THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTELLECTUAL GLOBALISM IN THE MEDIEVAL EURO-ASIA

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ABSTRACT

I classify the meanings of the term globalism into economic, political, and intellectual dimensions. In this paper I will focus on undertaking the intellectual meaning of the term. In order to examine the third meaning, I should make a comparative analysis of the specific periods of medieval Islamic and European cultures. Throughout my presentation, this meaning appears to be more fundamental to others because of its natural and historical antecedence. Finally, I will propose the concept of the intellectual globalism that has predisposed the globalist developments in our contemporary world. It is an extending idea over many cultures. Within this new concept, I attempt at defining the sub-concepts of extension that basically depend on the *paradigmatic conversion.*

Keywords: Globalization, intellectual globalism, Euroasian Studies, paradigm, paradigmatic conversion

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I mean, by the term *intellectual globalism*, the expansion of some paradigms that underlie every cultural, scientific, and technical productions. By the term *paradigm*, I mean the metaphysical meanings of cultural and scientific statements those cannot be seen in any text. I believe the basic paradigms of Eastern and Western civilizations are closed to each other; so to speak, no cultural relation or translation of texts can guide a culture to the paradigm of another one. This requires another technical operation that is entirely different task than translation or cultural contact.[1] The intellectual globalization is a concept dependent upon *paradigmatic contact*, and any paradigmatic contact entails some tools which will be called here as *paradigmatic converters*. This is quite alike to the text written in a language can be understood by a foreigner only through translation.

I want to build my theory upon the throughputs of my analysis of a historical fact: The question of Graeco-Arabic translations which held between the 9th and 10th centuries of Islam has been a matter of interest in the outlook of Greek influence on Islamic culture. Yet, the true reasons of this movement are been almost in dark and its formal results are left still unexamined. I have argued in another paper that the relationship between the ancient Greek and medieval Islamic thoughts (by the 9th century onward) represents a continuous historical advancement, so does the relationship between the medieval Islamic and early modern European thoughts.[2] Again, what made in the so-called historical period could not

be qualified merely as translation, but systematic and institutional translation those by I introduced to a primitive idea of paradigmatic contact.[3] Accordingly, in the present study, I will examine the first historical relationship in terms of paradigmatic contact and converters. I will undertake those paradigmatic converters through two basic questions that "what is the intellectual identity of Islamic thought" and "what happened to it after the so-called Greek influence". After investigating these questions we will embark on general principles of the intellectual globalism in the medieval Euro-Asia. My paper consists of two sections to make my hypothesis better clarified; "First Modern Materialist and Molecular System of Thought" and "Islamic Thought as Hellenized".

I. FIRST MODERN MATERIALIST AND MOLECULAR SYSTEM OF THOUGHT

The main difficulty in defining Islamic thought is that there is no clear formulation of its true nature and that supposing it to be consisted of one single homogeneous history and literature. Probably the biggest obscurity is representing Islamic thought from the Western viewpoint, as it reduces that into logical rationality and Hellenistic philosophy. Speaking shortly, it is not wrong to claim the entire history of Islamic thought is discussed in a logo-centric scope in the modern literature, implicating the classical Islamic culture dramatically turns around the Greek world.

Second important difficulty is concerning with defining rationalism in Islam.[4] When it is spoken about the methodology of Islamic thought, there are two categories that oversimplify the case of Islamic intellectuality; those are rationalism and traditionalism which is taken as a kind of irrationalism. What understood from rationalism is something identical with Aristotelian logic that is opposing to the revealed knowledge or traditionalism.[5] So, whoever

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1 Sadık Türker. "İslam Düşüncesinin Gelişiminde Tercüme Faaliyetlerinin Rolü", *Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları*, 3 (2003), 223-236.

2 It is almost unanimous among the contemporary scholars during the two centuries that Islamic thought developed through the translations of Greek scientific and philosophical texts, and so far, there is no known theory about if the early Islamic culture has an original thinking system. However, there is no agreement in the question why Muslims needed translations. The early orientalists had argued the translations were achieved due to the demands of Abbasid kings. By the post-war, a new approach which sought for the internal reasons to Islam viewed that it was because of enlightened community in the Abbasid state. V. Gustave E. Von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), 251-252, 256-257. Further, the presupposition of older scholars was almost fallen by the achievement of Rosenthall who qualifies the medieval Islamic thought as the Renaissance of Islam. v. Franz Rosenthall, *The Classical Heritage in Islam*, trans. Emile-Jenny Marmorstein, 1st ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 10-12. A farthest track of this critical tradition is attempted by Balty-Guesdon who drew out a more general picture of Medieval Islamic Enlightenment that translations were endeavored by a great majority of Islamic society including caliphs, soldiers, scholars, in historical continuity of human culture not only because the caliphs forced that. Balty-Guesdon, M.G. "Le Bayt al-Hikma de Baghdad", *Arabica: Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies*, XXXIX (1992), 131-150. The opinions are still varying; finally, by the end of the millennium, Gutas proposed that Islamic thought was original and translations were entailed by Muslim society as a demand for this original intellectual movement. See also Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Thought Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early Abbasid Society*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 1998). However, such endeavors cannot help us more than offering approximate solutions as there is still no formulation of what is this original thought system.

3 Türker, op. cit., 223-235.

4 There are some attempts of formulating Islamic rationality even not in a formalistic way. According to Açıkgenç, this system of thought can be defined as transcendent rationalism, a concept which inclines trespassing beyond the limits of physical experience and embracing it within the intellectual field. See Alparslan Açıkgenç, "Ibn Rushd, Kant and Transcendent Rationality: A Critical Synthesis", *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics*, 16 (1996), 164-190.

5 Roger Arnaldez. *Grammaire et Théologie chez Ibn Hazm de Cordoue: Essai sur la Structure et les Conditions de la Pensée Musulmane, Études Musulmanes III*, ed. Étienne Gilson, Louis Gardet (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1956), 14-17.

asserts an opposing idea to traditionalism is identified with rationalism which is frequently identified with Mu'tazilite school in historical studies;[6] and whoever criticizes logical thought is represented as irrational.[7] In no known contemporary source, the classical Arabic grammar has been taken as a subject-matter of formal thought and methodology. Rather it is considered as an art for correct speaking and reading Qur'ān at best. Accordingly, it is not considered as a rational science in its very essence, but a religious one, and it is regarded rational as much as it is considered to be influenced from logic.[8] However, the early classical Arabic linguistic system does never seem to be a religious science. Besides its being a rational science, it has strong materialist implications as will be seen. My main historical argument is the problem of persecution (*al-mihna*) that the createdness of Qur'ān leaded to. When we undertake the methodological structure of the 8th-century Arabic linguistics, we will understand this structure was responsible of the problem of createdness of Qur'ān. In other words, if the early classical Arabic linguistics were to be a liturgical science, there would not be a problem of createdness of Qur'ān.

Third important difficulty is considering Islamic thought to have only one rationalist system unlike the case with Western thought which is mainly built upon logical thought. Islamic thought has never had an uniformist character of methodology. There are many ways of thinking in Islam, and what is to be represented here is only one of them. Therefore, in this chapter, I want to outline this aspect referring to theological and linguistic sources and try to procure a formal structure of it within its own metaphysical fundamentals. In order to undertake it, I classify the history of Arabico-Islamic intellectuality into three periods in terms of intellectual and methodological transmutation: The early classical period (from the mid-7th century to the beginning of the 9th century), the middle classical period (from the first quarter of the 9th century to the mid-11th century), and the traditional period (from the third quarter of the 11th century until today).

The 8th-century Arabic linguistics was built upon some ontological and mathematical foundations. This early theory is entirely different edifice than its form which would be revolutionized by the 9th century onward. Having such fundamentals, the early theory

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6   Bernards says "Whether al-Mubarrad held 'rationalist' or 'Mu'tazilite' views in his grammatical theories ..." See Monique Bernards, *Changing Traditions: al-Mubarrad's Refutation of Sībawayh and the Subsequent Reception of the "Kitāb"*, Studies in Semitic Languages and Linguistics ed. T. Muraoka, C.M.H. Versteegh (Leiden, New York, Köln: E. J. Brill, 1997), 35.

7   Süleyman Hayri Bolay. *Türkiye'de Ruhçu ve Maddeci Görüşün Mücadelesi*, 4th ed. (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 1995), xx.

8   Bernards, *Changing Traditions*, 35.

represents something more than a linguistic system, rather a formal system of thought. However, one might rightfully raise a question that how a linguistic theory could be a rational system which is usable in the major intellectual fields of a culture. The answer is as follows:

The early Arabic linguistics is not only a theory of expression, but also that of understanding and thinking, unlike the case with its subsequent metamorphosis. It is built upon an abstract intellectual schema which has peculiar ontological, mathematical, and epistemological grounds. Therefore, what composed in syntax are not simply verbs, nouns, and particles. There are apparent metaphysical grounds of these grammatical terms such as governance, intention, combination, experimental and rational categories of linguistic phenomena, and the idea of process within contiguous and discrete dimensions, space, time, and finally stability and change that all allow the components of syntax to be more than words but something linguistic phenomena. Accordingly, such basic concepts are the fundamentals of the thought system used in the linguistic theory indeed.

It was Khalīl Ibn Aḥmad who first invented a comprehensive theory of morphology which is based upon mathematical fundamentals transforming them into an original synthesis that could be called mathematico-linguistic theory of morphology at the mid-8th century. We have only secondary sources about the origin of Khalilian mathematical ideas that they were Indian originated. Words consist of letters as the case with every morphological theory. However, what distinguishes Khalilian morphology from others is letters are considered as the units of combination that play a pure intellectual role. Therefore, the vocabulary of Arabic language is thought to be a product of this intellectual process. The Arabic morphology is of two facts; words and twenty-nine letters. Words are classified into four considering the original roots which contain two, three, four, and five letters. Now, the entire vocabulary is generated through a combination of two with twenty-nine, of three with twenty-nine, and so on.[9] What distinguishes Khalilian theory of morphology from a mere mathematical application and makes it a thinking system is that he considers letters to have specific places in a morpheme. Consequently, although "2 + 3" does not differ from "3 + 2" in mathematics, the word *fa-'a-l* is different from *'a-fa-l* even they both consist of the same letters. Here, we are introduced with the originality of Khalilian theory that he considers the linguistic units in coordination with abstract places. Accordingly, the morpheme of any word is thought as a *morphological space* that has particular places within itself those to be filled in by linguistic units. Now, we

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9   Ḫalīl ibn Aḥmad. *Kitāb al-'Ayn*, ed. Mahdī Maḫzūmī, Ibrāhīm al-Sāmarrāī, 8 vols. 1st ed. (Qum: Dār al-Hijra, 1405 A.H.), I, 49-55.

can figure out a hallmark of Arabic linguistic thinking from Greek logic which considers the words "going", "goes", and "gone" to be identical conceptually; because words can be identical in the early Arabic when they have identical places in syntax. It is this mathematico-linguistic theory that makes Arabic words to be more than a theory of vocabulary but something semi-mathematical phenomena.

My second argument for words are considered as phenomena in the early classical theory is the experimental and intellectual categories that associate to them. Within these categories, the words are not only meaningful symbols but have some experimental and intellectual properties which have been used by the early grammarians onward. Words may be massive or tenuous,[10] strong or weak, feminine or masculine, definite or indefinite, original or derivative, prior or posterior, much or less, close or remote.[11] In terms of governance, verb is stronger than nouns, verbal noun ('ism fā'il) is stronger than adjective, and adjective than noun. Thus, there are the strengths of verb (quwwat l-fi'l), of verbal noun (quwwat 'ism al-fā'il), of noun (quwwat l-'ism) etc.[12] Again, feminine and masculine as the peculiarities of things are a way of distinguishing and classifying things in order to obtain correct and specific information.[13] Since noun signifies an individual, naturally, the peculiarities of this individual are represented in noun.[14]

In order to understand the linguistic phenomena where the theory of syntax is built upon, we should step further in comprehending the ontological and epistemological features of morphology. The notion change (al-taghayyur) or becoming (al-ṣayrūrah) is the very kernel of linguistic phenomena and thinking. The entire universe of linguistic phenomena is considered in two basic categories in the early classical Arabic; stability and change. Many nouns in Arabic are qualified as stable (al-mutamakkin); but this is not considered from their being able to have various vowels in syntax as inflected words (mu'rab). If it were so, nouns would not be stable, but would have a changing nature. Nouns are qualified as stable because they signify stable things which do not change. Al-Mubarrad remarks on attribution of nouns

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10 'Amr ibn 'Utmān Sībawayhi. Kitāb Sībawayhin, ed. Hartwig Derenbourg, 2 vols. (Hildesheim-New York, Georg Olms Verlag, 1970), I, 5.

11 Sībawayhi, op.cit, I, 32; Abū al-Fat 'Uthmān ibn Jinnī, al-Ḫaṣā'iṣ, 3 vols. ed. Moḥammad 'Alī al-Najjār (Beirut: Dār Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, 1952), II, 55.

12 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 10.

13 Abū al-'Abbās Muḥammad Ibn Yazīd al-Mubarrad, al-Kāmil, 1st ed. 4 vols. (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risālah, 1406/1986), III, 1476.

14 Abū al-'Abbās Muḥammad ibn Yazīd al-Mubarrad. al-Muẕakkar wa l-Muannath, ed. Ramaḍān 'Abd al-Tawwāb, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Hādī (Republic of United Emirates: Wizārat al-Thaqāfah Markaz al-Taḥqīq al-Turāth, 1970), 107.

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by stability that since the point of verbs is governance, derived words are classified referring to the same principle. Thus, nouns are classified into two in respect of stability as frozen nouns (al-'asmā' al-jāmidah) and governor nouns. Since the frozen nouns are not derived from a verbal structure, they never govern.[15] The epistemological character of noun emerges from stability (al-tamakkun) of individual, and of verb is generated from change (al-taghayyur) of event; and the basis of individuality and of stability is being (al-shay').[16]

The term being and stable do not indicate something abstract in the early classical Arabic grammar unlike the case with the 10th-century of Islam; rather, it signifies an experiential individual that has a definite place. Therefore, things which are spoken about and demonstrable are all beings (al-ashyā'). In other words, things have locations, so have words in expression. What is stable refers to what is individual as every individual occupies a place. According to al-Farrā' (207/822), the place (al-makān, al-ma ābah, al-muqām) signifies one (al-wāḥid).[17] So, having a stable place is the strongest criterion of individual nominatum (al-musammā) which is always prior to noun,[18] and this is the very character of noun indeed. What is stable does not pass away; Sībawayhi remarks that "Because, the places and the mountains are things which do not pass away", this is why their nouns are used in syntax always definitely.[19] Accordingly, another meaning of stability is knowledge. This allows us classifying nouns as definite and indefinite in Arabic grammar. What known exactly and distinctively without any possible change in the mind of speaker or of people (al-ashyā' thābitah mustaqīmah ma'a al-nās) is definite, and what has not got these qualities is indefinite.[20]

As for verbs, they have a strong implication to events. The term al-ḥadaṯ which is used in the Sībawayhian definition of verb means both infinitive (al-maṣdar) and event. Al-Zajjājī (337/950) interprets the Sībawayhian formula of verb "al-fi'lu 'amthilatun 'ukhiẕat min lafẕi

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15 Al-Mubarrad, al-Kāmil, I, 57.

16 "The indefinite is more tenuous for Arabs than the definite, because the indefinite has a stronger stability (ashaddu tamakkunan) as it is primary. (…) You should know masculine is more tenuous for the Arabs than feminine, because masculine is primary having a stronger stability, feminine (al-ta'nīth) can only emerge from masculine (al-taẕkīr). Do you not see the being (al-shay') accompanies to everything what is informed about, before it is known if it is masculine or feminine, as being is masculine and nunnation is an indicator of what is more stable (al-amkan) for the Arabs and of what is more tenuous for them, leaving [nunnation] is an indicator for what they admit massive". See also Sībawayhi, op.cit, I, 5-6.

17 Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā ibn Ziyād al-Farrā', Ma'ānī l-Qur'ān, ed. Aḥmad Yūsuf Najātī, Moḥammad 'Alī al-Najjār, 3 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, 1374/1955), I, 76.

18 "inna al-'isma lā yasbaqu l-musammā"; see Abū al-Qāsim 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Isḥāq al-Zajjājī, al-'Īḍāḥ fī 'ilal al-naḥw, ed. Māzin al-Mubārak, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Nafā'is, 1393/1983), 58.

19 "inna al-'amākina wa al-jibāl ashyā' lā tazūl". See Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 229.

20 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 268.

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a dāthi l-asmā'" that if the verb is taken from the nouns and the nouns replace the nominatum (*al-musammāyāt*)[21] it results verb replace events as they signify events. It is not coincidence that the term *al-fiʿl* (action) and its derivative *al-fāʿil* (agent) have a double meaning both in early classical Arabic and in kalām as well; they are verb (and subject) and action (and agent). In its theological dimension, the term is relevant to many central problems such as creation and will. The metaphysical meaning of the term which is peculiar to Islam determined the future studies both in kalām and linguistics where the latter gives the terminological root of the former. Because action signifies something existent which was inexistent before and "Action cannot be conceived without an agent: where there is action, there is agent; and an agent is that which performs action".[22] This is perfectly the definition of the relationship between *al-fiʿl* and *al-fāʿil* in the early classical Arabic. The relationship between verb and subject signifies a relationship between action and agent which is understood axiomatically without entailing any argument. In al-Sīrāfī's words, this is because "the verb, as known by reason, necessarily needs a subject, as scripture needs a scriber, and building requires a builder".[23] Al-Mubarrad remarks the relationship between infinitive (*al-ḥadāṯ*) and *agent* (*al-fāʿil*) is just like noun and nominatum, as there cannot be noun without nominatum.[24] Ibn al-'Anbārī also verifies verb is nominated as *al-fiʿl* "because it signifies the real action (*al-fiʿl al-ḥaqīqī*). Do you not see when you say *ḍaraba* (he beat) it signifies beating itself which is a real action; since it signifies the real action, it is nominated accordingly".[25]

Sībawayhi considers the verbs transit (*al-wuṣūl*) from something to something. Transiting from something to something requires change primordially. Accordingly, the *jarr* which means possession and stabilization is not possible in words which signify change. When a word signifies them, it is predicated to something preferably with an adverb of time.[26] According to Abū ʿAlī the action of subject (*fiʿl al-fāʿil*) means influent movement

(*ḥarakah muʾaththirah*) which transits not only into subject and object, but also time, place, and infinitive.[27] This is because he thinks subject and object to be the parts of action. This relationship allows to change the places of subject and object in syntax, for example instead of "*ḍaraba ʿAbdullāh Zaydan*" one can say "*ḍaraba Zaydan ʿAbdullāh*" (Abdullāh beat Zayd) and of course to explain the passive voice in Sībawayhi's point of view. Because in passive voice of transitive verbs into two or three objects, the passive verb is also transitive to another object/s whereas in that of transitive verbs into one object, there occurs a restriction (*al-'iqtiṣār*) that does not allow the influence of verb to transit something else.[28] Al-Sijistānī focuses on the nature of verb remarking that "verb is not something stable" and "it is nothing other than an accomplishing movement (*ḥarakah munqaḍiyah*)".[29]

The Arab grammarians classify the utterances into two as governor and non-governor groups. This is to show the theory of grammar is based upon the idea of process which is of processors and processed elements. Verbs, some adjectives, some derived nouns, and some particles are governing processors whereas others are non-governing processors as they maintain the process created by governors. Nouns are *governed* (*al-maʿmūl*) elements in syntax. The governor which operates the process has two ontological fundamentals; one is inherent to the reason, another is intuited from physical events. The specific activity that the former performs is called *intention* and the result of the latter is called *verb*. Both intention and verb perform the same linguistic function; this results that the intuited form of physical events and the activity of reason are configured cooperatively in the Arabic syntactic theory.

The most important ontological bases of the early classical theory are space and time. They explain the principal idea of process which is created by governor. The nature of time in Sībawayhian theory of linguistics is not tense in its wide sense, but rather a cosmological time. He departs from an ontological concept of *al-dahr* (time) in explanation of time in syntax. He notices "the date, hours, days, months, years, and any analogous kind of time and instant are all been in *al-dahr*".[30] The space is a manifold concept in Sībawayhi, it means the grammatical place, the epistemological place, the cosmological space and adverb of place. The origin of the adverbs of place is only concrete *location* (*al-mawḍiʿ*) and stable point on the earth (*al-mustaqarr*

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21 Al-Zajjājī, *al-'Īḍāḥ*, 56.

22 Kwame Gyekye. "Al-Ghazālī on Action", in *Ghazālī: La Raison et le Miracle, Islam d'Hier et d'Aujourdhui 30* (Paris: Editions Maisonneuve et Larose, 1987), 83-91, also 84-85.

23 Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī. *Sharh Kitāb Sībawayhin*, ed. Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb, Maḥmūd Faḥmī Ḥijāzī, Moḥammad Hāshim ʿAbd al-Karīm, 2 vols. (Cairo: al-Hay'at al-Miṣriyyat al-ʿĀmmah li l-Kitābah, 1986), II, 11.

24 "Because the information (*al-khabar*) is about the nominatum but not about the noun, you say *qāla l-ḫalīfatu kaẕā, qāla l-rāwiyatu and jā'a l-nassābatu* where you inform about the individual[s in themselves] (*al-ẕāt*), but you do not intend what comes and says is the noun". See al-Mubarrad, *al-Muẕakkar wa l-muannath*, 107.

25 Abū al-Barakāt ibn al-'Anbārī. *Kitāb 'Asrār al-ʿArabiyyah*, ed. Moḥammad Bahjat al-Bayṭar (Damascus: Maṭba'at al-Taraqqī, 1377/1957), 11.

26 "*fiʿlun ya ilu min shay'in ilā shay'in*" see Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 112.

27 Abū ʿAlī al-Fārisī. *al-Taʿlīqah ʿalā Kitābi Sībawayhin*, ed. Awḍ ibn Ḥamd al-Qūzī, 1st ed. (Cairo: Maṭba'at al-'Amānah, 1990, 1410/1990), I, 74.

28 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 11, 14; al-Fārisī, *al-Taʿlīqah*, I, 74.

29 Abū Ḥātim Sahl ibn Moḥammad al-Sijistānī. *Al-Muẕakkar wa l-Mu'annaṯ*, ed. Ḥātim Ṣāliḥ al-Ḍāmin, 1st ed. (Beirut-Damascus, Dār al-Fikr al-Mu'āṣir, Dār al-Fikr, 1997), 41.

30 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 176.

min al-ʾarḍ).[31] He exemplifies this concept by "*innahū la-ṣulbu l-qanāt*" and "*innahū la-min shajaratin ṣāliḥatin*".[32] By his second sample, he seems to refer to a Qurʾanic verse. According to this Qurʾanic verse "*maṯalu kalimatin ṭayyibatin ka-shajaratin ʾaṣluhā ṯābitun wa farʿuhā fī l-samāʾ*" (Qurʾān 14:24-26), every *speech* (al-qawl) which expresses a truth[33] is similar to a tree which has a stable origin on the earth and branches those extend to the heaven.[34]

According to Sībawayhi, every verb (al-fiʿl) indicates an infinitive (al-ḥadaṯ)[35] that also signifies an event; every event emerges from an agent (al-fāʿil),[36] and every event occurs in space (al-makān) and time (al-zamān) conditions. Thus, every verb implies an innate argument (al-dalīl) for space and time, not in a specific way but very generally. When we say that "[he] went" (ẕahaba), the verb "went" spontaneously indicates that there is an "event of going" which occurred in some place and in the past time, but it does not imply an argument for the place whether it is Damascus or not.[37] The meaning of verb which is built upon *what passed and what did not* expresses the ontological character of verb that it signifies an action indeed. Accordingly, what happens is not only action but also infinitive (*ʾannahū qad waqaʿa al-maṣdar wa huwa al-ḥadaṯ*).[38]

Sībawayhi considered time concerning to space, to have two aspects in the verb which are convertible into each other:[39] [a] First is time-in-places (al-waqt fī al-ʾamākin) that when an event occurs in space, from its beginning to end it consumes an indefinite extension commensurable to the place which the event happens in. Abū ʿAlī (377/987) conceptualizes it as dated-place (al-makān al-muwaqqat)[40] or spatial-date (waqtun min al-makān).[41] [b] Second

is *date-in-times* (al-waqt fī al-ʾazminah) or temporal-date (waqtun min al-zamān)[42] that the place of event in the history, whether is it past, present, or future. In its first meaning there is no definite place for the extension of event. Second meaning of time is classified into three parts according to the subject, who speaks. Although the verb indicates both space and time; time is the source (al-maṣdar) of the verb and verb itself is essentially built upon what passed or what happens in time. But space (al-makān) is not the source of patterns (al-amṯilah) of verbs. In Sībawayhi's opinion, place is closer and peculiar to individuals such as *Zayd*, *ʿAmr*, *Makkah*, and *Oman* which have a characteristic that is not possessed by every space like mountain (al-jabal), sea (al-baḥr), and time (al-dahr): "Places have an extension (al-juttah), whereas al-dahr is passage of nights and days, and closer to the [nature of] verb, accordingly".[43] Therefore, it is preferable to use the adverbs of time with verbs rather than the adverbs of place in Arabic, like "I went for two months" (ẕahabtu shahrayn) instead of "I went two parasangs" (ẕahabtu farsaḥayn).[44]

The process in verb and noun-clauses is understood differently because of the conception of time in clauses. The noun-clause is configured by Sībawayhi in terms of an identity between its components as prior and posterior parts. The noun-clause depends on identity of its posterior part with prior part via the inflection of *rafʿ*. This simply means the predicate implicates a process which is concordant to al-mubtadaʾ. If the posterior part is not identified with the prior one in noun-clause, it implicates a partial process but not wholly. This is for instance "*ana al-yawma afʿalu ẕāka*" (I do this today) which does not mean the whole day.[45] In other words, the naṣb which is the hallmark of verb-clause as an influence of verb implicates a *discrete* (munqaṭiʿ) process whereas the *rafʿ* as a peculiarity of noun-clause signifies a *contiguous* (muttaṣil) one.[46]

The nature of information is different in both; the noun-clause signifies something in

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31 "*fa-ʾinnamāʾl-ʾaṣlu fī al-ẕurūfi al-mawḍiʿu wa l-mustaqarru min al-ʾarḍ*". See Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 173.

32 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 173.

33 Because every Qurʾanic verse express a truth. See the Qurʾān, 16: 102.

34 According to Muqātil, a good word arrives to God. See Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān al-Balḫī, al-Ashbāh wa l-naẕāʾir fī l-Qurʾān al-karīm, ed. ʿAbdullāh Maḥmūd Shaḥḥātah, 2 vols. Wazārat al- aqāfah (Cairo: al-Maktabat al-ʿArabiyyah, 1395/1975), I, 128. Langhade also mentions this couple of terms as the core of Arabic linguistics. See Jacques Langhade, *Du Coran à la Philosophie: La Langue Arabe et la Formation du Vocabulaire Linguistique de Farabi* (Damas: Institute Francais d'Études Arabes de Damas, 1994), 45-48.

35 "As [the verb] is mentioned only for the sake of signifying infinitive". Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 11.

36 "*al-ʾasmāu ʾaṣḥābu al-ʾasmāʾ wa hum al-fāʿilūn*". See al-Sīrāfī, *Sharhu Kitāb Sībawayhi*, I, 54-55.

37 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 11.

38 Ibid, I, 12.

39 "[The verb] transits into date-in-places as it transits into date-in-times, because it is date which occurs in places, no single place is peculiar to it, and no tense itself is specified to this date-in-tenses (waqt fīʾl-ʾazmān). Since it becomes equivalent date-in-tense (al-waqt fīʾl-zaman), it becomes its simile, because you do by places what you do by times (tafʿalu biʾl-ʾamākin mā tafʿalu biʾl-ʾazminah)". See Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 12.

40 Al-Fārisī, *al-Taʿlīqah*, I, 63.

41 Abū ʿAlī al-Fārisī. *al-Masāʾil al-Manthūrah*, ed. Muṣṭafā al-Ḥaḍarī (Damascus: Maṭbūʿāt Majmaʿ al-Luġat al-ʿArabiyyah, 1986), 19.

42 Ibid, 19.

43 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 12; al-Sīrāfī, *Sharh*, II, 299-300. Sībawayhi mentions again in another place of al-Kitāb that "*wa jamīʿu ẕurūfi l-zamān lā takūn urūfan liʾl-juthath*". v. Sībawayhi, op.cit, I, p. 57. Instead, they are closer to the nature of verbs. Notwithstanding, utterances become adverb because of a meaning of verb inherent in them (limā fīh min maʿnā al-fiʿl). See Ibid.

44 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 12. This principle, of course, explains why we generally observe in classical Arabic literature that while the authors narrate events they generally use adverbs of time, even it is appropriate to mention an adverb of place. Here is an example from al-Mubarrad: "al-Asmaʿī said that ʿAdiyy Ibn al-Fuḍayl said that 'I went to ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz the king of the Muslims to be allowed to drill a well in al-ʿAẕbah. He asked me 'where is al-ʿAẕbah?' I replied 'two nights [far away] from al-Basrah'". See al-Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil*, I, 205.

45 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 177.

46 Ibid, I, 141-142.

such case of "*al-julūs*" (sitting down) and "*al-qiyām*" (getting up) whereas verb-clause indicates something performs a definite act in a definite time, either past or future.[47] The verb-clause specifically states a change or a chain of changes which happens always in time. Its function is not to inform something unknown is or is possessed by something else.[48] Thus, the primary option is always *naṣb* (sc. verb) in expressing every case which implicates change.[49] According to Sībawayhi, the *mubtada'* (subject of noun-clause) signifies what is stable in the speaker, it is not possible to govern it and make it subject of verb-clause.[50] It implicates a continuous situation, as *al-ṯābit* (stable) means *al-dā'im* (continuous).[51] It also implicates what is known by speaker and unknown (*al-jahl*) by listeners. Thus, the substantial function of a noun-clause is to inform what is not known by the listeners.[52] Accordingly, the convertibility between verb-clause and noun-clause is restricted by the epistemological conditions of both. Abū 'Alī complements the point of Sībawayhi remarking some patterns like *fa'lān* determine the nature of the expression, as no one can be qualified by any word in this pattern without being known well. Therefore, it is obligatory the following sentence to be a noun-clause "*lahū 'ilmun 'ilmu l-fuqahā'*".[53] Hence *mubtada'* is not subject. This is the epistemological signification of noun and verb-clauses. Yet, both are dependent upon the concept of change, as both are fulfilled only by the *i'rāb* (grammatical cases).[54]

Briefly, the Arabic syntax has always two standards for time; noun-clause signifies knowledge and stability that do not change, and verb-clause signifies the change essentially. However, according to Sībawayhi verb-clause is more clear (*'awḍaḥ*) than noun-clause as the former explains the meaning is built upon what passed and what is happening.[55] Change is the very kernel of syntactic theory of Arabic. *Al-i'rāb* represents a process of change in expression.

The grammatical structures including noun-clauses are not free from *al-i'rāb*. Noun-clause and verb-clause are convertible into each other too. But the preference is for verb-clause principally due to its accordance with syntactic theory. Therefore, when a need occurs to convert one into another, noun-clause is converted into verb-clause.

The process is the very essential notion in the Arabic theory of governance which is the principle of syntax. *Governance* (*al-'amal*) is a process of syntactic operation of governors on utterances in sentence. Words and particles which determine the grammatical positions of other words in the syntax are called *governor* (*al-'āmil*, pl. *al-'awāmil*), and the words influenced by them are called *governed* (*al-ma'mūl*). The real governor is verb.[56] The functions of governors are predetermined by groundwork (*al-majrā* pl. *al-majārī*) that is inflections. In other words, any governor happens to be influent in a sentence no more than four groundwork which are *naṣb*, *jarr*, *raf'* and *jazm*.[57] Every groundwork indicates there is an influence which transmits from the governor. It is impossible to be governed without a governor, or inversely a governor to not govern a word,[58] as Ibn al-Anbārī mentions this is like a cause-effect relationship in physical events. Governors (*al-'awāmil*) are considered to be influent perceptually (*mu'aṯṯirah issiyyah*) similar to physical affects but not like the fire burns and the sword cuts,[59] "it is impossible in this science the *naṣb* [to be inflected] by a non-existent governor, because the grammatical reasons are similar to the *perceptual reasons* (*al-'ilal al-ḥissiyyah*)".[60] Perceptual influence and reason explains the co-existence of cause and effect in syntax; if there is an inflection there must be a governor. Likewise, Sībawayhi remarks governed word arises from the reason of governor.[61] The Arabic expressions are composed of simple and complex sentences. Both have a character of parenthetical structure or process. They have varieties of grammatical units; if you wish govern all by one governor as one contiguous process or separate them optionally. There are some cases where the governor is ceased from governing and the non-governor may become governor. Thus, some reasons prevent the verb from governance (*man'u l-fi'l an ya'mala*) and getting rid of (*al-'infāẓ*) the governance of verb.[62] Abū 'Alī remarks it is not possible the verb to govern the "Zayd" in "'*alimtu 'a Zaydun munṭaliqun*"

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47 Ibid, I, 142.

48 Ibid, I, 144.

49 Ibid, I, 145.

50 "*innaka 'ibtada'ta shay'an qad abata 'indaka wa lasta fī āli adī ika ta'malu fī 'i bātihā wa tazjiyatihā wa fīhā ālika l-ma'nā*". See Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 138-139.

51 Ibid, I, 139.

52 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 144; al-Fārisī, *al-Masā'il al-man ūrah*, 12.

53 al-Fārisī, Ibid, 12.

54 "*Al-I'rāb*" a term "for the system of nominal and adjectival suffixes of Classical Arabic. These suffixes are written in fully vocalized Arabic texts, notably the Qur'ān or texts written for children or Arabic learners, and they are articulated when a text is formally read aloud, but they do not survive in any spoken dialect of Arabic. Even in Literary Arabic, these suffixes are often not pronounced in pausa (al-waqf); i.e. when the word occurs at the end of the sentence, in accordance with certain rules of Arabic pronunciation." [Editor's note taken from *Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia*: accessed from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CA%BEI%CA%BFrab, on 2 February 2010].

55 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 23.

56 Ibn Jinnī, *al-Khaṣā'iṣ*, I, 187.

57 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 2.

58 Ibid, I, 27.

59 Ibn al-'Anbārī. *al-'Inṣāf fī masā'il al-ḫilāf bayna al-naḥwiyyīn al-Baṣriyyīn wa'l-Kūfiyyīn*, ed. Mohammad Muhyiddīn 'Abd al-Hamīd, 4th ed. 2 vols. (Cairo: Matba'at al-Sa'ādah, 1380/1961), I, 19-20.

60 Ibn al-'Anbārī, , I, 247.

61 "*lā yakūn al-ma'mūl fīh 'illā min sababih*". See Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 84.

62 Sībawayhi, Ibid, 54.

(I knew if Zayd left), here the process of governance must be separated (*al-faṣl*) because of the interrogative particle.[63] The term *cut* (*al-qaṭʿ*) signifies a break in a contiguous process (*al-ʾittiṣāl*) lexically. A contiguous process is like an action which has no cut (*ghayr munqaṭiʿ*) while happening.[64] Cut, as a term, signifies a break in the extension of governing process throughout the syntax. It specifically conceptualizes a technical phase before separating grammatical units by assignment of governors or definition of the elements of syntax as governors. This phase is relevant to the determination of the extension of governance. The term *al-saʿah* (extension) and its derivative *al-ʾittisāʿ* are used for extension of governance (of governor) throughout the expression breaking the other governors and omitting some words, by Sībawayhi onward. The term is used properly as *saʿatu al-kalām*, *ʾittisāʿu al-kalām* (extension of expression), or *al-ʾittisāʿ fī'l-kalām* (extension in expression). Ibn al-Sarrāj defines extension as a kind of displacement (*al-ḥaẓf*) essentially.[65] It is contradictory to the term cut. The extension of governance arises from the knowledge of listener about the meaning.[66] It describes a very common feature in Arabic expressions. The result of extension is the use of verb or governor in the expression ignoring the meaning, removing some words which have a definite grammatical position. Hence, another result of this concept is shortening (*al-ʾiqtiṣār*). This is for instance the Qurʾanic verse "*wa-s'al al-qaryata llatī kunnā fīhā…*" (Qurʾān, 2:25) where the *ʾahl* is displaced from the possessive phrase "*ʾahla l-qaryati*".[67]

The syntax is a matter of governing process, and this also considered in terms of *prior* and *posterior*.[68] They determine the direction of governance which is generally realized from prior to posterior, and sometimes inversely. Verb is always prior to other components of the sentence, just like the *al-ʾibtidāʾ* is. They govern what is posterior to them. Prior and posterior are one of the bases of the consistency between the manifestations of utterances in terms of feminine-to-feminine, masculine-to-masculine, singular-to-singular, plural-to-plural, definite-to-definite etc. This is because the process of governance follows an extensional order in syntax which is formulated by them. It appears generally inconsistent when a plural noun is followed by a singular one such as "*wa lā takūnū ʾawwala kāfirin bih*" (Qurʾān: 2/41),

this requires an interpretation of the peculiarities of morphology of them.[69] According to Khalīl, the meaning of dual is two things which of the posterior is *contiguous* (al-mawṣūl) with the prior without *discretion* (al-ʾinqiṭāʿ). Relevantly, the coordinated words by "w" like "*labbayka wa saʿdayka*" implicate such a contiguity, that is one is ready to another approval after one. Sībawayhi generalizes this concept to the cooperative verbs (*fiʿlun min al-ʾiṯnayn*), and verb and noun with dual pronoun. The cooperative verbs like "*dāwala*" implicate an action consecutive (*al-mutābiʿ*) to a previous action which does not leave it (*al-mufāraqah*). Likewise "*haẓāẓayka*" states "*haẓẓun baʿda haẓẓin min kulli wajhin*".[70] The prior and posterior are not only explicative to a single sentence, but the nature of a text which is composed of a flow of governing process, by various governors. A sentence can be dependent upon an antecedent process (*al-muʿtamid ʿalā mā qablah*) or can be cut from the prior (*munqaṭiʿ min al-kalām al-ʾawwal*).[71] Eventually, a process which is composed of prior and posterior can be contiguous or discrete. The coordinative particles like "f" and "ḥattā" makes the governing process contiguous (*al-muttaṣil*).[72]

Space and time are used in two different meanings. First is the place of words in syntactic order. In this meaning "primary" means "before" (*qabl*) and "precedent" (*al-muqaddam*), hence prior, and the linguistic function depending on it is called preceding (*al-taqdīm*); secondary means after (*baʿd*) and end (*al-ʾāḫir*), hence posterior, and the linguistic function depending on it is called postponing (*al-taʾkhīr*). Second kind is logical priority and posteriori; that is primary and secondary; singular is prior to plural, simple (*al-mufrad*) is prior to complex (*al-murakkab*).[73]

To make a further investigation on the difference between the logic of Arabic syntax and the syntax of Greek logic, one should take into consideration the metaphysical interpretations of logical proposition and Arabic syntax. We observe only a few contemporary scholars achieved noticing to the difference between inclusion of meanings one another and syntactic peculiarity of early Arabic grammar, many of the contemporaries failed in obtaining the difference.[74] Comparing Aristotle's logic with Arabic linguistic thinking, the hallmark of

63 Abū ʿAlī al-Fārisī. *al-Masāʾil al-Baṣriyyāt*, ed. Muḥammad Shātir Aḥmad M. Aḥmad, 1st ed. 2 vols. (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Madanī, 1405/1985), I, 275-276.

64 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 70.

65 Al-Sarrāj, op. cit., II, 255.

66 "*li-ʿilmi l-muḫātabi bi l-maʿnā*". See Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 89.

67 "*istiʿmālu l-fiʿl fī lafẓ lā fī l-maʿnā li-ʾittisāʿihim fī l-kalām*". See Sībawayhi, ibid, 88-89.

68 Sībawayhi, ibid, 382.

69 Al-Farrāʾ, *Maʿānī l-Qurʾān*, I, 32.

70 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 146-147.

71 Ibid, 366.

72 Ibid, 367.

73 Maḥmūd Saʿd. *Ḥurūf al-maʿānī bayna daqāʾiq al-naḥw wa laṭāʾif al-fiqh, al-mabāḥis al-ʾuṣūl al-naḥwiyyah* (Alexandria: al-Nāṣir al-Maʿārif, 1988), 20.

74 Louis Massignon. "Reflexions sur la Structure Primitive de l'Analyse Grammaticale en Arabe", *Opera Minora*, 3 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Maʾārif, 1963), II, 613-625, 623-624; G. J. H. Van Gelder, *Beyond the Line: Classical*

Arabic grammar is its paradigm of change that must be highlighted carefully. The notion of change is founded in the early classical grammar by means of another abstract notion of *space* both in morphology and syntax. The governor generates the syntactic space which contains various places. These places are determined by the grammatical judgments (*al-ḥukm*, pl. *al-ʾaḥkām*) which proceed from the governor namely verb.

There is very rich terminology to state the concept of space and place in the early classical Arabic literature. The terms *al-maḥall, al-mawḍiʿ, al-mawqiʿ, al-makān, al-manzilah*, and *al-majrā* are all built upon the idea of governance. They play a substantial role in understanding and building expressions, and conversion of sentences into each other indeed. Sībawayhi remarks the verb-clause "*ḍarabanā*" (he beat us) in "*haẓā rajulun ḍarabanā*" (this is the man who beat us) occurred in the place (*waqaʿa mawqiʿa*) of noun, as it is equal and convertible to "*ḍāribun*" (beater). Furthermore since the verb takes the place of noun, it is attributed by the qualities of this noun such as being indefinite.[75] Here the predicative operation is apparently determined by the concept of space not by the Greek notion of universality.

Al-makān is probably a Kūfian term replacing the Basrian term *al-maḥall*. Al-Farrāʾ mentions it is possible "*al-ḥamd*" in "*al-ḥamdu li-llāhi*" (Qurʾān, 1:1) to be read as *naṣb*, if the place of infinitive (*makānu l-maṣdar*) is correct.[76] Al-Mubarrad uses the term *al-maḥall* as "a dominant adjective extends the place of noun" (*ṣifatun ghālibatun taḥullu maḥall al-ʾism*).[77] Sībawayhi clarifies the meaning of *al-manzilah* while discussing the relationship between the subjects of active and passive voice in the examples "*kasawtu Zaydan ṯawban*" (I made Zayd dress a cloth) and "*kusiya Zaydun ṯawban*" (*Zayd is made dressed*). The subject of passive voice is in the place of the subject (*bi-manzilati l-fāʿil*) of active voice.[78] This is why its inflection is *rafʿ*. The term *al-majrā* is configured by Sībawayhi in such a way that if one linguistic phenomenon is similar or coordinative (*naẓīrah*) to another, it results it is in the place of (*bi-manzilah*) that, hence this correlation requires fulfillment of the entailment of this correlation (*fa-ʾajrūhā majrāhā*), that is replacing one to another.[79] Another meaning

of *al-majrā* is to explain the structure of sentence and the relationship between prior and posterior. Sībawayhi remarks the second coordinated object is fulfilled *naṣb* according to verb (*yajrī ʿalā l-fiʿl*) in "*raʾaytu Zaydan wa ʿAmran*", as the second replaces the first object via the coordinative particle *w*.[80] The *al-majrā* is a platform that covers many similarities between various linguistic phenomena and that which by we reach to upper formal concepts like equality (*al-siwāʾ, al-ʾistiwāʾ*). Sībawayhi remarks the singular noun (Zayd) and possessive structure (ʿAbd Allāh) are equal, as the possessive structure which is composed of two nouns is in the place of singular.[81]

The expression can only be made if the utterances are located in their correct places. Every place is determined by a judgment and every judgment emerges from governor. Sībawayhi remarks "it is not possible if you put the particles in the places of nouns (*mawāḍiʿ al-ʾasmā*) [in sentence]. Do you not see if you were to say ʿ*inna yaḍriba yaʾtīnā* (to beat is coming to us) and its similar, they would not be an expression (*kalām*)".[82] In an expression, there is one process and unique space which contains particular places. The infinitive is the place of verb. It is very common in the Arabic lexical formulations that grammarians mention a verb with its infinitive; "*kataba kitāban*" ([he] wrote a writing), "*ḍaraba ḍarban*" ([he] beat a beating), etc. According to Sībawayhi, "*ẓanantu ẓāka*" (I supposed this) means "*ẓanantu ẓāka al-ẓanna*" (I supposed this supposition) where an action happened in infinitive.[83] Al-Sīrāfī contributes "you say *ẓanantu* and then you make it govern the *al-ẓann*, as you make *ẓahabtu* govern *al-ẓahāb*; here likewise the *al-ẓann*".[84] The process of governance is realized in an epistemological space, "you say *ẓanantu bihī* (I supposed him) that is you put him in the place of your supposition".[85] The grammatical action happens in infinitive and the infinitive happens in time. Consequently, the Arabic syntax depends on the concept of space in coordination with process and extension, but not inclusion. Sībawayhi's theory of grammar and theory of predication in linguistic thinking depend on these principles. He did not speak of inclusion (*al-ʾinḍimām*) as post-10th century grammarians did. Original Arabic syntax essentially depends on verb-action dialectics. The action has two prongs: First of all, it is an action of intention which arises from mind. But since verb is derived from the experiences of natural events,

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Arabic Literary Critics on the Coherence and Unity of the Poem, Studies in Arabic Studies, vol. 8 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982), 15; Gerard Chamy, *al-ʾIshkāliyyat al-luġawiyyah fī falsafat al-ʾArabiyyah*, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1994), 165-167.

75 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 2-3.

76 Al-Farrāʾ, *Maʿānī l-Qurʾān*, I, 3.

77 Al-Mubarrad, *al-Kāmil*, II, 589.

78 Sībawayhi, op. cit., I, 14.

79 "They ... put the 'tanwīn' in the place of the 'nūn' because it is similar to the 'wāw' in feminine [cases] and to the 'yāʾ' in masculine [cases], accordingly they fulfill them in the places [of others]". Sībawayhi, ibid, 4.

80 Sībawayhi, Ibid, 37.

81 Ibid, 105.

82 Ibid, 2.

83 Ibid, 18.

84 Al-Sīrāfī, *Sharh*, II, 323-324. For the use of the pattern *mafʿal* both as infinitive and place (*al-makān*). See al-Fārisī, *al-Masāʾil al-Baṣriyyāt*, I, 280-281; *al-Masāʾil al-Manthūrah*, 1.

85 Al-Sīrāfī, *Sharh*, II, 324.

intention comes to true due to two ontological conditions, as all natural events do indeed; they are space and time. Intention and its metaphysical conditions are the bases of the theory of governance. Accordingly, every sentence contains the conditions of meaning –sc. its truth, validity, beauty, etc. referring to the process of governance. What lies behind the governance is an abstract impact, of course. Impact or influence is a general concept which manages the meanings of nouns in general. Classification of nouns into feminine and masculine is by the same reason, as the feminine noun signifies to an impacted object and the masculine noun refers to impacting one. Therefore, every meaning has an abstract place in syntax which is given to it by a governor that is an impact. Hence, the nature of predication in the early Arabic linguistic thinking is not a matter of inclusion, rather extension of an impact into the space and ramification of a root into branches. Verb produces the grammatical judgments (*al-ḥukm*, *pl. al-ʾaḥkām*) which determine the places of utterances in syntax. Thence, the logic of the Arabic syntax could be qualified best as an extensive thinking that every meaning is placed in their own places by means of proper judgments. The relationship between verb and action is the unique way of representing the places of both meanings and utterances in the Arabic syntax. If it is broken, the logic of Arabic syntax is destroyed and replaced by the idea of inclusion that means Hellenization.

As known well, the basic Arabic linguistic sciences are of two; morphology and syntax which of both depend on the idea of change. The morphological formulae are configured in the limited space of *fa-ʿa-l*. Every letter corresponds to a place in this formula, and every place is defined by the axiomatic concepts of prior and posterior. The change in morphology is always explained by these concepts. Then, the morphology is a science of change in particulars (words); every particular has sub-components (letters and dependent vowels) that everyone occupies a place in the formula. The particular changes as soon as the places of its components change. Morphology is peculiarly the science of this change, and what distinguishes it from lexicology is this peculiarity. Likewise, the grammar is a science of change in a contiguous space. Words become an expression when they occupy abstract places which are created by a governor. It is an open process that can be progressed by particles as the processors, ad infinitum. Verbs and other processors maintain the space of expression conventionally until the speaker or listener stops it. The expression changes and becomes another expression as soon as the places of words change. Thus, the grammar is the *science of change* and *becoming*. Abū ʿAlī clearly remarks on the very nature of linguistic thinking that "the grammar is of two classes: one is the change that penetrates into the ends of words, other is the change that

penetrates into the essence of words in themselves…".[86]

I call this system of thought as the *science of becoming* or the *science of change* considering its peculiar ontological and mathematical foundations which are centralized in the idea of change and process. However, when we notice to the problems it emerged, we can qualify it as the first modern materialist and molecular system of thought. Here the term *materialist* is to signify its strong character of quantifying and materializing the thoughts which are esteemed as essential things in the Hellenistic outlook. And the term *molecular* means its analytic character that allows dividing thoughts and phenomena into infinite units.

II. ISLAMIC THOUGHT AS HELLENIZED

Second intellectual and methodological phase of the Islamic thought begins by the first quarter of the 9th century. The basic notion that this phase depends on is stability, the way which leads to this consequence is Hellenization, and what results Hellenization is the problem of createdness of Qurʾān. As I have already introduced what guided to this problem is the early classical Arabic linguistic theory within its materialist metaphysical fundamentals and molecular nature of thinking. The opinion that Islamic thought is Hellenized due to the strong external influence of Greek heritage has always been misleading its case. Such a consideration is to exaggerate the Greek influence while underestimating the Arabico-Islamic intellectuality presupposing it has no theoretical and metaphysical ground before this external influence. This opinion concealed the true reasons of medieval Arabic translations and the genuine identity of the early classical Arabico-Islamic thought, accordingly. However, the internal factors to Islam are stronger than the external influence of Greek heritage; because the point is not an *external impact* but a *deliberate choice* that is resulted from internal problems. On the other hand, Islamic culture did not only translate the Greek works, but it Hellenized itself within a systematic program that its micro-components are reckoned, scrutinized, and governed carefully. In other words, Hellenization of Islamic thought is not simply an outcome of translation of Greek works into Arabic, but it consists of a process of paradigmatic conversion that has been realized in more than two centuries within a conscious program of transmutation achieved step by step. The process of paradigmatic conversion encompasses

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86 Abū ʿAlī al-Fārisī. *al-Takmilah wa hiya l-juzʾ al-t̲ānī min al-ʾĪḍāḥ al-ʿAḍudī,* ed. Ḥasan Shāzalī Farḥūd, al-Turāt̲ al-ʿArabī (Algeria: Dīwān al-Maṭbūʿāt al-Jāmiʿiyyah, 1984), 3-4.

some revolutionary transmutations in the core of Arabico-Islamic intellectuality such as transmuting the dynamic kernel of thinking system in Islam into a static one, codifying the Greek concepts into this system, converting the Arabic concept of being into the Greek notion of being, reconfiguring some essential terms according to the Greek paradigm, and applying the logical theory to linguistic and theological thinking systems. The target of this program is to dissolve the political problem of persecution and to finalize the thoroughgoing problem of the createdness of Qur'ān.

Early classical linguistic system had a primary importance in Islamic theology as the entire juristic and theological thinking was dependent upon this method. Considering the problem of createdness of Qur'ān has occurred by the first quarter of the 8th century, I am inclined this linguistic thinking system within its ontological and mathematical foundations was already built and functional by that time.

It was not easy for Muslim scholars to convene the divine nature of revelation and the materialistic character of Arabic grammatical theory. How divine revelation could still be divine and immaterial within such a thinking system? If Qur'ān and God is identical in respect of eternity, there would be a plurality of eternity which was principally impossible in Islam. On the other hand, how the speech of an eternal being could not be eternal after being revealed in Arabic language, memorized and written was another big problem.[87] This complicated case is called as the createdness of the Qur'ān. The early opinions on this problem naturally emerged from the metaphysical principles of linguistic thinking. Jahm ibn Safwān (d. 133/751) is known first who claimed Qur'ān has a character of createdness at the first quarter of the 8th century. His thesis depends on a refusal of co-eternity of speech in God, as speech requires multiplicity of sounds, words, and finally the speech requires movement.[88] The createdness of Qur'ān that "the Qur'ān is created and produced (al-muhdath), but not eternal" is attributed to Mu'tazilite scholars.[89] This opinion is significantly formulated by Basrian scholars such as Abū Huzayl al-'Allāf (d. 235/850), Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī (d. 303/915), Abū Hāshim (d. 321/933), and 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 416/1025) who is the formulator of entire teaching of Mu'tazila. According to Abū Huzayl there are two kinds of divine speech; one does not occur in a place (al-maḥall)

like the order of kun (be), other kinds of his speech do in a place.[90] The Rāfiḍī School and its followers like al-Naẓẓām had been admitting the voices and sounds to be corpus.[91] According to al-Jāḥiẓ Qur'ān is a corpus and it is possible for it whatever possible for a corpus and this is not in a metaphorical meaning but actually.[92] The basic difficulty in proponents of creation was this thesis would require transporting voice from one place to another. A relevant second difficulty was that since voice is an accident it entails a substantial corpus to emerge from.[93]

The defense of orthodox schools is built upon rejection of the speech of God is composed of letters and voices and its being divisibility, it is essentially indivisible and is not from the genus of letters and voices.[94] Early refusals were pioneered by the Jurist Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), the Shi'ī theologian Hishām ibn Ḥakam (d. 179/795 or 199/815), traditionalist Aḥmad ibn anbal (d. 241/855), and after them the majority of leading scholars such as Ibn Kullāb (d. 241/855), al-'Ash'arī, and al-Baqillānī developed this objection.[95] Since Ibn Ḥanbal hesitates from the troublesome of materials like paper and ink, he believed Qur'ān is neither creator nor created.[96] Al-Baqillānī (d. 403/1013) remarks that God is speaking, having the attribute of speech, and that speech is eternal, not created, nor made and temporal. His speech is not an expression neither a reproduction. Thus, it is not admitted the pronunciation of the Qur'ān is created, neither one can speak by God's speech. Al-'Ash'arī discussed the question by a making distinction between essential speech (kalām al-nafsī) and articulated speech (kalām al-lafzī). God's essential speech is an eternal quality, inherent in his essence, the revealed Qur'ān is an expression of it.[97] However, the defenders of uncreated Qur'ān were not even homogeneous figures during the break point in Islamic thought. A group of scholars called ashwiyyah is a derivation of Ibn Ḥanbal's traditionalist school and 'Aṣḥāb al-Ṭabā'ī which is akin to Dahriyyah (materialism) with its opinions on natural causality, both are defenders of

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87 F. E. Peters. Aristotle and the Arabs: Studies in Near Eastern Civilization, ed. R. Bayly Winder, Richard Ettinghausen (New York-London: New York University Press and University of London Press, 1968), 350.

88 Louis Massignon. The Passion of al-Hallāj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam, trans. Herbert Mason, 4 vols. Bollingen Series XCVIII (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), III, 139.

89 Bahā al-Dīn al-'Āmilī. al-Kashkūl, ed. Ṭāḥir Aḥmad al-Zāwī, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār Iḥyā' Kutub al-'Arabiyyah, 1961), I, 323.

90 Abū al-Man□ūr 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī. Kitābu l-Milal wa l-Niḥal, ed. Albīr Naṣrī Nādir, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1992), 90.

91 Ibid, 91.

92 'Amr ibn 'Utmān al-Jāḥiẓ. "Fī khalq al-Qur'ān" in Rasā'il al-Jāḥiz, ed. 'Ubaydullāh Ibn Ḥassān, M. Bāsil 'Uyūn al-Sūd, 4 vols. 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1420/2000), III, 217-228, 221.

93 Al-Jāḥiẓ, "Fī ḫalq al-Qur'ān", 219-220.

94 Nūr al-Dīn 'Alī al-Ṣābūnī. al-Bidāyah fī 'Uṣūl al-Dīn (text & translation), ed. Bekir Topaloğlu, Diyānet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, Pars Matbaacılık-Matba'aṭ Moḥammad Hāshim al-Katbī (Ankara-Damascus, 1396/1979), 31.

95 Peters, God's Created Speech, 332.

96 Sālim Yāfūt. Ibn Ḥazm wa l-fikr al-falsafī bi l-Maghrib wa'l-'Andalūs, 1st ed. (Casa Blanca: al-Markaz al- Ṭaqāfī al-'Arabī, 1986), 383.

97 Peters, op. cit., 332-333.

the uncreatedness of Qur'ān.[98]

After a theoretical debate which endured one century, the problem of createdness of Qur'ān is transformed into a political problem due to the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mūn declared the opinion of the createdness of Qur'ān is the official ideology of the Abbasid state. He issued a decree in 212/827 obliging all doctors of the law to subscribe to the idea of created Qur'ān. The great majority obeyed, and the opinion had become an official approach, and objecting scholars such as Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal was indicted, flogged, and imprisoned.[99] This political attitude divided Islamic society into two: one departs from *Arabic Qur'ān* which is heard, read, and understood under the same physical circumstances of human speech, and allows no supranatural exception for it; another inversely considers the Arabic Qur'ān is eternal and it is the speech of eternal God. Yet, some scholars like Abū Ḥanīfa's preferred an ambiguous as well as political way which was formulated as "it is neither God nor other than Him".[100] Eventually, there are arisen two representations of reality and transcendence in Islamic intellectuality; one embraces divinity within the material universe, another embraces material universe within divinity. Yet, the former still maintains the exact divarication between material universe and immaterial one having approving the idea of divinity and specifying it only to God; another does not. Another important consequence of this debate had been a methodological deviation that we are interested in significantly. Albeit older Kullābiya refused usage of discursive thinking arguing it is not helpful in a kind of unknown speech which is different from terrestrial one,[101] the conceptualism, a relevant essentialism, and finally logic are firstly recognized and used by traditionalist scholars and settled down the basic opinion of orthodox Islam.

Actually this intern intellectual break caused many Hellenistic teachings to penetrate the Islamic thought. In other words, there is created a platform for every external doctrine to preserve the Islamic principles. Maymūn al-Qaddāḥ, the founder of Qarmatian freemasonry,

without declaring the Qur'ān to be co-eternal with God, regards it as a divine emanation: "The word of God, God's light (ḍiyā') and brilliance, which proceeds from Him and returns to Him, can it be created?" According to the Ibadite tradition, remarks Massignon, it was in these terms that they disseminated the idea of an uncreated Qur'ān among the Sunnites.[102] Not long after these opinions, we will observe al-Fārābī's revolutions in Islamic metaphysics and methodology which follow the same destination determined by this intern intellectual break.

As Bochenski and Jordan mentioned long ago, the relationship between great religions like Buddhism, Christianism, and Islam and the history of logic is political and theological that they aimed at protecting religious fundamentals rather than a demand of enlightenment, and logic had always been considered and used as a tool for this purpose.[103] This reflects a defensive reaction in Islam which invited every external influence for the sake of this purpose, and this influence is gradually increased, and a paradigmatic transmutation has been realized: At first inspecting external solutions, later on realization of individual translations, of systematic translations, and establishment of Arabic logic, predisposition of metaphysical basis for Arabic logic, adaptation of logical doctrine to Arabic grammar, and subsequently Hellenization of Islamic thought. The foreseen thread which resulted in Muslims to transmute their original thought system and paradigm was apparently the rise of a new kind of materialism within the Islamic thought.

There is a controversial relationship between the hypotheses, methods, and backgrounds of the actors of the debate. First of all, it seems entirely wrong that Mu'tazilite scholars depart from logical concepts in this debate. They were using logic, but their hypothesis was departing from the bases of Arabic linguistic principles;[104] on the other hand, the traditionalists were not even familiar with logic and their method was substantially Arabic grammar, but they strongly affiliated an essentialist hypothesis which consequently constrained them toward embracing Hellenism. De Boer rightfully remarks that "although the Mutazilites in maintaining this dogma were more in harmony with the original Islam than their opponents, yet history has

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98 Ibid, 20-23.

99 The letter of caliph al-Ma'mūn (d. 218/833) dated in 833 condemns who believe Qur'ān was eternal as God. "They show this most clearly by putting God –the Blessed and Exalted—on the same level with the Qur'ān, which he has sent down; they all are agreed, unanimously and unequivocally, that the Qur'ān is eternal, exists from the first beginning, and is not created nor produced nor originated by God". Peters, *God's Created Speech*, 3. There is a political connection between the official ideology of createdness of Qur'ān in Abbasid state and Mu'tazila scholars because "Wāṣil and the whole Mu'talizah were definitely enemies of the Umayyads". See Afzal Iqbal, *The Culture of Islam: The Analysis of its Earliest Pattern*, 1st ed. (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1967), 251-252.

100 Peters, op. cit., 2.

101 Ibid, 369.

102 Louis Massignon, *The Passion of al-Hallāj*, III, 140.

103 Joseph M. Bochenski. *The Logic of Religion* (New York: New York University Press, 1965), 22-23; William Chester Jordan, *Europe in the High Middle Ages*, 1st ed. (London: The Penguin Press, 2001), 215-216. Daniel also mentions the aim of Thomas Aquinas "the mention of Christian polemist in dealing with articles of faith must be directed, not at proving faith, but at defending it". See Norman Daniel, *The Arabs and Medieval Europe*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Longman – Librarire de Liban, 1979), 250.

104 Unlike Arnaldez's general remark about Mu'tazilite scholars. See Roger Arnaldez, *Grammaire et Théologie chez Ibn Ḥazm de Cordoue*, 14.

justified latter".[105]

Notwithstanding, the immediate result of the persecution (*miḥna*) is achieved neither for Mu'tazilites nor for their traditionalist opponents, but the result is achieved for the Abbasid state which was in a very difficult political position. Behind the political influence of Mu'tazilite doctrine on Abbasid state, there were relationships of Mutazilite scholars with Abbasid governors[106] which resulted from the Mu'tazilite support in Abbasid revolution. On the other hand, it was strongly possible the traditionalists to support an alternative political trend in the period of persecution and onwards. Under these circumstances, the political solution which had been significantly contributed by the influence of Syrian officials, *mawālī* population in Abbasid dynasty,[107] and by the movement of *al-Shu'ūbiyyah* was contradictory to Islamic scholarly tradition which was originally civil and independent initiation from the government.[108] The fault decision of Ma'mūn and the powerful political situation of traditionalism in Islamic society resulted in Abbasid state to find out a political solution which was launched by the movement of systematic translations toward the application of logic to the entire Islamic thought, especially in three disciplines, grammar, kalām and law. Subsequently, the result achieved by the persecution had been initiation of systematic translations of Greek

heritage by al-Ma'mūn in 830, and it is an interesting coincidence to notice that the movement of translation lost its impetuosity short after al-Ma'mūn, in parallel with the impetuosity of the debate.[109]

Yet, another result of *mihna* in long term, as De Boer mentions rightfully, would be breaking out of Mu'tazilite school,[110] and also a methodological revolution in orthodox schools, and something which is not formulated yet, that a process of elucidation, evacuation, and subsequent replacement of the bases of the early Arabic linguistic thinking by a logical paradigm.[111] This revolution is initiated due to condemnation of utterance, or by the term of Hurvitz an *anti-lafẓiyya campaign*,[112] and it followed a way of application of conceptualism to another side of *i'rāb*, that is meaning. It is a fact that every defender of createdness of Qur'ān defines the speech by utterance and voice, and contrarily every opponent defines it by meaning, substantially.

For sure, the persecution, systematic translations, *anti-lafẓiyya campaign*, *al-Shu'ūbiyyah*, and contiguous process of logicization are followed, furthermore, by two contrary developments in Islamic thought: an extensive model of *adīb*[113] and Ẓāhirite School as a more silent movement respectively. Political roots of the model of *adīb* arise from the influence of the class of scribers and Mutazilite jurists in Abbasid state, and strong *mawālī* tendencies, of course. This new development configured a problem of incompatibility between Greek and Arabic expressions short after the beginning of systematic translations, and this also conducted to a general criticism of Arabic theory of grammar and to the creation of a new style in Arabic linguistics,

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105 T. J. De Boer. *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, trans. Edward R. Jones (London: Luzac & Co, 1961), 48. Nöldeke thinks contrary to De Boer, as the attitude of Mu'tazilites were plainly in contradiction to supernaturalistic religion. See Theodore Nöldeke, *Sketches from Eastern History*, trans. John Sutherland Black (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), 93.

106 Josef Van Ess, "Abu l-Hudhayl in Contact: The Genesis of an Anecdote", *Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani*, ed. Michael E. Marmura (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 13-30.

107 Iqbal, *The Culture of Islam*, 88-97, 126. *Mawlā* is a term expresses "the association of the freed slaves with the tribe of the erstwhile master, the slave was referred to as the Mawlā of the particular tribe. … In a broder sense, in the books of jurisprudence, the word mawlā is used for conquered nations which embraced Islam. … The Persians were called *Mawālī* because technically they had become slaves of Muslims after the conquest". See Iqbal, op. cit., 90. In the mixture of blood of early Islamic society with Romans, Persians, Syrians, and other nations, the important thing was daughters of aristocratic families were slaves of the sons of the most prominent figures of four caliph period, the son of 'Umar 'Abdullāh, of Alī Husayn, of Abū Bakr Mohammad, and they were giving birth for three celebrated boys al-Qāsim, Zayn al-'Abidīn, and Sālim. Even though this free mixing of blood was not favorable among the people of Madina, these mixed generation created for themselves a distinguished position on their own merit as men of piety and learning, thus the resistance of general public was considerably reduced. Iqbal concludes "In the second generation of Islam, we see among the Tabi'īn a large number of leading Muslims who were born of slave mothers. They had a significant contribution to make the cultural life of Islam". See Iqbal, op. cit., 92. If it is true, al-Baghdādī reports from the point of view of al-Naẓẓām a political attitude against Mawālī-Arab mixture which was fulfilled by the second khalif 'Umar Ibn al-Ḫattāb as he had forbidden the Mawālī to get married with the Arabs. See al-Baghdādī, *Kitāb al-Milal wa'l-Niḥal*, 98.

108 Iqbal, *The Culture of Islam*, 93.

109 Philip K. Hitti. *Makers of Arab History*, 1st ed. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1968), 92. Decrease of impetuosity of the debate after al-Ma'mūn is also implicated by al-Jāḥiẓ. See al-Jāḥiẓ, "Fī khalq al-Qur'ān", 222-223. Interestingly, there is no remark about the relationship between the persecution and the movement of translation in the contemporary sources. For example see Abdurraḥmān Badawī, *La Transmission de la Philosophie Grecque au Monde Arabe*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Librarire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1987).

110 De Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, 49. Most probably, the disqualification of Mu'tazilites was an Abbasid policy due to the same political reasons that had played a significant role in the Abbasid revolution in 745.

111 Indeed, we have many reasons to revise the contemporary remarks about the place of Greek philosophy in Islam such as the relationship between Islamic rationalism and Greek philosophy, Mu'tazilite rationalist methodology and their affiliation of logic, etc. whether they are valid or not. For example see W. Montgomery Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1973), 279-286.

112 Nimrod Hurvitz. *The Formation of Ḥanbalism: Piety into Power*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge-Curzon, 2002), 153. "Lafẓ al-Qur'ān served as a litmus test among the Traditionalists, defining one's attitude towards kalām". v. Ibid.

113 Al-Jāḥiẓ talks about the foundations of *adab* (*uṣūl al-'adab*) that it consists of four classes of sciences: Astrology, geometry, chemistry and medicine and music. See 'Amr Ibn 'Utmān al-Jāḥiẓ, "Fī ṭabaqāt al-mughannīn" in *Rasā'il al-Jāḥiẓ,* ed. 'Ubaydullāh Ibn assān, M. Bāsil 'Uyūn al-Sūd, 4 vols. 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1420/2000), III, 97-101.

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mainly under the title of *al-bayān*, by al-Jāḥiẓ onward. The bases of Ẓāhirite school which was as a contra-movement against the logical method of ʾAshʿarite and Muʿtazilite schools, and against the logicization which is built upon conceptualism and meaning, is, of course, reading and understanding Qurʾanic text for itself, but not by means of an interpretative approach which is mainly established upon Greek logic, physics, and metaphysics.[114] Because the new trend in Arabic grammar had firstly striken the vital concepts of creativity and freedom in juridical thinking, and thus, the motive behind Ẓāhirite movement is a strong conviction of imitation in orthodox juridical, theological, and linguistic schools as well as others which are influenced Greek thought, instead of free reasoning (*al-ʾijtihād*).[115] By the 11th century onward, this decline is quite observable in the entire fields of Arabic linguistics and Islamic thought in general. After that time, the period of imitation and stagnation begins and the gate of free reasoning is closed.

By the 9th century onward, this intellectual climate in the Islamic thought altered the destination of grammatical studies. This athmosphere was not peculiar to grammarians; obviously it was a matter of theological disagreement which had been contributed by grammarians, jurists, traditionalists, and lexicologists,[116] more truly it was reflecting entire theological situation of the early 9th-century Islamic society. It influenced entire society in its all theological schools and occupied the medieval Islamic scholarship during the centuries.

The reason for restriction of the post 9th-century grammarians the Sībawayhian principles is relevant to understanding the verb-action relationship in a theological content.

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114 For example v. Arnaldez, Grammaire et Théologie chez Ibn ḥazm de Cordoue, 16. However, since Arnaldez did not attend to ontological bases of early Arabic grammar, he interprets the Zahirite movement is correspondent to supranatural nature of Christianity as the subject-matter is purely theological. See also op. cit., 17.

115 As Fück remarks the theory of *i'rāb* gave rise to a certain freedom and clarity in expression. See Johann Fück, *'Arabiya: Recherches sur l'Histoire de la Langue et du Style Arabe*, trans. Claude Denizeau, Institute des Hautes Études Moracaines, Notes et Documents XVI (Paris: Libraire Marcel Didier, 1955), 3. Versteegh tries to explore the development of the concept of freedom in Arabic linguistics, in the strict framework of linguistic literature. At first hand, he concludes there is no relationship between *ittisā'* and freedom. Although he embarks on an important conceptual network in his study such as *hadf*, governor, *i'rāb*, *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*, and even adverbs of space and time, he concludes "…the term ittisā' is its development from a specific syntactic term with a restricted domain, to a general term indicating the individual choice as well as the flexibility of Arabic language", he does not delineate us more. v. Kees Versteegh, "Freedom of the Speaker? The Term *Ittisā'* and Related Notions in Arabic Grammar", *Studies in the History of Arabic Grammar II*, (Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium on the History of Arabic Grammar), ed. Kees Versteegh, Michael G. Carter, *Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science*, vol. 56 (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pub. Co, 1990), 281-293, 288.

116 Balty-Guesdon, op. cit., 139.

They generally reduce time to tense and space to adverb of place, due to theological reasons. Al-Sīrāfī holds a nominalist method as he thinks the *genuine action* (al-fi'l al-ḥaqīqī) belongs to God that implicates only God can act genuinely, some like Ibn Jinnī affiliates conceptualist way and considers every action stated by verb to be metaphorical even for God. Nominalist approach conducts the genuine action to be considered peculiar to God and metaphorical action to human, accordingly to grammar. The former is called *action*, the latter *verb* appropriately. Al-Sīrāfī remarks:

> (…) the verb is also movements which are performed like the performance (*al-taqaḍḍī*) of time. By *al-fi'l* I only mean here what grammarians meant without genuine action. Because the universe is an action of glorious God who had made and created it. I only mean to pronounce *fa'ala-yaf'alu*. This is because when human happens to a case of action (*ḥāl al-fi'l*), we say *ʾannahū yaf'alu l-ʾān* (he acts now), but this never be stabilized more than one time so that we say *fa'ala* where the case of action is accomplished (*al-mutaqaḍḍiyah*) and never been stabilized just like time.[117]

One of the most important theological influences that grammarians affiliated is real and metaphorical meanings of Qur'anic verses, of course. The point of grammarians such as Ibn Jinnī while explaining the theological questions such as knowledge of God and creation in terms of linguistic point of view essentially depends on Greek metaphysical doctrine. Ibn Jinnī attempts to apply his theory of meaning to God's actions claiming they are not in the real meaning but metaphorical.

> Similarly, the actions of the Eternal (being) [which are narrated in the Qur'ān] are [metaphorical], for example *khalaqa al-samāwāt wa'l-'arḍ wa mā kāna mithlahū*; do you not see –he who is honored name– does not act likewise the actions that we create. If it were real but not metaphorical, he would indeed be the creator of infidelity (*al-kufr*), enmity, and many other human actions, [but he is] eminent and honored. Again, the knowledge of God about *Zayd's getting up* is metaphorical too. Because the case which his knowledge about *Zayd's getting up* is not the same of *'Amr's sitting down*. [Thus] we cannot approve the knowledge for him, as he is the scholar in himself (*'ālim bi-nafsih*).[118]

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117 Al-Sīrāfī, *Sharh*, II, 300.

118 Ibn Jinnī, *al-Ḫaṣā'iṣ*, II, 449.

After Sībawayhi, especially the 10th-century grammarians onward, they are influenced by the idea of the priority of nouns epistemologically. The vehement followers of Sībawayhi did not examine Sībawayhi's theory of syntax comprehensively, instead, we observe even the commentators of *al-Kitāb* such as al-Fārisī trying to restrict the conception of Sībawayhi to adverbs of place and time. It can be interpreted as a hesitation about ontological results of the theory. Furthermore, some others such as Ibn Jinnī attempted to synthesize the Arabic essentials with the logical theory of universals which is fundamentally built upon *inclusion*. This conducted grammarians who are especially involved in dialectical theology or logic to undertake the reality of statements to be impossible. For example, even though Ibn Jinnī approves the priority of verbs, he says in his *al-Ḥaṣā'iṣ*, what a verb states is a *meaning of genus* (*al-maʿnā l-jinsiyyah*) that is an infinitive which includes all the tenses in an absolute manner; past, present, and future. But this raises another ontological deviation, because he admits even singular actions to be metaphorical but not real, referring to his master Abū ʿAlī.

> You should know that the language is at most part metaphorical but not real (*al-ḥaqīqah*); likewise all the verbs such as *qāma Zaydun* (Zayd got up), *qaʿada ʿAmrun* (Amr sit down), *ʾinṭalaqa Bishrun* (Bishr left), *jāʾa al-ṣayfu* (the summer came), and *ʾinhazama l-shitāʾu* (the winter declined). Do you not see that what is stated by the verb is a meaning of genus, such as *qāma Zaydun*; its meaning is *there occurred* getting up (*al-qiyām*) from him that is *[there occurred]* this genus from the verb. As it is already known, there did not occur all [kinds of] getting up (*jamīʿ al-qiyām*); [because] how that could be [real] whereas the genus contains everything which fulfills *getting up* in all the past, present, and future [times]? As it is already known that imagining one person (neither in one time) nor in 100.000 years to fulfill all [kinds of] getting up is impossible. This is impossible for everyone who is intelligent. If this is so, you understood that *Zaydun qāʾimun* is metaphorical but not real. (…) Abū ʿAlī told me that *qāma Zaydun* is just like *ḥarajtu fa-ʾiẕā l-asadu* (I went out and suddenly a lion [appeared]!). The meaning of *ḥarajtu fa-ʾiẕā l-asadu* is a definition of lion in a manner of definition of genus (*taʿrīf al-jins*). (…) you do not intend *ḥarajtu wa jamīʿu l-ʾasad* (I went out and suddenly the entire lions [appeared]!) contrary to the faculty of fantasy (*al-wahm*) [is accustomed to] undertake. This is impossible and its conviction is confusion (*al-iḫtilāl*). But rather you intended that *ḥarajtu fa-ʾiẕā wāḥidun min hāẕā l-jins* (I went out and suddenly one of this genus [appeared]!).[119]

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119 Ibid, 447-449, 451.

As this perspective is essentially far away from Sībawayhi's theory of grammar, Ibn Jinnī interprets the *al-Ḥaṣā'iṣ*'s theoretical obscurity is resulted from *al-Kitāb*'s definition of correct (*al-mustaqīm*) expression.[120]

Al-Zajjājī is a strong figure in logicization of Arabic grammar, not randomly but theoretically, even though he rejects logical method in grammatical study. One of the most influent grammarians who affiliated the movement of logicization in grammar is al-Jurjānī (470/1078). He warns us some value-terms such as truth and falsehood, which were apparently applied by Sībawayhi, are not linguistic, mentioning "language is not the way to this".[121] Thus, he makes a difference between the fields of language and reason clearly, as he will apply this difference to affirmation in itself (*nafs al-ʾithbāt*) and in expression.

Al-Jurjānī undertakes the place of meaning in the reason (*wāqiʿun mawqiʿahū min l-ʿaql*) which is either true or false belief, when he defines the truth and metaphorical meanings as "every sentence you dispose that the expressed judgment in it accords to [the reality] in the reason and to its place [in the reason], it is a truth".[122] This raises the metaphor does not mean something inconsistent with reality. Because "the lexicological considerations follow the instances and customs of creatures" (*tattabiʿu ʾaḥwāl al-makhlūqīn wa ʿādātihim*).[123] Notwithstanding there is a close relationship between lie and metaphorical expression, as in both of them the attributes are not used in their primary and real meanings. Then, what makes a difference between a lie and metaphor is conviction. The conviction is invalid and lie in a lie-statement, whereas it is valid and true in metaphorical one. For example, it is metaphorically said that the flowers and trees are arisen in the spring because of spring; thus, the action of rising is attributed to the spring although it is not real reason. Such expressions state the real reason implicitly and conventionally.[124]

However he clarifies the meanings of these terms; the first is only "truth" contradictory to metaphor without "false" in its linguistic meaning, another is true and false as logical values. In their logical meaning they also indicate to ontological values. He gives an example of true-statement "the glorious God created and built up the universe…" that if we suppose this is not true, we would be irrational, as the place of attributes in the sentence are true. The

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120 Ibid, 455.
121 ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī. *ʾAsrār al-Balāghah*, ed. Hellmut Ritter (Istanbul: Istanbul Government Press, 1954), 245.
122 Ibid, 355.
123 Ibid, 90.
124 Ibid, 366.

contradictory statement like "*wa mā yuhlikunā 'illā al-dahr*" (Qur'ān 24:45) will be false and lie. Such a contradictory statement would rise from invalid conviction (*al-i'tiqād al-fāsid*) and wrong supposition (*al-ẓann l-kāẓib*),[125] as the reason is naturally inclined to accept a valid conviction and true supposition. Al-Jurjānī mentions the origin of deviation from truth is ignorance of the topics of lie and invalidity (*jahl makān al-kiẓb wa l-buṭlān*).[126] Thus, the focus is whether an action or an attribute is real for something or not: "The action is subject of an impact in the existence of an event in the language; however the reason judges and decides there is no role for something which has not got afford (*al-qādir*)".[127] This is the result of his definition of metaphor indeed.

He builds the propositional form of expression upon inclusion (*al-'inḍimām*) and Greek categorical theory, following the logicist tradition in the descendent grammarians. He underpins the inclusion by an analysis towards the nature of classical Arabic term, participation (*al-'ishtirāk*). Accordingly, he makes a distinction between an attribute that is genus and its entailment (*muqtaḍā l-ṣifah*) which is represented by action. He maintains:

> The participation to the attribute itself (*al-'ishtirāk fī nafs al-ṣifah*) is prior to the participation to the entailment of attribute (*al-'ishtirāk fī muqtaḍā l-ṣifah*) in representative [faculty] (*al-taṣawwur*), just like the attribute itself is prior to its entailment in [the faculty of] fantasy (*al-wahm*). Thus, the taste is prior, then it entails the pleasure of who perceives. If we consider its structure we find out it entails convention and participation between two things so that it is possible to imagine one of them to be another.[128]

Here, he tries to make a distinction between attribute which is represented by noun and manifestations of attribute which are stated by verbs. The next attempt of al-Jurjānī is to reduce the manifestations of attribute to attribute itself, in respect of logical terms *al-'iṯbāt* (affirmation) and *al-nafy* (negation). When he uses these terms, he needs to refer to another logical term "copula". Affirmation and negation are two kinds of attribution in a way that the attribute is either existent (*al-wujūd*) or none-existent (*al-'adam*) in a subject.[129] According to his opinion, any sentence contains two conditions respectively. The absolute affirmation

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125 Ibid, 355-356.
126 Ibid, 356.
127 Ibid, 348.
128 Ibid, 89.
129 Ibid, 67-71.

(*al-'ithbāt al-muṭlaq*) cannot be thought such as affirmation of something (*'ithbāt al-shay'*), neither the *absolute negation* (*al-nafy al-muṭlaq*) is intelligible like negation of something. Because there is a *second condition* (*al-taqyīd al-thānī*) which modifies affirmation as the "affirmation of something for something" (*'iṯbāt shay' li-shay'*) and negation as the "negation of something for something" (*nafy shay' 'an shay'*). Al-Jurjānī maintains his synthetical endeavor undertaking the definition of sentence (*al-jumlah*) which is used to define as an expression which has a benefit (*al-fā'idah*):

> The cause in this, namely the point of benefit, in fact, is relevant to affirmation and negation. Do you not see the predicate is primary and preceding meaning of speech; and it is that all other meanings depend and are arrayed upon it. It is separated into these two judgments. If this is so, affirmation requires affirmer (*muthbit*) and affirmee (*muthbat lah*). For example, when you say *ḍaraba Zaydun* (Zayd beat) or *Zaydun ḍāribun* (Zayd is beater) you affirm *ḍarb* either as verb or attribute for *Zayd*. (…) Every one of the judgment of affirmation and negation needs to be conditioned twice, being connected with two things. That is when you say *ḍaraba Zaydun* you intend affirmation of beating for Zayd (*'iṯbāt al-ḍarb li-Zayd*). As for *'iṯbāt al-ḍarb*, it is a condition (al-taqyīd) for affirmation by means of its possession of *ḍarb*. However, this condition is not enough for you until you give a second condition and say *'ithbāt ḍarb li-Zayd* where Zayd is the second condition which is in [the meaning of] a judgment of second genitive possessive (*fī ḥukm 'iḍāfat al-thāniyah*).[130]

The logical formulation of any sentence "affirmation of something for something" or "negation of something for something" is enough to transform verb-clause into noun clause, and both into a propositional form where the topics of lie and truth are apparent. For this purpose, he interprets verb-clause like *ḍaraba Zaydun* (Zayd beat) as "affirmation of beating as action of Zayd" whereas *mariḍa Zaydun* (Zayd got sick) is interpreted as "affirmation of sick as an attribute of Zayd". He also transforms "affirmation of beating as action of Zayd" applying it *'amartuhū bi-'an yaf'ala l-qiyām*; thus, any verb signifies action of this attribute (*fi'lu tilka l-ṣifah*).[131] Now, in both of noun and verb-clauses, the predicate is a form existent in subject (*al-hay'at al-mawjūdah fīh*). As for transitive verbs, the affirmation or negation in

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130 Ibid, 338-339.
131 Ibid, 344.

their signification is interpreted as an attribute for object, when it is said *ḍarabtu Zaydan* the action of *ḍarb* is affirmed as an attribute for Zayd; thus, what affirmed is *Zaydun maḍrūbun* (Zayd is beaten).[132]

Thence, the topics of truth and falsehood are assigned by an *affirmed meaning* (*al-maʿnā al-muthbat*) or negated meaning which are constructed in a propositional form. Since the core of this form is attribution which requires inclusion of a noun by an attribute (*al-waṣf*), Arabic linguistic thinking is reduced to a pure logical process in its ontological basis. Because inclusion prerequisites an ontological conception of copula which al-Jurjānī undertakes it referring to condition (*al-taqyīd*). The result is a logical understanding of reason and reasoning. On the other hand, the Arabic linguistic thinking is restricted to building inflectional structure of sentence which has no original ontological foundation anymore.

As I have already introduced, this revolution is not performed by al-Jurjānī alone, but by many others long before him such as al-Jirmī, al-Jāḥiz, al-Zajjājī, Abū ʿAlī, Ibn Jinnī and so on. But al-Jurjānī reformulated the preceding developments and he has a distinct place in the history of the Arabic literature. The influence of al-Jurjānī over the subsequent scholars could be understood by means of the impact of his two books. The editor of *ʾAsrār al-balāghah*, Ritter says, the two books of al-Jurjānī those *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz* and *ʾAsrār al-balāghah*;

> revolutionized the studies of rhetoric in the East. They were first condensed and rearranged by Fakhraddīn ar-Rāzī the great dogmatist and commentator of Koran (d. 606 A.H.), and then by the encyclopedist Sakkākī (died 624 h) (…) Sakkākī's work forms the base of the abstract *Talkhīṣ* by Qazwīnī the Khatīb of Damascus (d. 739 A.H.). The *Talkhīṣ* has become the classical text-book on rhetoric throughout the Islamic world. Countless commentaries on this text and commentaries on these commentaries were written. The most famous are the *Muṭawwal* and *Mukhtaṣar* by Taftazānī (died 791 h). Everything that an educated Muslim knows about rhetoric is derived from this book.[133]

We observe a certain afford in the 10th-century grammarians that they tried to rebuild the theory of grammar on the idea of inclusion that is an order of inclusion between genus and species. And it is not surprising to see the logical influence guided grammarians to harmonizing the Greek logical concepts of *universal* and *inclusion* with the Arabic concept of

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132 Ibid, 339-342.
133 Editor's introduction. See also al-Jurjānī, Ibid, 6-7.

space and *extension* as is seen both in logicians like in al-Fārābī and grammarians. For example, according to al-Jurjānī, "some of the elements of syntax includes others" (*yanḍammu baʿḍuhā ʾilā baʿḍ*),[134] "some are penetrated (*al-dukhūl*) into others and the connection of the second [element] to the first gets stronger"; thus, there occurs a single meaning which arises from intention of reason.[135] Eventually, this process led grammarians to undertake the bases of the reason and its synthetic activity under the impact of logic in linguistic study. For example, al-Jurjānī mentions that since some words are essentially included in others, "then your intention is a meaning which does not need to be done anything in it other than exemplification of an already existed pattern (*mithlih*) [of syntax]".[136] Accordingly,

> When you examine carefully, some speech does not require its speaker to think and contemplate for its composition (…) such as the opinion of some literary-men on description of language that 'the language is a tool which by the beauty of expression is displayed, a discloser which informs about what is concealed, an apparent which notifies you through disappearing, a criterion which by the speeches are separated, a consulter which prohibits the ugly, an ornamenter which leads to the beautiful, a farmer planting affinity… This and similar [samples] do not have any peculiarity [in terms of] its order and composition (*al-taʾlīf*), except than its meaning and text.[137]

Briefly, after the program of paradigmatic transmutation that has been held throughout two centuries, not only the Arabic linguistic thinking has been revolutionized but also the entire Islamic methodology has been transformed and Hellenized. If to compare the pre and post-revolution in a formalistic character, the expression "*a* is *b*" means "*a* is included in *b*" in the logical paradigm whereas it means "*a* has a place of *x* which is created by *b*" in the early Arabic linguistic theory.

As conclusion, I have shown only one aspect of the medieval intellectual globalism that the static Greek paradigm caused, because not only Islamic thought but also Buddhist and Jewish cultures also affiliated this paradigm due to the similar reasons that Bochenski noticed.

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134 ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī. *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz*, ed. Muḥammad Altunjī, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1995), 83.
135 Al-Jurjānī, *Dalāʾil*, 87.
136 Ibid, 90.
137 "al-lisānu ʾadātun yaẓharu bihā ḥusnu l-bayān, wa ẓāhirun yuẖbiru ʿan al-ḍamīr, wa shāhidun yunbiuka ʿan ġāib, wa ḥākimun yufṣilu bihī al-ẖitāb, wa wāʿiẓun yanhā ʿan al-qabīẖ, wa muzayyinun yadʿū ʾilā al-ḥasan, wa zāriʾun yaḥrutu l-mawaddah…". v. al-Jurjānī, *Dalāʾil*, 90.

Notwithstanding, there is another phase of the intellectual globalism that is realized in the early modern European thought due to an intellectual wave arising from East, especially Islam toward West by the 12th century onward and that resulted another historical phase of the intellectual globalism. This second phase is of much importance in order to comprehend the development of modernity and even the rise of post-modernity by the 1940s. I think that if we can identify the channels of the paradigmatic circulation we may afford to draw out the entire historical route and the results of the intellectual globalism between East and West.

Arabico-Islamic Thinking before the Paradigmatic Transmutation

Thought_____: Space of thought which is generated by a processor (P), sc. governor.

Thought forms_____: Abstract places within a space of thought, sc. "X¹", "X²", etc. that guide to gates (al-bāb, *pl*. al-'abwāb) such as "G¹", "G²", etc.

What generates proposition_____:Emanating judgments from a process that determine the places of thought forms in the space of thought.

Style of thinking_____: Open-ended rectilinear progress and ramification through gates *ad infinitum*, sc. no extreme terms wherein the mind will be operated logically.

Nature of thinking_____: Timed, hypothetical, experimentalist.

Type of predication_____: Placing concepts in the space of thought and identifying places for generating common notions.

Hellenized Arabica-Islamic Thinking after the Paradigmatic Transmutation

Circular process

Thought_____: Timeless activity that is performed in one point sc. universal.

Thought forms_____: Universals.

What generates proposition_____: Inclusion or exclusion of concepts that results in affirmation and negation.

Style of thinking_____: A limited circular process that works within the extreme terms.

Nature of thinking_____: Timeless, necessary, essentialist.

Type of predication_____: Including or excluding one concept into another.

III. MAIN STEPS OF THE INTELLECTUAL TRANSMUTATION

* The Arabic concept of *space* is transmuted into the Greek *universal*, and *place* into *topic* that is a relationship between species and genus.

* The Arabic *endless rectilinear process* is transmuted into the Greek *circular process*.

* Transmutation of the conception of time from *timed contiguity* into *timeless continuity*.

* Unification of *known* (al-shahādah) and *unknown fields* (al-ghayb) of epistemology which were originally separated in Islam.

* Creation of an *artificial copula* which is an illegal achievement in Arabic.

* Creation of an *artificial being* instead of Arabic experimental concept of thing (*al-shay'*).

* Application of Greek theory of *universals* and *categories* to Arabic linguistic thinking.

* Application of Greek *definition* theory to Arabic linguistic thinking.

* Redefinition of language as *mere speech*, and speech as a matter of *meaning*.

* Invention of propositional form of expression that depends on *noun-clause* instead of *verb-clause*.

* Transmutation of *materialist* and *molecular* system of thought into an *essentialist* and *logicist* system.

* Transmutation of the *dynamic* kernel of cosmology into the *static* Greek one admitting God as *First Mover* and an *eternal matter* implicitly.

* Restricting thought within the *extreme terms* of syllogism and the subsequent end of free reasoning (sc. the closure of the gate of ijtihād at the 10th century).

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