandora and Eve, "condemn the female through her sexuality and explain her position as her well-deserved punishment for the primal sin under whose unfortunate consequences the race yet suffers."[25] Then, it appears

that both the Judeo-Christian as well as Greco-Roman myths agree about accusing woman of the sexual sin rather than showing empathy to her. Narratives like them "serve the patriarchal system" which makes history "his [man's] story" by casting life in "a masculine perspective" (Martin 1988:29).[26] Mythological patterns have not only been affective defining the social roles, but these elements have played an important role in setting the rule for the narratives of later centuries to follow in the West.

It is not surprising that in a male oriented culture woman is oppressed. Normally, in a culture that upholds patriarchy, myth and literature are also patriarchal. A literature, which has been codified and canonized by men, depicts woman in accordance with their political, religious and traditional point of view. Needless to say, women have not had a position in literature on their own, but in relation with a male. Our knowledge about the history of women is mostly restricted to the writings of male writers. As Cole argues, "what we know about ancient women is derived from a masculine source—from the things which men said about women, from the images of women which they created in literature and art, and from the informal rules and legal regulations which they constructed in order to deal with them."[27] As a result, women have learned and internalized what men have thought and written, interpreted about them. Moreover, De Beauvoir says, "woman herself recognizes that the world is masculine on the whole; those who fashioned it, ruled it, and still dominate it today are men."[28] De Beauvoir further argues that woman has always been man's dependent. Although she has never been his slave, the two sexes have never shared and lived in an equal world. Woman hating and belittling attitude of man toward woman is associated with patriarchy, and patriarchies imagine or picture themselves from the male point of view.

Mythic criticism, which is also called archetypal criticism, is based on the notion that several modern leitmotifs are actually extensions of ancient myths. Therefore, Northrop Frye, in his Anatomy of Criticism, argues "the structural principles of literature are closely related to mythology and comparative religion."[29] In Sexual Politics Millett points out that "two leading myths of Western culture are the classical tale of Pandora's box and the Biblical story of the Fall," which have become "highly influential ethical justifications of things as they are."[30] Therefore, in addition to the other societal myths such as the myth of Pandora and Medusa, the Biblical monomyth of creation legitimizes the mistreatment of women by projecting general misconceptions about women, and thus justifying the patriarchy's attitude to them. Myths like these are "repressive" of women, and "collaborate in the subordination-by-domestication of women."[31] Then, it appears that myths of ancient times are important in understanding the literature of the present as well.

This one-sided opinionation stemming from both Greco-Roman and Judeo Christian myths naturally creates stereotypes in the depiction of woman in life and literature. The masculine perspective makes an essential dichotomy between man and woman. According to this dichotomy, man is supposed to be aggressive, dominant, hard, logical, intellectual, competitive, achievement-oriented, inventive, rational, and initiative whereas woman is passive, compliant, soft, emotional, intuitive, co-operative, nurturing, and tender."[32] While a man was supposed to be an assertive and dominant master, women were obliged to be submissive and passive, invisible and silent, completely absent from the public life.[33] Myths are in this sense the keys to the "unconscious notions which men entertained about women", and they clearly explain "what *woman* meant to men," it is crucial to analyze the original myth of creation to see the ado-genetics of misogyny and hegemonic discourse.[34]

Myth and literature are only two of the media, which serve and reflect the patriarchal misogyny tendency towards women. The collective unconscious, as Jung sees it, finds expression in "archetypes," in articulated images that share certain basic features despite the particularities of time and place. The Biblical myth of creation is the first of its kind to emphasize the archetype of paradise, which means "garden," and the image of woman as demon, which establishes itself as a monomyth (basic myth) in Western literature. The myth in Genesis tells of humankind's fall soon after their creation. Yahweh, the Biblical God, is the author of the universe who creates within six days a series of dual oppositions: the heaven and the earth; light and darkness; the day and the night. Then, comes the creation of Adam and Eve. The archetypal man and woman sin by eating the forbidden fruit from "the tree of knowledge of good and evil," which results in their subsequent expulsion from Paradise. In later centuries, this story, written millennia ago, has become a symbol of humankind's first disobedience, loss of innocence, and its fall.

An interpretation of the Western myths from the standpoint of archetypal criticism is, therefore, both relevant and indispensably necessary to reveal the unconscious of the West.[35] It is self-evident that the Biblical monomyth has a number of misogynistic implications. Above all, the myth has it that in the beginning there is a primordial chaos. Out of this chaos, Yahweh creates an orderly universe, the Garden of Eden, in which he later places Adam, the representative of his patriarchy. In this sense, Eden is the primary and ultimate utopia in the myth (Gen. 2: 8-9). The woman comes later in the order of creation, and she is only a derivation of man. She is named by Adam, and has no individual self (Gen. 2: 23). That is, Eve is depicted as inferior to Adam, and later proves to be rebellious and falls prey to her instinctual desires symbolized by the serpent that urges her to eat the forbidden fruit. The Biblical narrative implicitly suggests that the man is godly,

and the woman is serpentine and demonic: Yahweh and Adam are one party, the serpent and Eve another. Eve is also presented as the negative party in the pairs created: she is contrasted with the man just as darkness is contrasted with light. Finally, she destroys the archetypal paradise, which is gifted to the man originally, and becomes a source and symbol of agony of all humankind. Death and disorder are introduced into the universe; the harmony in divinely ordered Eden is soon transformed into disharmony by Eve, who transforms the utopia into an agonizing dystopia.

Thus, as Lieberman formulates it, many myths, like the Biblical one, function as "training manuals for girls" designed to "acculturate" them to "traditional roles." [36] According to patriarchal narratives, "the only legitimate woman is the one who can be legally controlled, socially defined as a wife." [37] In this way, the patriarchal tradition considers the male "equivalent" to "human" while the female is "deviant and inferior." [38] As Jung maintains in his Modern Man in Search of a Soul, such psychic residue of misogyny is older than "the historical man," and has been ingrained in him from ancient times on, and resurfaces in "hereditary forms of behavior" in the literature of societies. [39] Just as the mythic narratives are reflectors of the society in which they emerge such genres as the epic, the novel and story are of the several literary forms in which the mythic archetypes make themselves manifest. [40]

Neither the Judaic Biblical story nor the Greek Hesiodic present a plausible view of women. As Campbell puts it, "the corruption of life, the sinfulness of natural impulses" and the "identification of woman with sin, of the serpent with sin" in the Judeo-Christian tradition all go back to the Biblical monomyth. [41] Based on the assumptions of this monomyth, each woman has traditionally been considered as a fallible descendant of "Eve," and each "evil" in the West. [42] She is supposed to have caused the mortality of all coming generations through her temptation. Thus, the whole story amounts to the supposition that love and sexuality are despicable; so is Eve because she initiates it first. Eve is held responsible not only for sinning, but also for mortality, which is ordained later. That is, even if both Adam and Eve have eaten out of the forbidden tree, Adam, when rebuked by Yahweh, accuses her of tempting him: "The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me fruit of the tree, and I ate" (Genesis 3:13). Therefore, in addition to the attribute of arch sinner, the woman is at the same time made the scapegoat. The female figure in the monomyth is seen as "the epitome of sex," and, consequently, as "the corrupter," and never a pedestal of love.

To be more precise, the Biblical narrative always refers to "knowing" as a form of sexual intercourse that results in childbirth: "Now Adam knew Eve his wife and she

conceived and bore Cain...with the help of the Lord" (Genesis 4:1-2). Then, the Biblical woman's sole responsibility assigned by the Bible is wifehood and motherhood; she should not attempt at knowledge, and power through knowledge. As Daly observes, this means that women should not aspire "too high," and imposes on them "a strangely ambivalent fear of success." [43] The monomyth not only establishes the basis for the age-old assumption that man should dominate woman, it also defines and determines the roles of both sexes. [44] The man becomes the master and breadwinner, and the woman is assigned the duties of wife, mother, and housekeeper. Yahweh defines the role of the woman first: "I will greatly multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children, your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you." Then, he talks to the man: "in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; and you shall eat plants of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the ground" (Genesis 3:16-9). Elsewhere in the Bible, the following is accusatively noted of Eve: "From a woman sin had its beginning, and because of her we all die" (Sirach 25: 23). Love and sin are reciprocally referential in the story.

Eve has long since been the center of severe criticism of the Church fathers and Christian philosophers for many centuries. In fact, the image of Eve as a temptress in the Bible has resulted in an extremely negative impact on women throughout the Judeo-Christian tradition. [45] All women were believed to have inherited from their mother, the Biblical Eve, both her guilt and her guile. [46] Consequently, they were all untrustworthy, morally inferior, and wicked. Menstruation, pregnancy, and childbearing were considered the just punishment for the eternal guilt of the cursed female sex. This treatment and the feelings towards woman directly find their main source in the Genesis account of the creation in "Holy Bible." It was not only Eve responsible for the bad fortune of mankind, but all women descending from the same origin were thought to have the same characteristics as "the mother of all living creatures." For the last two thousand years or so, Eve has represented the fundamental character and identity of all women. Through Eve's words and actions, the true nature of women was revealed. Eve represents everything about a woman a man should guard against. The prevalent belief in the West has been that all women are by nature disobedient, weak-willed, prone to temptation and evil, disloyal, untrustworthy, deceitful, seductive, and motivated in their thoughts and behavior purely by self-interest. The consideration of woman "as the cause of human suffering, knowledge and sin" represents "the most crucial argument of the patriarchal tradition in the West." [47] Such assumptions make woman guilt-ridden, ashamed of her own sexuality, and less daring in her life: she is gradually acculturated to accept herself as the

other sex views her. In another words, the myth about woman passes from the mythical to the socio-cultural realm to appear as a culturally acknowledged catchword.[48]

Just as the Judeo-Christian tradition has canonized the oppression of woman through the Scriptures, the Greco-Roman tradition also found ways of legitimizing the oppression of women through mythology. The earliest Greek account of creation includes the story of how power changed its side from matriarchy to patriarchy. It is similar to the Christian myth of creation only in the beginning when there was only Chaos, a shapeless mass of darkness and meaninglessness. Unlike the Christian version, the first god to come into existence is Gaia, Mother Earth. Uranus, Father Sky, is born of Gaia as she sleeps without making love. He becomes her husband, and together they have many children including the primitive gods known as the Titans. Uranus, Father Sky does not show any love or affection to any of the offsprings he has fathered, and then he grows very cruel and hides them inside Gaia. His son Cronus defeats his father and becomes the Lord of the Universe. The story of a son's violent overthrow of his father is repeated in the next generation when Zeus, the son of Cronus, grows up and overpowers his father. Finally, the grandson of Mother Earth, Zeus alone became the sole patriarchal ruler by eliminating the Father, Mother Earth and Cronus. All in all, this story of creation stages a war in the history of patriarchy. In the struggle between fathers and sons woman has no place, and she is totally crossed out of history.

The original myth of creation by Hesiod, and the monomyth of creation in Genesis form the archetypes and "they point to one single fact that patriarchy wishes the domination of woman by man."[49] Hesiod's story actually implies the pristine model of existence of a matriarchal society in Ancient Greece.[50] Gaia is the initiator of life on earth and later comes Uranus who falls prey to Oedipal complex even before Oedipus appears in the Sophoclean vein. There, however, is no love involved in the relation of these two creators of the Earth. She dominates chaos, and transmogrifies it only to be dominated by the phallogocentric order. The whole relation between them boils down to a sexual act with the male God having the upper and the Mother Earth the lower status, thus impliying the supremacy of the male order: "And huge Ouranos came on bringing night with him, and desiring love he embraced Gaia and lay over her stretched out complete."[51] Love, then, appears in the vitiated form of sexual intercourse in the Hesiodic world resulting in the birth of posterity, and sexual politics.

Just like the sign is constituted by the signifier and the signified, the male principle has the upper hand, and the female the lower, signifying misogyny at its fullest: the common sign of the classical legacy. As the story develops, the early matriarchal society

in the Hesiodic world is replaced by patriarhcy, which causes a war between the father and son, first between Uranus and Cronus and then Cronus and Zeus. Ironically, it is implied that the mother is but an accomplice who goads the son to patricide. Moreover, the female principle Gaia is, above all, undermined, and, she being only a spectator, watches the power politics staged by her husband and son. With the victory of the son, Cronus, a political power presiding over time, comes also the caterer to emotional and sexual needs, who is destined to serve men to follow. who, after all, have created her, the obdurate goddess of love.

The Ancients must have been aware of the implications of origins of the goddess because, as is known, the emasculating power of love turns gradually into a devise of male power politics, and will later desecrate the whole male-dominated order by causing the Trojan war, and death of thousands in the Hellenistic world as Homer narrates it in the Iliad. The whole work is virtually an expanded version of the motto in the Hesiodic poem: love "makes men weak, overpowers the clever mind" Lurking behind all these is a woman of Pandora's descent, which will later mark out the logocentric duality in the Socratic tradition: reason versus emotions.

Although women are sometimes divine beings. the existence of the goddesses is perceived as the representation of women in society. Hera is a married woman who is jealous of her husband. Demeter is the symbol of motherhood. Hestia is the goddess of hearth and home while Aphrodite is the goddess of sexual love. Each goddess is identified with socially given roles of women. The roles given to goddesses can also be something between possible and impossible for women in real life. Being a goddess, maiden or priestess, women experience some physical changes in mythological stories. They become invisible or turn into an animal or a plant. Io is an example for this. She is the victim of the lust of Zeus and the jealousy of Hera. She is a priestess of Hera, and is unmarried. Zeus has sex with her and she is transformed into a white cow. Kallisto's story is nearly the same as Io's. She is a figure in a group of nymphs that accompany Artemis in hunting and because of this, she has to remain a maiden. However, Zeus has sex with her and Artemis transforms her into a bear. Physical changes of the characters in the stories signify the impact of social codings on the roles assigned to women. In the stories both of the characters are to remain virgin and transformation into an animal is their punishment. In this way, they become nonentities. The story of Daphne is another significant example. Daphne is an independent and young huntress who hates love and marriage. Apollo falls in love with her and follows her. Desperately escaping from him, Daphne wants her father's help and her father transforms her into a tree. Being a tree, her body and beauty become

invisible, which can be seen as a punishment for her denial of the roles assigned to a woman. She wants to be independent and her choice leads to her losing her body. The cultural signpost has it is that the only way to survive in society is to comply with patriarchy.

On the other hand, there is a strict sense of hierarchy in mythology that penetrates into all spheres of social life. There is, for instance, a hierarchy among gods and goddesses. Zeus is the chief of all and goddesses cannot do anything without asking his permission. Although the goddesses are worshipped for their power over so many aspects of human life, they act only within the limits defined by Zeus and with his approval, or with the cooperation of another god. Zeus honors the virgin goddess Hecate beyond all others and gives her shining gifts. He permits her to help or hinder kings, soldiers in battle; with Poseidon she can help the fisherman, with Hermes the herdsman.

Despite their divine power, goddesses are to obey Zeus. Athena, the daughter of Zeus, is another example. She takes her power from him and works for him, thus she does not appear as an individual and independent character. Neils (2001: 221) states: "Zeus lets Athena do as she pleases and she is favored by her father."[52] She claims that her patronage is commanded by Zeus and carried out to please him." She is a beloved daughter and the servant but not an independent power. Like the other goddesses, Zeus limits her actions and she cannot act independently. Therefore, goddesses are only visible as servants of Zeus but they are invisible as independent individuals, since they have no power to free themselves from Zeus' control.

Hierarchy among gods and goddesses is an inevitable result of the social codings and socialization process through which cultural values and social rules are acquired. Since mythology is a reflection of social structures, it is not independent from the social orderings that turn women into marionettes. Women are led to remain in the barriers set for them and fit into the given rules. In Greek mythology, women are seldom considered in isolation from men, though we will consider important exceptions below, and they seldom have scope for action on their own initiative. Mostly, females are children, nubile maidens or married. What is absent from this female career structure is any stage between initiation and marriage --the stage which allows the male to become a warrior, prove himself and discover himself. Widows are mostly ignored and single women cannot be allowed to exist. When they refuse the given role, women are reflected as evil and destructive. The only women who are seen to express different notions about their primary role in life, or are seen to complain of it, are the evil women of epic and tragedy, who bring destruction on their families and on themselves, like Clytemnestra, Deianeira

and Medea.

In conclusion, patriarchal myths are still today with us in different spectra and media.[58] The myths of the past have lingered on in literature, paintings and the cinema in particular, let alone daily lives. From novels to movies, fashion shows, and commercial ads patriarchal attitudes continue to dominate women's lives, sometimes abusing them while at the same time they seem to be foregrounding them. From Fritz Lang's silent movies like Metropolis (1926), and Woman in the Moon (1929) to sound movies like Blade Runner (1982) by Ridley Scott, Basic Instinct II by Michael Caton-Jones women continue to server patriarchy. Whether in physical or social sense, women continue to experience time-honored roles assigned by patriarchy's social, economic and cultural values.

NOTES

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Müneccim Başı Ahmed Dede'nin "Adab-ı Mutalaa"
adlı risalesinin Tahlili

Sleyman Hayri Bolayi

Müneccim başı Ahmed Dede veya Ahmed bin Lütfullah el-Mevlevî, "Âdâb-ı Mütalaa" adlı 57 sayfalık risalesine kendisinden önceki alimlerin bir tutumunu tenkid ederek başlar.Ona göre bu değerli insanlar ,muhtelif konularda bir çok eser telif ettiler ;fakat onlar bir çok tartışma kitabı yazmalarına rağmen,"Adâb-ı Mutalaa"yı ne andılar,ne de "Âdâb-ı Münâzara " gibi ilmî olarak bir mutâlaa kitabı yazdılar. Halbuki mutalaa kuralları münakaşa kurallarından daha mühimdir. Çünkü talebeler tartışma yapabilmek için çok iyi bir mutâlaa da bulunmaları lâzımdır.eğer bunu yapmazlarsa tartışma mücadele ve husumete dönüşür; bundan da mücadele ve pişmanlıktan başka bir çıkmaz Yazar,risalesini niçin yazdığı sorusuna böyle cevap veriyor ve risale yazmasını böyle temellendiriyor. Burada mutâlaa âdâbını geçmişlerin eserlerinden almasını öğrencinin kendisine bırakalım denmesine el-Mevlevî, karşı çıkarak bunun münazara kurallarını da terk etmek mânâsına geleceğini söyler.(varak,161b)

Kitapta bir mukaddime(giriş), mutalaanın beş maksadı,bir sonuç bir de zeyl(ek) kısmı yer almaktadır.Girişte müellif "mutalaa"nın sözlük ve ıstılah(terim) mânâsı,tarifi ve gayesi üzerinde durur.Sözlükte mütalaa okumak,anlama nüfûz etmek gibi mânâlara gelir. Ama ıstılahta, yani Ahmed Dede'ye göre alimlerin ekseriyetle anlayış geleneği açısından, kavramın elde edilmesi için tarif üzerinde kısaca düşünmek ve metinde ortaya konmuş bilinen lâfızların üzerinde durarak anlamlarına ulaşmak, etraflıca düşünerek metnin ortaya konulmasındaki maksadı kavramaktır.

Mutalaa ilmi nedir? Cevap: Bu, mutalaa kurallarından, şartlarından ve mevzuundan bahs eden ilimdir.Gayesi nedir? Mutalaa ilminin gayesi zihni, görünüşteki kusurlu ve hatalı hareketlerden, hakikatları ve anlamdaki incelikleri kaçırmaktan doğan mahrumiyetten korumaktır. Faydası nedir? Bu kurallarda gizlenen manaların çıkarılmasında ve korunmasında(müraat) ilerleme (terakki) kaydetmektir.

Hedefine gelince:müellif ,hedefi mütali' yani kitabı anlamaya çalışan kimsenin mütalaa esnasında geçireceği dört basamak açısından inceler. Düşünürümüz, burada psikolojik bir unsurdan bahs ediyor ki bence çok mühimdir: O da ibarelerden mutalaayı yapan kimsenin "haz" duymasıdır.Çünkü kitabı anlamağa çalışmaktan zevk almayan kimse, kerhen bir şey

yapamaz, yapsa da ondan hayır gelmez. Bir de yazar mütalaacının "nasib"inin yani payının ve "istidâd"ının bulunmasından bahs ediyor. Burada esas maksat, mütaliin ister taklit isterse tahkik seviyesinde olsun, bilfiil bir ilmi elde etmesidir. Bunun için şu dört basamaktan geçmek gerekir: **Tahsil** yani delile dayanmadan bir takım bilgileri ve malzemeleri edinmek; **tahkik**, kaynaklara inerek ve delillerini toplayarak okumak;**istihzar**, yani kaynağından bilimlerin esasları ve ilkelerine dair aldığı şeyleri tekrar ederek, sindirerek belli bir hazırlık seviyesine gelmek., **tenmiye** veya takviye yani bir çok kaynağa müracaat ederek edindiklerini takviye etmek ve pekiştirmek.(v.163a)

Ahmed Dede, ilmî kemale/mükemmelliğe talip olan mütalaacının da üç basamağı yani **başlangıç,orta** ve **bitiş**(mübted,münteh ve mütevassıt) basamaklarını aşması gerektiğini söyler Başlangıçta olan bir talip, ibareler üzerinde düşünerek mutalaa ile çeşitli mânâlar çıkarmak imkanından mahrumdur.Çünkü o, henüz hocalarının ağzından bir takım şeyleri öğrenmek safhasındadır. Burada şu noktaya işaret etmekte fayda var: Osmanlıda eğitim hoca ile bire bir yapılırdı ve talip ilmi kitaptan evvel hocanın ağzından öğrenirdi. Bu bakımdan müellif burada aynı zamanda yetişecek alim tipinin niteliklerini de belirtmiş oluyor. Ama bitiş noktasında olan talip ise eldeki metinlerden kolayca yeni anlamlar çıkarmak hususunda tam bir meleke/alışkanlık kazanmıştır. Orta basamakta olan talip ise mânâ çıkarma melekesini o da kazanmıştır, fakat mükemmel hale gelememiştir. **Mutlak meleke**, ruhta derinlik ve sağlamlık kazanarak ihtiyarî ve iradî olarak muhtelif uyarılar karşısında oradan kolayca mânâlar çıkarmaya yarayan bir niteliktir. İstihraç melekesi buna tabi olmakla beraber alet ilimlerini usûllerini sağlam bir şekilde edinmek,bunlarla ilgili malzemeleri/mühimmatı hazırlamak ve şu iki işi tamamlamaktır: Hüküm çıkarırken ruhun mutmain, mütemekkin/sağlamlık kazanmış, tereddütten uzak, sıkıntı çekmeden ve gerçekler dünyası ile mutabık kalmakta aynı hususlara dikkat etmesi.ikincisi ise, itminan, temekkün gibi bütün halleri, kullanılmakta olan bütün bilim dallarında gözetmek. bununla da yetinmeyip durmadan mutalaada bulunarak bilimlerin kurallarına/âdâbına ,şartlarına riayet etmek, çıkarılan anlamların bütün diğer sahalara tatbikine yönelmek; bunu da imkan bulursa kendi asrında, kendi beldesinde şifahî olarak, bulamazsa başka uygun şehirlere seyahat etmek suretiyle anlatması , sonra da bunları sınıflara ve çeşitli dallara göre düzene koyması gerekir.

Müellifimiz bu noktada mühim bir şey söylüyor: Talip anlam çıkarma işini bitirdikten ve hocaları melekesinin kemale erdiğini görünce,bu melekenin zamanla zihinlerin de farklılaşmasından dolayı zeki bir öğrencinin daha kısa bir zamanda bu kemale erdiğini fark ederler. Kavrayışı kuvvetli olmayan öğrenci ise daha uzun zamanda bu kemale ulaşır. Zihnin muhtevasının ve düşünüş şeklinin zamanla değişmekte oluşu,mütalaayı da ona göre

düzenlemeyi gerektirmektedir. Bilimler kesinlik/yakîn ve zan mertebelerinde farklıdır.Bu bakımda talibin her ilmi yakîn ve zan derecesinde bilmesi gerekir.Aksi takdirde bir ilmin sahasının genişliği nisbetinde delile ihtiyaç duyup duymadığını fark edemez. Kesinliğin en yüksek derecesi, düşünürümüze göre, hendese/geometridir.

İlimleri yakîne ve zanna dayanması itibariyle sıralayan ve adeta ilimler tasnifi sunan yazar, delillerinin kesinliği itibariyle evveliyat ve zaruriyat mertebesinde olan hendeseden sonra delillerini geometrinin öncüllerine veya önermelerine dayandıran hesap, mesaha ilmi, cebir, mukabele, düzlemsel astronomi, musıkî gelir.Geometrinin ve hesabın kolları/füru olarak telif edilmiş ilimler, fizik/hikmet-tabiiyye, sonra ilahiyat ve onundan da kelam ilim gelir. Sonra tabiat ilimlerine bağlı olarak tıp,yıldızlar ilmi/ilm- i nücûm ve benzerleri gelir. Sonra ilahiyat ilimlerinden fıkıh üsûlü ,nahiv, sarf ve kelime türetme/iştikak gelir.Müellif yine çok önemli bir şeye daha işaret ediyor:İlahiyat ilmini zannın en yüksek mertebesi olarak gösteriyor. Bu anlayış Kant'ın saf akıl ve pratik akıl ayırımını hatırlatıyor. Aslında benzer bir anlayış, daha Osmanlı alimi ve filozofu İbni Kemal'de de görülmektedir. Müellif bir de lengüistik/ilm-i lüğatı ilim saymıyor; çünkü onun önermeleri ve iddiaları şahsî önermeler ve iddialardır. Halbuki ilim,ona göre, "küllî önermelerden ibarettir."(v,165b)

xxx

Talip yahut mütalaacı çeşitli bilimlerin ilkeleri ve esasları ile donandıktan sonra mütalaaya başlarken neler yapması lâzımdır? Mütalaacı önce Allah'ı anacak, ona hamd edecek, O'ndan yardım dileyecek ve sonra İslâm Peygamberine düa okuyacak,"Senin bizae öğrettiğinden başka ilim yoktur. Seni bütün noksan sıfatlardan beri kılarım" ayetini okuyacak,sonra kalbini Allah'ın nurlandırması için bildiği ve faydalı olduğuna inandığı duaları okuyacak. Sonra bir sanat/fenle ilgili bir kitap okuyacaksa evvela tarifine dayanarak bu fenni tasavvur edecek ki kendisinde o fennin icmalî yani özet halinde bir bilgisi hasıl olsun.Sonra bu fennin konusunu tasavvur edecek ki hedefini diğer bilimlerden ayırabilsin, gayesini tasavvur etsin ki o fenni elde etmek hususunda şevki artsın. Müellif bir talibin okuyacağı kitap ve konu üzerinde şuur kazanmış olmasını(meş'ur) da şart koşar. Mesela maddenin mahiyeti ve kaynağını isbat için çalışacaksa heyulanın cevherliği, bunun hariçte mevcudiyetinin isbatı ve diğer bir cevherle birleşerek bileşik bir oluşu hakkında filozofların iddialarını özet olarak bilirse, ayrıntılarıyla birlikte onun hakikatını araştırarak öğrenmek hususunda heveslensin.

Bundan sonra tafsilatlı olarak konuyu mutalaaya başlar, ibarelerde yanlışlar varsa onları tashih eder. Kitabın müfredatını/fihristini ,işlenmiş konuları/mürekkebatını tek tek gözden geçirir, dilsel konularını ve anlamları cihetinden ele alarak dilbilimde meleke kazanır, bu hususta dil bakımından hata olmadığından emin olmalıdır, böylelikle ibarenin

sözlük mânâları ile istılah/terim mânâları arasındaki münasebetlerinin ve bunların çeşitli şekillerinin farkına varır, bunları bilmesi, mümkündür ki zihin kuvvetinin mertebeleri, güvenliği, ruhun meseleleri çıkarmak ve çözmek açısından hatırdan geçmeyen ve umulmadık faydaları ortaya çıkarır,kelimelerin şekilleri arasındaki benzerlikler ve karışmalar/iltibas bakımından hatadan emin olmalı,fiil çekimlerinde ve kipliklerindeki yöntem açısından da konuları tek tek ele almalı, Arapça kelimelerdeki ilave harflerle,aslî harfleri ayırmalı, ziyade harflere dayanarak ince anlamlar ve bunlar arasındaki münasebetleri keşfetmeli, bu hususlardaki hatalardan emin olduktan sonra konuları bu sefer ilgili ilimlerin ibareleri ve lâfızları bakımından esasını teşkil eden vad' cihetinden inceler ; bu suretle küllîyi cüz'îden, geneli özelden, ferdî olanı müşterekten, sözlük anlamını terimden,terim ve hakikatı mecazdan ayırma gücünü elde eder. vad'ın türlerini ayırır, her kelimeye bu vad'ın türlerini tatbik eder. böylece yeni anlamalar keşfeder. nahiv açısından , bileşik kelimeleri parçalarından ayırarak inceler.nahiv ilminde güç kazanır. böylelikle kötü teliften dolayı doğacak güçlükleri çözer.İnce anlamlı çeşitli nükteler kendisine açılır. ibare halin gerektirmesine(muktedal hal) göre, özel durumlar cihetinden sözün zahirine ve batınına uygun düşer; bu özel durumlar,ibarenin tertibi,takdimi,tehiri,tarif ve nekrelikle tavsifinden ortaya çıkan anlamlar cihetiyle bu anlamların mahiyetlerinin gerektirdiği hallerdir. Daha sonra talip,metni belâğat ve meani ilmi açısından inceler, tefsirin inceliklerine ve Kur'an'ın hakikatlarının bilgisine ulaşır.dolayısıyla zor/vahşi anlamların avına çıkabilecek duruma gelir. Bunları ihmal ederse sözün geçmiş,hal ve gelecek ile olan münasebetini bilemediği gibi, meramına da ulaşamaz. Hatta bu münasebetler dayanan ince/dakîk mânâları çıkarmaya muktedir olamaz

Daha sonra mutalaacı, beyan ilminin yani bu metinde benzetmeler, istiareler,kinayeler ve mecazın sair kısımları bakımından güzellikleri(letaif)ni arar ve bulur, ibaredeki terkibî ve ferdî,aslî ve fer'î, mutabık veya *tazminî ve iltizamî* mânâları da çıkardıktan sonra ma'kulat-ı saniye açısından mülahaza eder.Müellif, bu son kavramı açıklar: Bu, mantık ilmidir. Çünkü o, bilinenden bilinmeyeni çıkarır, kavl-i şarihin lafzî,ismî ,hakikî yahut hadd-i tam veya nâkıs, resm-i tam veya nâkıs,cins,fasıl,araz ,hassa gibi mantığın temel kavramları açısında inceler: sözün ihbarî veya inşaî mi olduğu, tümevarım mı tümdengelim mi, önermelerin şekilleri yani basit mi mürekkep mi,haki mi zihni mi,haricî mi ,hamlî şartî mi hasılı önermelerin her çeşidi açısından sonra kıyas çeşitleri,istikra,temsil(analoji), istihsan ve istishab bakımından metni incelemeli, sonra verilen misalleri niçin verdiğini, bunların gerçeğe uyup uymadığını, bütün öncüllerin tam olarak zikr edilip edilmediğini bir bir gözden geçirmelidir.

Müellif mantığa neden bu kadar önem veriyor.?Çünkü ona göre mantık ilminde meleke yani güç kazanmak,doğru fikri yanlışından,geçerli olanı geçersizden ayırma imkanına

kavuşmaktır.Mantık ilmi,"mizan'ül-ukûl ve'l- ulûm"(akılların ve ilimlerin terazisi)olup, fikrini ve nazarını bu teraziye vurmayan kişi hüsrana uğrayıp kıyas yapamaz, zihnini ve aklını mantık ile süslemeyen ve kuvvetlendirmeyen kimse, fikirlerinde ve derin düşüncelerinde(nazar)mahcup olur,hızlana uğrar,Mantık zihinlerin kuvvetlendiricisi/ mukavimidir, nitekim nahiv ilmi de lisanın mukavimidir. Düşünürümüz nazarında iki şerefli ilim olan mantık ve nahiv ,talebeyi düzene sokmakta ve kemale ulaştırmakta ebeveyn makamındadır(v.170b)

Müellifimiz mantığa karşı çıkanlara şiddetle karşı çıkar ve mantık öğrenmeyi sapıklık sananların cehaletini ve katı taassubunu ortaya koyduğunu söyler.Gazzalî'ye dayanarak aklı olan herkesin mantık öğrenmesi gerektiğini ileri sürer.Çünkü der, alemin hadis olduğu, bunun delilleri, sonra evrenin değişime uğraması gibi her şey mantıkla bilinir.

Eğer mutalaacı, çalıştığı bahsin özetini çıkarmada güçlük çekerse,bunun birkaç sebebi olabilir.İbareyi güzelleştirmede lafzî kusur olabilir,maksada uygun manaları tayin ederken lafızların(sözlerin)yazılmasında, telifde hataların bulunması ve telifin kötü olmasından dolayı ibarenin aslında düğümlenmiş olması gibi bir takım sebepler anlamayı zorlaştırdığı için hülasayı zorlaştırır. Talibin bu zorlukları aşması lâzımdır.Bunun için de zorluğun kaynağına inmesi icab eder..

Zihin ve Basitlik ilkesi:

Ahmed Dede neden bunun üzerinde duruyor? Çünkü ona göre zihin,bu çeşitlilik ve karışıklık karşısında zihin bulanıklığı olur,zihin karma karışık olur(teşevvüş);zihin bu kadar karışma/tedahül, çokluk karşısında derin düşünme(nazar) kesintiye uğrar.Yazarımız burada Batı felsfesinde ve biliminde de temelde olan bir ilkeyi öne sürüyor: Basitlik ilkesi. Çünkü o, zihnin basit olduğunu ve çokluktan nefret ettiğini söyler ki çok doğru bir anlayıştır. Eğer zihin, karışık ve düzensiz bir çoklukla karşılaşırsa onu vahdet cihetinden zabtettikten sonra idrak eder. Sebebini de mantıkçılar nezdinde birlik şeklinde düzenlenmiş basit tek bir hüküm olarak kabul eder.Bu makul tertip üzere yapılan basitleştirme sayesinde zihin aslı ayrıntıdan /fer',her iddiayı delilleriyle beraber diğer davalardan temyiz eder; dolayısıyla idrak edilen şeyin zihne yerleşmesi ve zihnin istikrarı sağlanmış olur.(v.171b) İlim de zaten zihin kuvvetli himmet ve gayret yüksek olursa elde edilir.Yalnız zihne takatının üstünde fazla yükleme(teklif ve tekellüf) yapmamalıdır. Çünkü o takdirde kemale ermeden zihne yorgunluk/kelal ve usanç/melal arız olur.(v174b ve 175a) Burada düşünürün aradığı hususlardan birisi zihin ile gerçeklik ve manalar arasındaki mutabakattır.Bir de düşünce için lüzumlu malzemelerin bazıları açık, bazıları da kapalı ve muğlak olursa zihin bunları birleştirmekte arada kalır ve hüküm ve mana çıkarmakta zaaf gösterir. zeka da aynı zaafa

uğrar.Talip zeki olup tenkide muktedir olsa bile kemale ulaşmanın peşinde koşmaktan geri kalmaması lazım. Aslında zihin, Ahmed Dede nazarında, edindiği şeyleri açılığa kavuşturma alışkanlığındadır. Şayet zihin fazla hızlı çalıştırılırsa o zaman da hazırlıklarını düzene koymakta ve bir kısmını diğerlerinden ayırmakta aciz kalır.Bunun yanında mütalaacı, bir meseleyi halletmeden ve onda tatmin edici bir netice almadan acele eder de başka meselelere,başka bölümlere veya başka bilim dallarına geçerse sonu yine mahrumiyet olur.Bu bakımdan Ahmed Dede, aceleden uzak sabır ve teenni ile hareket etmesini istiyor.Bir de halktan alkış almak veya ikbal için tribünlere oynamanın da hedefe ulaşmaktan ve mükemmel olmaktan alıkoyacağı,emeğinin de abese ve sapıklığa götüreceği hususunda mutalaacıyı uyarıyor.(v.184b)Bu çerçevede talibin ibarelerin mânâsını anlamadan ezberlememesini, eğer böyle ezberlerse budalalık(belade) hasıl olacağını, zihnî/dimağî kuvvetin gayesi dışında fazla kullanılmasıyla zaafa uğrayacağını, yapması gereken hareketlerini yerine getiremeyeceğini, kendi çapı dahilinde ortaya koyacağı şeyleri zihnin izhar edemeyeceğini söylüyor ve şöyle bir iddia ileri sürüyor:"Hafıza kuvvetlendiği zaman müfekkire/düşünme gücü zayıflar." Tabiî ki bu iddia münakaşa götürür. Zihnin fazla hareketli ve hızlı çalışmasının doğuracağı zararı gösteren Ahmed Dede,hiç çalışmayıp sükûn halinde kalan zihin için bazı ikazlarda bulunuyor.Zihin hareketsizliğe alışırsa oradan da ,müellifimize göre ahmaklık ve budalalık doğar. Çünkü müfekkire, benin ortasında bir boşluktur; bu kuvvet,uzun zaman hareketsiz ve atıl kalırsa,o boş mahalli çok ağır bulanık bir buhar kaplar, bir hareket yapılmak istendiğinde müfekkire bunda aciz kalır, eğer bu buhar çoğalır ve yoğunlaşırsa, müfekkire mecburî olarak bun yapamaz.(v.185b) Eğer zihin acizlik içindeyken bir harekete zorlanırsa düşünmeyi terk etmek gibi bir zarara yol açar, bulanıklık ortaya çıkınca mutalaayı terk etmek gerekir. Zira böyle hallerde zihin fazla hata yapar.Bunun gibi aklı hatıralar, mutelif düşünceler,bir hisler ve vehimler kaplarsa yine benzer neticeler çıkar.Bunlara ilaveten açlık,susuzluk ve aşırı uykusuzluk,bölünme gibi haller, zihni karışıklığa sevk eder.Zihnin berraklaştığı ,anlayışın arttığı zamanlarda mesela gecenin son üçte birinde mütalaada bulunmak zihni çok verimli kılar.

Baştan beri karşılaştığımız ve sık sık tekrar ettiğimiz bir hususa dikkat çekmek gerekiyor: Ahmed Dede,daima tahkikî ilimden yani mutlaka çeşitli delillere dayanan, tecrübeden faydalanan "fiilî ilim" taraftarıdır.Ama aklî delil istemeyen tarih, şiir ve nesir için talip,bunları zabtedecek, işittiği ve araştırdığı üzere onları ezberleyecek,sonra da bedii,beyan mecaz ve kinaye açısından mânâlandıracak.Eğer uğraştığı saha fıkıh usulü ise ,bu saha çok geniş olduğundan onun her problemi için ayrı ayrı deliller arayacak ve bunda da çok titiz davranacak.Bu hususta "sırf akla dayanan" delillere de ihtiyaç olabilir,aynı zamanda nakilden ve semiyattan da olabilir, felsefî ilimler, kelam, akaid gibi

ilimlerde olduğu gibi.

Bundan sonra talip zaruriyyatı ve müsellematı göz önünde bulundurarak kendisinden gelen kusurları izale etmeli ve yeni anlamlar ,hükümler çıkarmak hususundaki istidadını geliştirmeli, mizacından veya hariçten gelen hatıralar,kuruntuların hücumunun yol açtığı zihin bulanıklığını gidermeli, mutalaayı da başka uygun bir vakte tehir etmelidir. Düşünürümüz burada bir başka hususa dikkati çekiyor: Zihnin saf ve temiz oluşu ve düşüncelerin toplanması,eylemin merkezi ve medarı/yörüngesidir. Ahmed Dede, zihnine güvenemeyen talibin maksadını kaybetmeksizin ibare ve lafızların nasıl sıhhatli olacağını,yeni anlamların o metinlerden nasıl çıkaracağını, bir konu başlığının nasıl açılacağını, lafız ve mana yönünden bunların nasıl edileceğini bilmesi gerektiğini söyler. Şayet bunlara gücü yetmezse öğrenmek istediği ilme ve makama düşünce bakımından en münasip ve en mühim olanları her mutalaasında seçmesi lâzım geldiğini bildirir.Müellif sık sık mutalaacının çalışacağı mahallin önemine de işaret eder.Çalışma mahallini seçerken maksadın gerçekleştirmeye uygun ve faydalı olup olmayacağını nazara almalıdır.Ahmed Dede, sarf,nahiv meanî, beyan ,mantık gibi alet ilimlerinin tasdikî ilkeler ve esas ilimler için bir yöntem teşkil ettiğin hatırlatarak bunların bizatihi yönelilen bir maksat olamayacağını bildirir, kelam ve felsefenin çeşitli kısımları gibi delile dayanan hakiki ilimlerin öğrenilmesi hedeflenirse, delillerden çıkarılan bu tahkiî ilimlere yönelmesi gerekir.

Müellifimiz mutalacıya ve ya ilim peşinden koşan talibe çok mühim bir ihtarda bulunmaktadır: Tahkikî ilimlerde mücerret iddialara aldanmamalı, taklide yönelmemelidir. Çünkü "taklid ve teslimiyet, hedeflere ulaşmaktan mahrum bırakır." Yani müellifimize göre talip, taklitci değil yaratıcı olmalı, o ibarenin ne maksatla konulduğunu bilerek "hür mânâ" peşinden koşmalıdır.düşünürümüz, talibin zihnini duyguların, günlük olayların işgalinden kurtarmalı, lafızları zihnine nakşetmeli, bunları kulaktan da alabilmeli; eğer bunu yapamazsa nakşedilen sözlerin tahliline sığınmalıdır.

Bu minval üzere devam eden risale,bir zeyl(ek) ile biter.Müellif zeylde müzakerenin,münakaşanın ne demek olduğu ve bunlar arasındaki farkı bildirir, müzakerenin muhtelif akıllarla mütalaanın ise tek bir akılla yapıldığını bildirir. Ahmed Dede,bu çok mühim risalesini bir takım ahlakî tavsiyelerle bitirir.

Değerlendirme:

Buraya kadar Ahmed bin Lütfullah el-Mevlevî'nin bir kitabın nasıl okunması hakkındaki risalesinde ileri sürdüğü belli başlı fikirlerini belirtmeye çalıştık.Şimdi bunların bir değerlendirmesini yapalım:

Düşünürümüz, bir kitap nasıl okunur, nasıl anlaşılır,nasıl tamir edilir,nasıl yeniden

yaratılır gibi sorulara cevap teşkil edecek şekilde geniş geniş açıklamıştır.Bir metni anlamak hangi alet bilgilerine ne derecede sahip olunması gerektiğini,hangi esas ilimlerin ne kadar bilinmesi gerektiğini ortaya koymuştur.Bir metni iyi anlamak ve ondan yeni anlamlar çıkarmak yani yorumlamak için gereken şartları iyi tesbit etmiştir . Talibin yaptığı işten haz duyması, mutalaaya karşı kabiliyet,nasip ve heves, zeka ve akıl sahibi olması gibi hususlar,anlamanın psikolojik ve fizyolojik şartlarını teşkil eder.Bulunduğu mekanın gayesine uygun olması, mutalaanın dış maddî şartını meydana getirir.Zihnin yapısı,çalışma tarzı, öğrenmenin zihnin açık olduğu zaman dilimlerinde yapılmasını,zihnî bölünmüşlükten kurtulunmasını tavsiye etmesi, okumayı ve öğrenmeyi basamaklara ayırması, hem epistemolojik hem de öğrenme ve anlam psikolojinin esaslarına yabancı değildir.Ahmed Dede,sistemli düşünen ve böyle düşünülmesini isteyen bir filozoftur. Eserinde o,epistemoloji yapmıştır.Zihnin yapısını,gücünü. mahiyetini, iç ve dış çalışma şartlarını incelemiş ve ona göre hüküm vermiştir

Ahmed Dede, mantığa ve mantıkî çıkarımlara ve delillere dayanan fiilî b ilgiyi ve ilmi benimsemiş olan bir rasyonalisttir. Ama o, aynı zamanda bir anlama ve öğrenme ontolojisi yapmıştır.Hermenötikçilerin metni anlamak ve yorumlamak,onu hayata geçirmek hususunda ileri sürdükleri esaslara müellifimizin yabancı olduğu söylenemez Kanunî Sultan Süleyman

Döneminde yaşamış olan bu mütefekkir ve filozof mutalaayı ayrı ve yeni bir ilim olarak kurmak istemekle devrinde yeni bir ufuk aşmıştır. Kendisini rahmetle selamlıyorum.

Yeni Dünya Düzeninde Kadının Konumu

Şule Bilge ÖZKEÇECİ, Sanatçı-Sosyolog

Dünyamız uzunca bir süredir Batılı düşünürler tarafından geliştirilen "modernleşme, batılılaşma, çağdaşlaşma" gibi çeşitli adlarla nitelenen teorilerin yönlendirdiği bir dönüşüm yaşamaktadır. Dünyayı Doğu ve Batı olarak ikiye bölen, kadim uygarlıkları, köklü kültürleri, ekolojik sistemi bir kasırga gibi savurup altüst eden bu değişimden insanlık büyük yaralar alarak çıkmıştır. Düşünsel temelleri evrim teorisine ve ilerleme fikrine dayalı, çıkarcı ve maddeci bu yaklaşım, sürekli yenilenen teorilerle ayakta tutulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Modernleşmenin başarısızlıkları, doğurduğu sorunlar ve değişen dünya dengeleri ile ortaya çıkan küreselleşme söylemini "Yeni Dünya Düzeni" terimi devam ettirmektedir. Bu terim ilk kez ABD Başkanı G. Bush tarafından 1990'da, düzenlediği bir basın toplantısında kullanılmıştır. Berlin Duvarı'nın debdebeli yıkılışıyla özdeşleşebilecek olan bu kavram uluslararası işbirliğini ve barışı yaratma ideali olarak tanımlanmıştır. "Liberal Demokrasi", "Evrensel Barış" ve "İnsan Haklarına Saygı" kavramları ile birlikte zikredilen "Yeni Dünya Düzeni" söyleminden günümüze yaklaşık onbeş yıldan fazla bir süre geçmiştir.

Bu tebliğin amacı; bu süreçte dünyada yaşanan gerçekleri, toplumun yarısını oluşturan kadınların konumu açısından analiz etmektir. Bu bağlamda feminizm de dahil, hayat karşısında hepsi eksik veya çaresiz kalan tüm izmlerden uzak, toplumun içinde, alttan bir bakışla biraz felsefik, biraz duygusal bir yaklaşım benimsenmiştir.

Yeni dünya düzeni düşüncesinin yeni olmadığını biliyoruz. Hükümranlığı ele geçiren pek çok liderin vazgeçilmez ideali önlerine engin denizler, aşılmaz dağlar çıkana kadar gitmek, tüm dünyaya egemen olmak olmuştur. Günümüzün hâkim güçleri hedeflenen düzeni sağlama konusunda maalesef coğrafik zorlukları engel tanımamaktadır.

Aydınlanma çağından itibaren bilimsel amacı; doğayı tanıyıp doğaya hâkim olmak, toplumları ve insanı tanıyıp onlara hâkim olmak düşüncesine dayanan Batılı toplumlarının bu düşünce tarzı ile adil bir dünya düzeni kurmaları beklenemez. Merkeze kendini koyup diğer tüm toplumları aynı çerçeveye yerleştirerek batı dışı olarak niteleyen Batılı toplumların hegemonyasında bir dünya düzeni, inandırıcı olmadığı gibi gerekli de değildir.

Düzen kurma iddiasındaki Batı toplumlarının sömürgelerle ve vahşi kapitalizmle gelişen şaibeli mazisi ve bugünkü tutumları hiç güven verici değildir. İnsani ve ahlaki değerler konusunda bulundukları konum, diğer toplumlar ve inanç sistemlerine bakış açılarıyla bu hükümranlığa hak sahibi değiller. Mutlaka tek merkezli bir düzen zorladığında, ne kadar katılımcı, adil, tarafsız ve güvenilir olduğu iddia edilse de sonuçta tek hâkim gücün merkezi ve sesi olmaktadır.

Batı medeniyeti kendi çıkarları pahasına tüm dünyaya toplumsal, kültürel, ekonomik ve ekolojik her alanda büyük zarar vermiştir, tüm kadim değer sistemlerini yıkmış, zedelemiş veya yok saymıştır, bunun bedelini ödeyecektir. Monolitik (tekelci) küresel kültürü hedefleyen güç merkezli hegemonyanın hiç erdemli olmayan bu yaklaşımıyla evrensel bütünleşme bir kandırmacadır, bu düşünceyle evrensel sömürü gerçekleşebilir. Önyargılı ve taraflı bir bakışla Doğuyu, tüm farklı değerleriyle tek sayan güçlerin amaçları sorgulanmalı ve adalet temelinde yeni, farklı yaklaşımlarla alternatif modeller geliştirilmelidir.

Aslında teorisyenler tarafından modern kâhinler gibi çok iddialı tahminlerle devamlı değiştirilen ve farklı ülkelerin aydınlarınca tekrarlanıp duran kavramlar ve teoriler sadece insanlara sunulan sanal tarih ve gelecek tasavvurlarıdır. Milyonlarca hatta milyarlarca insan kendi hayatı üzerine kurgulanan "iki kutuplu dünya", "soğuk savaş dönemi", "üçüncü dünya ülkesi", "modernleşme" vb. bir yığın adlandırmadan, teoriden habersiz bir düzen veya düzensizlik içinde, kendi dünyasında yaşadı ve öldü. Bu kavramları sadece aydınlar kullanıyor, bu teoriler hayatın içinde yoklar. Dolayısıyla yaşadığımız dönemi özellikle zengin tarihi birikime sahip Asya toplumları için yeni dünya düzeni olarak değil, bu yıkımdan çıkarak kendine gelme ve arayış süreci olarak değerlendirmek daha gerçekçi olacaktır. Bu bağlamda tarihteki olumsuz gelişmelerden de ders alarak daha barışçı ve daha adil bir toplumsal düzen düşüncesi yine bu toprakların insanlarının gayretiyle gelişecektir.

Bütünsel bir yaklaşımla insanlığı bir beden gibi düşünürsek, yeni dünya düzeni söylemi sonrasında bu beden yara almıştır. Bazıları çok derin ve bu yaralarla bir bedenin sağlıklı yaşayabilmesi mümkün değildir. Hedeflediği barışın ve hakların tersine gidişat, insanlığın yavaş yavaş intiharı olabilir. Farklı biçimlerde ve farklı düzeyde tüm dünyayı etkileyen dönüşümlerden sonra özellikle ekonomik olarak toplumlar içinde ve toplumlararasında dengesizlikler artmış, uçurumlar büyümüştür. Planlanan yeni dünyada kadınların; kimlikleri, hakları, toplumsal konumları açısından medeniyet düzeyi yüksek toplumlara yakışan seviyede olmadığına inanıyorum. Hayatın neşesi olarak gördüğüm ve onlarsız bir dünyanın çok sıkıcı olduğunu düşündüğüm kadınların toplum içinde etkin bir rolü, saygın bir kimliği

yoktur. Bu konumu gelişmiş, ileri veya geri vb. olarak çeşitli biçimlerde adlandırılan tüm toplumlara genelleyebiliriz. Maddi doygunluğun tatmin etmediği ve ne kadar artarsa artsın asla tatmin edemeyeceği ekonomik açıdan sorunsuz toplumlarda, ailenin değersizleşmesi ve ahlaki yozlaşma sebebiyle kadınlar büyük sorunlar yaşamaktadır.

Modern dünyanın evlerin içine giren savaşlarının yaşandığı toplumlarda ise kadınların da en az erkekler kadar, hatta farklı biçimlerde onlardan daha çok zarar gördüğünü söylemek mümkündür. Dünya üzerinde, ilk insanla birlikte kardeş kanı dökülerek başlayan savaş ve düşmanlık olgusu insanlık tarihine paralel olarak hiç değişmeden süregitmektedir. Eski dönemlerde sadece erkek yakınlarını savaşa yollayan ve savaş sonrası onların kaybı ve yoksullukla mücadele eden kadınlar modern dünyada artık savaşın tam içindeler. Modern savaşlarda ölen sivillerin, mültecilerin çoğu kadınlar ve çocuklardır. Her vesileyle, herkesin dilinden barış temennileri duyarız, ama maalesef barış kayıp bir hazine gibidir ve yeryüzüne daha çok savaşlar hâkim olur. Savaşı kimse istemez, ama ülkelerin bütçelerinde en çok pay savunma adına silah ve savaş sektörüne ayrılır. Tarih bile savaşlarla biçimlenir.

Savaş kararını yöneticiler verir, bu yöneticiler -genellikle- erkeklerdir, savaşta orduları kumanda edenler, savaş alanında ölen askerler de erkeklerdir. Ama bu erkekleri kadınlar doğurur. Bir kadın için ise, dünyada en acı şey evladını kaybetmektir. Mutlaka her kültür içince muhtelif anlatımlarla ifade edilen bu acı gerçek, bizim kültürümüzde "ciğeri yanmak" deyimiyle dile getirilir. Herkesin her fırsatta barış dilediği, ama savaşlarla yaşadığımız dünyada sevgi nerede?

Yaşadığımız dünya hepimizin eseri. Bu dünyanın biçimlenmesinde herkesin büyük-küçük payı var, ama önderlerin, bilim adamlarının, sanatçıların ve farklı konumlarda güç sahibi olan kişilerin daha çok payı var. Bu aynı zamanda çok büyük bir sorumluluk ve görev demektir. Bu noktada sevgiyi yeşertmek ve barışçı bir dünya kurabilmek için kadının rolünü önemsiyorum.

Dünyanın en sessiz direnişçileri olan kadınların; kimliği, hakları, toplumsal konumu, uzun süredir genelde kadın-erkek eşitliği bağlamında tartışılmaktadır. Kadın ve erkek hem eşittir, hem değildir. Bu ikilemi çok dikkatli değerlendirmek gerekir. Yaratılmış bir varlık ve içinde bulunduğu toplumda insan ilişkilerini sürdüren bir birey olarak, yasal haklar ve sorumluluklar açısından kadın ve erkek eşittir. Birbirinden farklı yaratılmış ve farklı özelliklerle donatışmış bu iki cins bir bütün oluşturabilir ama birbirini tamamlayan iki cinsin birisi olarak kadın, erkekle eşit değildir. Bu farklı yaratılış sebebiyle hem toplumsal hayatta

ve iş dünyasında kadın ve erkeğin konumu, hem ailede baba rolü ayrı anne rolü ayrı olmalıdır. Bu ayrılıklar göz ardı edildiğinde günümüzde yaşanılan ve giderek büyüyen sorunlar toplumların dengesini bozabilir. Zira zamanla özellikle çalışma hayatında görülen "cinslerin tekleşmesi" olarak adlandırabileceğimiz tavır ve hareketler, giyim tarzı, karakter olarak kadına benzer erkekler veya erkeğe benzer kadınlar insanlığın geleceği açısından çok sakıncalı bir tektipleşmeye doğru gitmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu ikilemi doğru analiz etmeden yasalarla kadınlara haklar tanımak soruna hiçbir zaman çözüm olamaz. Zira kadınlara her türlü hakkın verildiği ve yasaların en üst düzeyde koruduğu ülkelerde bile kadına yönelik şiddet çok yoğun ve yaygın olarak yaşanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu sorun uluslararası sözleşmelerle veya kanuni yaptırımlarla çözülemez. Nitekim "İnsan Hakları Evrensel Bildirgesi"nde olduğu gibi kadınlara önemli haklar tanıyan "Kadınlara Karşı Her Türlü Ayrımcılığın Önlenmesi Uluslararası Sözleşmesi" (CEDAW) çok sayıda alt madde ile otuz ana maddeden oluşmaktadır.

Önlemler alarak, yaptırımlar uygulayarak ve gerekirse cezalandırarak bu yasaların uygulanması önerilmektedir, ancak yüzlerce devletin imza attığı bu sözleşmelerdeki kuralları toplumların içselleştirmesinde sorunlar yaşanmaktadır. Bu tarz genellemeler yerine toplumların kendi iç dinamikleri, inanç ve kültür kodları dikkate alınarak yapılacak düzenlemeler çok daha etkili olabilir. Her toplumun kendine özgü değer sistemini göz ardı etmeden, bulunduğu şartlar ve imkânlar çerçevesinde kısmi çözümler üretmek sorunları aşmada daha verimli sonuçlar doğuracaktır. Aksi takdirde inanılan değerlerle yasaların uyuşmadığı durumlarda –benim ülkemde de çeşitli örnekleriyle yaşadığımız gibi– toplumlar bu kuralları uygulamamakta ısrarla direnmektedir. Bu çerçevede toplumun özünden uzak yasal yapılanma bireyin ve ülkenin enerjisini tüketmektedir.

Kadın ve erkeğin rol paylaşımını simgesel bir anlatımla genelleyecek olursak, erkeğin maddeyi, kadının manayı temsil ettiğini düşünebiliriz. Erkeğin fiziki gücü, zihni melekeleri daha etkin iken, kadında sezgi ve duygu baskındır. Cinslere verilen kendine özgü hassalar, onlar birleştiğinde anlamlı bir bütün olmalarını sağlar. Artıyla eksi, siyahla beyaz gibi kadınla erkek birbirini tamamlayan iki mükemmel parçadır, ama eşit değildir.

Dolayısıyla sevgi ve şefkate daha meyyal kadının, her konuda daha duyarlı ve daha verimli olmasını bekleyebiliriz. Ancak tarih boyunca öne çıkan, beğeni toplayan, çağları biçimlendiren düşünce sistemlerine, ekonomik gelişmelere, yönetim kademelerine, siyasi, askeri, bilimsel, sanatsal üretime baktığımızda, kadının adını ön sıralarda göremeyiz.

Örneğin sanat alanında meşhur eserleri üretenler arasında kadınlar yoktur, ama ilk çağdan bugüne kadın; ana tanrıça kültünden, Rönesans'ın Madonna'larına ve modern resmin nü'lerine kadar sanatın üreticisi değil de objesi veya ilham kaynağı olmuştur. Yine siyaset alanında etkileri çok güçlüdür. Saray entrikaları kadınlarla anılır, büyük savaşların çoğunun arkasında kadın parmağı vardır.

Kadınların kendilerine verili olan doğal yetenekleri ve duygusal donanımı kullanarak toplumsal olarak daha etkin bir konumda olması gerekirken, -istisnaları hariç tutarsak- evrensel boyutta güçlü konumlarda yer almadığı görülmektedir. Bunun sebebini nerede aramalıyız? Toplumların kadına bakışında mı, kadını konumlandırmasında mı, eğitim tarzında mı, kültürel faktörlerde mi, yoksa değer sitemlerinde mi? Sorun bu unsurların hepsini bir parça içermektedir. Sadece iki eşit parçanın birbirini tamamlaması şeklindeki yavan bir yaklaşım ile kadın ve erkeği eşit görüp onların özgünlüklerini anlayamamak, dolayısıyla farklı yönlerini, yeteneklerini ortaya koymalarına fırsat vermemek ilk sebep olabilir. Kadın olsun erkek olsun insanın eğitiminde bir değer sistemiyle donatılması en öncelikli kaygı olmalıdır. Çünkü yaşamın amacını belirleyen ve onu yönlendiren değerler ve inançlardır. Eğitim sistemlerinde ise, ahlaki boyutun eksik kalması veya değerlerin yeterince anlatılamaması, daha önemlisi bunları benimsemeyen bireylerin yetiştirilmesi günümüz toplumlarının en önemli sorunudur. Bir değer sistemiyle beslenmeyen, insani bakış açısını içselleştirmeyen ve ahlaki değerleri özümsemeyen eğitimler ne kadar uzun süreli olsa da hiçbir verim sağlamıyor. Asya toplumları bu konuda derin ve çok zengin birikimleri ile çok şanslıdır ve eğitim alanında bu köklü mirastan yararlanmalıdırlar.

Toplumun yapı taşı olan bireyi yoğurup şekillendiren kadın, geleceği kuracak olan insanı eğitebilmesi, soylu ve vasıflı nesiller yetiştirebilmesi için çok özel eğitilmelidir. Hem kendinin hem de toplumun benimsediği değer sistemini iyi tanımalı, yaratılışında ona verilmiş olan üstünlüklerin farkına varmalıdır. Bana göre kadının en büyük eseri onun yetiştirdiği çocuktur. Kadının öncelikle insan ve birey olma konumu yanında, en önemli ve en zor toplumsal rolü anneliktir. İyi anne olmak demek biraz; iyi sanatçı, iyi doktor, iyi öğretmen, iyi politikacı, iyi düşünür, kısaca her şeyden mutlaka haberdar olmak demektir. Kadınların gücü ve yeteneğine göre farklı konularda büyük başarılar elde edebileceği toplumsal roller içinde her açıdan ve tüm toplumların sağlıklı geleceği için başat olan rolü anne rolü olmalıdır.

Burada gözden kaçmaması gereken en önemli unsur madde ve mananın dengesi iyi

kurabilmektir. Aynı değişme ve süreklilik arasındaki denge gibi, aynı ruh ve beden arasındaki denge gibi, aynı kadın ve erkek arasındaki denge gibi. İnsanlar ve toplumlar sürekli değişse de, temelde var olan en önemli yapı taşları hep aynı kalır. Ölen değişir de ölüm değişmez, seven değişir sevgi değişmez, düşman değişir savaş değişmez, inanılan değişir inanç değişmez, eser değişir sanat değişmez. Bu olgular birbiriyle mutlak bir etkileşim içinde her toplumda vardır. Geçmişte yaşamak mümkün değildir, ama gelecek geçmişin üzerine kurulur. Dün bugünü doğurdu, bugün ise geleceği doğuracak. Bu bağlamda her toplum, kendine sunulan yeniyi ve köklerinde var olan eskiyi sorgulamak, tartışmak ve dengeleri iyi kurmak durumundadır.

Günümüz dünyasında mananın dengesinin madde lehine bozulması insanlık için olumsuz bir hayat tarzını da beraberinde getirmiştir. Ben insanın bedeni gibi ruhunun da üç boyutu olduğunu düşünüyorum. Aynı zamanda insanı insan yapan bu boyutlar ilim, ahlak, estetiktir. Maddeye verilen önem ve mananın neredeyse tamamen unutulması ile bozulan dengede ilim, ahlak ve estetik ile beslenemeyen insan ruhunu örselemekte, bunaltmakta ve yanlış mecralara yönelmektedir.

Toplumların yarısı kadınlar, diğer yarısı da onların doğurduklarıdır. Haklar ve sorumluluklar arasındaki dengeyi iyi kurarak ve bütün aşırılıklardan kaçarak kadınların etkin ve bilinçli katkısıyla daha yaşanılası bir geleceğin kurulabileceği konusunda ümitvarım. Tebliğimi kutsal bir sözle bitirmek istiyorum: "İnanıyorsanız üstünsünüz."

LANGUAGE AS INTERMEDIARY
OF TRADE AND CULTURE

The Case of Central Asia Between Russia and Turkey

Vassil Hristov Anastassov, Fatih University

The paper deals with the importance of language for the implementation of political goals in the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia on a diachronic basis, to start with the relative unity (in terms of both language and religion) of semi-legendary *Turkestan*; via the (Soviet) Russian influence, and to end up with the so-called 'Turkish Model'.

It aims at giving more light on the role of Russian language policy, followed by the enormous impact of the Russian culture in the area. More specifically: it aims at investigating how Tzarist-Communist Russian political hegemony, in terms of language, could affect the identity process of the Turkic population of Central Asia

It was inspired by Marc Dickens' impressive work, 'Soviet Language Policy in Central Asia'

It is based on the asumption that in the history of humankind there have been lots of cases where one language becomes predominant in areas with mixed population, for the needs of 'trade-culture' interaction.It is interesting to admit that this predominance may occur *as the result of* or *without* any political hegemony:

For example: the Mediterranean 'Lingua Franca' has been used as a term, coined to denote a kind of an 'interethnic' language, motivated by the needs of trade- and cultural interaction around the region. As the traditional definition goes:

'A mixture of French, Arabic and Spanish in the Levant.....any language, serving as a medium between different nations whose langauges are not the same system, providing understandnig'

(Map of the Mediterranean)

What is more: even if there is an initial political reason for the language dominance it often, within time, loses it, and starts functioning as the symbol of the socio-cultural integrity of a ceratin society, for example:

'Athenian political dominance lasted less than a century, but the prestige of Athenian literature and of Athenian speech remained, and from it developed the 'koinē'. This word

means 'shared, common, popular', and was indeed the common language of a large area for something like a thousand years'

(Barber 2000 : 56)

In this respect — a diachronic analysis of the situation in Central Asia shows a remarkable support for the idea, given the similarities in the need of a 'common language' at all stages of evolution:

1. At the time of 'Turkestan'

'Because of the area's(Central Asia!) situation on the famous Silk Road.....there has been considerable mixing of ethnic groups over the centuries. As a result, in addition to the major groups, one can also find Arabs, Jews, Gypsies, Persians Tatars,Koreans, Azerbaijanis,Armenians, Germans, Ukrainians, Belorussians and Russians'

(Dickens 1988)

(Map of the Silk Road)*

Apparently, the need of 'social interaction' stimulated the need of a 'langauge' one and, in the case of 'Turkestan', it was maintained, by the Muslim *Ummah* (community), by means of language (Arabic) and religion (Islam).

'Arabic became the language not only of religion but also of higher learning and the Arabic script was employed in all writing,......,However, most of the people continued to speak in various Turkic or Iranian dialects.'

(ibid.)

2. The Mediterranean 'Lingua Franca' in the Levant had, at some time(18-19 century), to co-exist and even to compete with the Turkish of the Ottoman Empire as the intermediary of 'Western Culture' in North Africa, Asia Minor and the Balkans up to, even, the Caucasus, Georgia and Central Asia.

(Map of the Ottoman Empire)

One may conclude that the investigated region has always been the center of different type of 'language-culture' interaction, which, on its turn, resulted in the need of a 'Lingua Franca', accompanied *by* or *no* political hegemony. Throughout its history the penetration of 'Western Culture' into Central Asia has been, obvioulsy moving, Eastwards.

In recent times the economic status of Turkey and her secularity seemed capable to start a set of new challenges for the ex-Soviet Turkic states. This is how the philosophy of the 'Tturkish Model' emerged on the belief that Turkey's traditional open-market economy, by having to compete with the relics of the Soviet rigid 'planned' one, would

improve trade interaction between the republics and the more developed, 'Western', powers. More specifically: supporters of the 'Turkish Model' claim that in both Turkey and Central Asia, the mutually comprehensible means of language communication in the domain of 'trade-culture' is historically motivated and could function as a homogeneous unit at the crossroad between Western and Russian socio-political and cultural influence of Turkey and its secularity as the start of new challenges for the ex-Soviet Turkic states. It is important to keep in mind that almost all the languages of Central Asia, except Tajik, are of Turkic origin, which means that phonologically, semantically and morpho-syntactically they are very close to Modern Turkish.

So: 'The Soviet Union's breakdown and the emergence of independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia presented Turkey with the unique opportunity to explore a new role as an influential regional power'
(Onis, 2001)

Attempts have been made in this direction such as:

- investment projects;

- telecommunication;

and,

- in terms of education: scholarship programs and setting up vocational schools;

Surprisingly, all these attempts proved to be a way too far from the expected results.Supporters of the 'Turkish Model' themselves tend to explain the reason for the relative decline of the project with a set of factors, among which, for example:

- the fear of replacing the Russian 'Big Brother' with a Turkish one;

- the fear of a possible Turkish 'Pan-Turkic' sentiment;

and, basically:

- the Russian-language-dominated trade and culture in the area which resulted in the reluctance of the population to accept the 'Turkish Model' as an alternative to the Soviet one, focusing on the local, rather than on the common in its further development.

It becomes quite clear, as I shall try to prove, that Russian — both Tzarist and Bolshevik- policy towards this population, managed, especially during the USSR period, to disintegrate not only the language-religion *Ummah* of the region, but to affect the national-cultural identity of the people by imposing the Russian language as a common means of communication. In other words: the Central Asian area became part of Soviet Russia thanks to the use of language as the cultural 'avant-guarde' component of political hegemony.

The Russian presence in the area started after Ivan The Terrible captured the Tatar

stronghold of Astrakhan in 1552.

'From that time on, Russia was the power to be reckoned with as she rapidly expanded her empire into Asia'

(Dickens, ibid.)

As the same author points out, Tzarist Russia pursued an active policy of Russification:

'However, despite their (Russian!) efforts, the native intelligentsia that emerged was by and large extremely nationalistic'

(ibid.)

No matter how strong this 'nationalistic' feeling might have been, the idea of *Ummah* was not dead, as it reemerged in the conception of *Jadid* (based on the assumption that Muslims in Russia would not be able to maintain their ethnic and religious heritage without significant reform) which included the promotion of a common Turkic language. *Jadid* could not survive the fierce resistance of Islamic conservatives and ended up with a total failure after the Soviet Russians came into power, established by means of the following steps:

a) Since most of the local inhabitants were illiterate, the first step to change 'the linguistic landscape of the area' was to promote literacy, on the scale of a 'cultural revolution', as Dickens claims. The process took place in either Russian, or the local language, where the holders of it became more aware of it and developed more respect for it.

b) Since Russian Soviet(language) policy in the area, especially during Stalin's regime was following the principle of 'language as the most obvious and important attribute of a nation', the language awareness mentioned above being successfully used to develop 'national languages' for the different groups of the Turkic population, artificially focusing on the different and ignoring the common. Hence – the beginnning of a 'national identity', based on the disintegration of the Ummah, which became even stronger with the:

c) Alphabet Reform, which took place in two stages

– the shift from the Arabic to the Latin script, which left the older part of the educated Islamic priests practically helpless, and, thus, broke the religious unity of the Ummah,

– the second shift – from Latin to Cyrillic practically opened the gates for the status of the Russian language to change from 'second national language' to the only possible means of comunication:

'The linguistic journey frorm theArabic to the Cyrillic script succeeded in effectively

separating these closely related Turkic languagers from each other and from their Arabo-Persan roots, as well as preparing the way for the introduction of Russianism...'
(Dickens, ibid.)

In addition to Dickens' thesis, it should be taken into consideraiton that 'Russianism' not only linguistically separated those 'closely related Turkic languages', but – what is more – it managed to manipulate the Turkic identity of the population. This is what explains, in my opinion, explicitely well the 'relative decline' of the 'Turkish Model'. The end of the Gorbachev era and the collapse of Russian Soviet communism left the Turkic republics of Central Asia with a strongly Russian language dominated 'trade-culture' way of life.

The initial enthusiasm of the 'Turkish Model' was partly 'cooled down' by the here investigated unstable sense of identity of the population in the Soviet aftermath, partly – due to the changes in the economic interaction between Russia and Turkey themselves.This, however, gave yet another direction to the process of penetration of 'Western' culture in the area. At the beginning of the 'decline of the Turkish Model' the situation looked as if the Western countries (mainly USA,Canada and UK) and the republics of Central Asia had found it mutually beneficial not to interact via any intermediation. Recent research, however, shows a certain disbalance in the 'linguistic landscape' of the immediate post-Gorbachev 'statu quo':

a) Being no longer the 'official lanuage', Russian started functioning, and is now more and more, functioning as 'Lingua Franca' in an increasing competition with other, local languages. The above mentioned thesis about 'dominant languages' losing, with the flow of time, their political connotation, and remainig just landmarks of cultural integrity of the speakers can be supported not only by means of the example of the Athenian koinē, but also with lot more cases, such as the case of Spanish, spoken in almost all Latin America, by societies, different and independent from the times of Spain's Conquista, or the Portuguese of Brasil, the French of Canada, or even the English, outside the United Kingdom.

b) The increasing influential role of the English language contributes to the diversity of the picture. It is interesting to admit that, nonetheless the efforts to deny intermediation, in fact this role of the English language, along with the prerequisites of 'trade-culture' penetrates into Central Asia , coming from three different directions:

– The direct contact with the English 'langauge-culture' based on North-American

(basically Canadian) participation in the industrail development in some of the Turkic republics

- The 'traditional' Russian component with the new dimension of 'Westernized' 'trade-culture'

- The Turkish educational system (with Central Asian students trained at universities in Turkey and Turkish universities in some of the republics, all of them 'Enlish- language-medium') also has its part of the 'language-identity' co-relation and 'language-identity' orientation process.

We may conclude, finally, by classifying the significant role of language in the development of 'national' identity, as a role, capable of affecting the political status of a particular region. In the case of the republics of Central Asia as a traditional root of trade , attractive for the neighboring powers as a potential area of influence, the importance of language as the cultural component of dominance can play a key role in handling economic factors for political reasons.

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