

PREFACE OF “CULTURAL STATE” A THEORETICAL ATTEMPT FOR STATE IDENTITY OF KOREA

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ABSTRACT

In this essay, I would like to discuss the relationships between the state/civil society and between civil society/formation of individual in order to explain South Korea's state identity. On the other hand, as I shall try to show such dichotomies occur only theoretically; in practice, they are always interlinked with each other. It is nonetheless convenient for our purposes of running empirical studies and organizing their results. Moreover, in formation and implementation of governmental policies, it will also be useful to consider components of Korean society separately. On the other hand, as the subtitle of this essay—Theoretical Attempt for State Identity of Korea—conveys, this essay is meant to serve as an introduction. In other words, additional efforts to discover the state identity of Korea must take place through further studies. Although such a pursuit requires analysis of extremely complex factors, perhaps due to the influence of American academia, most political theories in Korea have approached this task with economic points of view. Thus, the concept of “developmental state” has played a key role in characterizing Korean identity. However, in the current global economy, developmental policies from the Park Chung Hee regime are not sufficient for Korea to achieve another spectacular economic growth. New types of policies and visions fit for future circumstances must be produced. This essay is a theoretical effort to fulfill such an objective.

Keywords: State identity, American Academia, developmental state, Korean identity

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I. PROBLEMATIC INTRODUCTION

Since the financial crisis of 1997, failure of economic development in Northeast Asia has been topics of frequent discussions. Subsequently, the debate on the character of Korea as a nation has also actively taken place. However, previous efforts to explain the characteristics of East Asia seem more confused and misguided than successful in recognizing the realistic problems at hand. Such examples include market-centered theory,¹ which asserts that the role of free enterprises explain the idiosyncrasy of East Asian growth; developmental state theory,² which emphasizes the effective execution of industrial policies through active intervention by the state; Confucian culture theory³ that focuses on embedded racial uniqueness such as industrious work ethic or investment in education; and lastly, the Asian value theory which refers to the tendency of anti-Western political resistance born by Asian economic growth.⁴ It was in the midst of such discussions that diverse conceptualizations of the Korean national identity have transpired. Nonetheless, such contentions have not been sufficiently adequate in analyzing the characteristic of Korea as a nation-state.

Although many contentions⁵ are possible, the several reasons as the following can be deduced. First is the lack of consideration for appropriate methodology in explaining the change of political reality; the discussion merely depicts the apparent problems. Secondly,

the fact that paradigms of such analyses originate from Western point of view undermines the pertinence of arguments themselves.⁶ Third, due to weak connections among studies that deal with the theory of the state, state identity has been discussed limitedly under separate domain of research. In other words, the existent theories concerning Asian states demand comprehensive examination for objectives, methodologies, and research topics, because their dispersal into different fields have resulted in one-dimensional analyses of characteristics and functions of state.⁷

Hence, a new point of view toward social formation is required to explain the identity of Asian states. To further defend this position, the existing academic emphasis concerning the state in political science must be criticized. Political science has placed more importance to features and types of state building than characteristics of the state; such trends can be categorized into the following two. The first focuses on the self-developmental process of nation-states,⁸ and the second endeavors to find the origin of modern states under the capitalist world order;⁹ the former can be classified as the political explanation and the latter as economic, respectively. If the former approach can be considered endogenous and microscopic in that its interest lies on variables of domestic politics, the latter may be treated as exogenous and structural for its aggregate view of capitalism.¹⁰ Only when these two frameworks are dialectically synthesized

1 B. Balasaa. "The Lesson of East Asian Development; Overview ", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 36, 3 (1998); World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

2 Frederic C. Deyo. *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987); A. Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant; South Korea and Late Industrialization* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); P. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1995).

3 G.. Rozman. *The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and its Modern Adaptation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); Tu Wei-Ming, *The Confucian World Observed: A Contemporary Discussion of Confucian Humanism in East Asia* (Honolulu, Hawaii: Institute of Culture and Communication, The East-West Center, 1992); Kim, Il-Gon, "Yugyojeok Jabonjuuiui Inganjongjungua Gongsaengjuui (Humanism and Solidarism of Confucian Capitalism)", *Dongasiaui Munhwawa Sasang (East Asian Culture and Thoughts)*, South Korea: Youlhwadang, 1999.

4 Lee Kuan Yew. *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000* (London: Harpercolins, 2000).

5 Kim Seok-keun. "Yugyowa jabonjuuiui seontaekjeok chinhwaryuk? hangukui kyunghungwa bipan, geurigo junmang (Selective Affinity of Confucianism and Capitalism?: Korean Experience and Critique, and Vision)", *Hanguk Jeongchihakhui Yeonryehaksuldaehui Balpyomun (Working Paper from Annual Meeting of Korea Political Science Association)* (South Korea: Korean Political Science Association, 1995); Lee Seung-hwan, "Asiajeok gachinonjaenggwa hangukui yugyomunhwa (Asian Value Debate and Korean Confucian Culture)", *Sacheonnyuneul Hyanghan Hanguksahuiui Bijeon (The Vision of Korean Society for New Millennium)*, Ataepyunghwajaedan 23cha Haksulhuiui Jaryojip, 1999.

6 During the Asian Economic Crisis, the term "crony economy" was often used by American international political scientists to describe Northeast Asian economies; this term maintains the Western ideological viewpoint towards the East. For example, there was a time when the oversimplified view of economic development as a predecessor to political democratization was widely accepted under the American political development theory. This perspective may place the political economy theory before others in determining the identity of state. Such theoretical inadequacy is inherited by the discussion of identity of state in Korea post Asian Economic Crisis; economic development is construed as the central variable but the role of state or individuals is still considered as secondary variables. (cf. Woo-Cumings, Meredith, *The Developmental State*, Cornell University Press, 1999).

7 ⁷The origin of state has been discussed in history, external representation of state's ideological characteristics was studied in international politics, and domestic class conflicts were examined in sociology.

8 C. Tilly. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); M. Mann, *The Sources of Social Power; A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). They analyze methods such as war or fund raising to play crucial roles in nation-state building. Through such internal factors, it was possible to build individual modern states based on nationalistic sentiments.

9 I. Wallerstein. *The Modern World-system: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, Volume 1 (New York: Academic Press, 1974). According to Wallerstein, formation of nation-states is one of the results of global capitalist economy. In such a system, independent activities of each state are less important than the overall structure. For instance, the division of states into core, semi-periphery, and periphery enables even the formation of states and motives of political change to correspond precisely with structural dynamics of international division of labor and historical change.

10 As a matter of fact, classifying existing political theory of the state into two simple forms may be

can identities of Northeast Asian states, including Korea, be elucidated.

In addition, I claim that, instead of explaining the functions of state in order to justify economic development, it is more pertinent to understand the functional characteristics and status of state within the social formation in order to reveal their effects on economic variables. Moreover, the role of individuals within classes that cooperate with civil society must be analyzed as well. Thus, state identity must be understood in terms of organic entity, interacting with following three axes: *the state*, which acts as an institution of power; *civil society*, which operates by market logic; and *individuals*, the minimum unit of communication. Whereas the characteristics of state in existing frameworks have been confined to an institution of power, it is discussed in this new model under the aforementioned structure of three axes.

Recognizing such limitations, this essay is a challenge to develop a new paradigm for explaining "identity of Korea" as a state. First, the accumulated resources in separate areas of study are systematically criticized. Then the investigation for a new paradigm, capable of providing an alternative, will follow. Insofar as the theory of the state has mostly remained within the topic of nation-state building or the role of state, they may render state identity as an unfamiliar issue of research. Thus, it is imperative to theorize the necessity for the concept of state identity and methodology of its explanation. The range and objective of such studies command those of interdisciplinary domain, from sociology to philosophy, than to solely depend on political science. For the purpose of this chapter, these efforts to study state identity will be called cultural studies.

II. FROM POLITICAL ECONOMY TO "CULTURAL STATE"

In consideration of the above concerns, the existing theories used to explain the characteristic of state unavoidably face following criticisms.

1. As an explanation for nation-state building, the approach that emphasizes the

overgeneralization. Even within the world order theory, there are micro perspectives to explain how political interests reconstruct the relations between states, along with economic division of labor. Even those who seek the origin of Western European nation-states in internal factors of domestic politics consider the variables of external politics vis-à-vis internal politics and question the effects of economic variables on nation-state building. For example, in his work, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, Perry Anderson explains that the discovery of Roman law played a significant role in transformation of society from Middle Age to Modernity. This perspective is very exceptional in the overall trend of economic approaches toward the origin of nation-state building, sufficiently providing counterexamples to inadequate economic explanations.

institutional aspect of the state is prone to fundamental critique. For example, Wallerstein identifies the state as an infrastructure that enables accumulation of capital, whereas Tilly understands the state as a military or political institution. Such analyses of the state as an institutional body are appropriate for structural understanding of the state, but are limited in its ability to clarify the specific exercise of the state as an actor. In other words, whether political or economic, one-sided interpretation of nature of the state lacks in explaining particular behavior of the state vis-à-vis external change within international relations.

2. In the theory of the state, especially in regards to international relations, the application of 'rational choice' hypothesis needs crucial reconsideration. Another established theory in line with the political economy approach, "rational action" supposes that the state performs highly logical decisions under the abstract objective of "national interest." But in reality, international relations often ignore legal authority of sovereignty and lead to serious subordinate relationships. Such inequalities are not only driven by military or economic causes, but also by so-called "ideological wars"¹¹ which demand a variety of interpretations. The fact that these conflicts between traditional values or customs are significant factors in limiting activities of the state must be recognized.

3. It is imperative for the international political theory of the state to broaden its range as far as domestic class conflicts. The academic interest for the state has been concentrated in political science, sociology, and history; thus it seems fair that these have more copious accumulation of academic achievements than international relations. The American international politics deal with domestic political issues relatively less, although the state is the central unit of analysis¹². Interestingly enough, the "bureaucratic authoritarian model", widely discussed throughout Korean academia of sociology in 1980's, illustrates the process of change in state identity by explaining how external capital competition causes internal class conflict. When the accrued theories about state identity in sociology and history are closely examined, it becomes apparent that comprehension of class conflict within domestic politics is essential for understanding the activities of states in the international arena.¹³

11 For instance, the war in Iraq has resulted in not only military, but also ideological quagmire for the United States. This is due to the lack of legitimacy in waging the war, which has been lost since weapons of mass destruction have not been discovered.

12 Although there have been efforts to explain the interrelations between international and domestic factors in terms of 'linkage', not much has been accomplished beyond rhetorical pursuit.

13 This may be explained methodologically as the following. The binary analysis that attributes micro politics and economic structure to the origin of nation-state building must overcome its limitations. Utilization of interrelated micro and macro thinking must take place in international politics as well. This method closely

4. Rather than as a structural institution or legal framework, the state must be viewed as a network of social formation. The state can be segmented into three fields: institution of power, civil society, and individuals. These are interrelated to each other in a systematic fashion. For instance, the logic that connects institution of power and civil society can be described by homology,¹⁴ whereas the relation between civil society and individuals follows the rules of *habitus*.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the three axes not only abide by the rules of domestic power distribution, but also are highly affected by influx of forces from international politics, e.g., politics, economy, and culture. While the logic of politics and economy are generally forced on visible, macro dimensions and provide analysts with clear views, those of cultural aspects are mostly micro and invisible. This exclusion of cultural studies among topics of the state is the focal point of this essay.¹⁶

5. As cultural influences are typically micro and invisible, careful construction of its model is necessary for studying state identity. The way in which unequal aspects of international politics enter domestic politics can be broadly bifurcated. The first is through language and the other is through taste. The former deals mainly with the inter-workings of institutional power and civil society, whereas the latter affects the personal taste within the relationship of civil society and individuals. Thus, these two factors must be taken into consideration for a dialectic synthesis. The process of change in state identity formed by homological relationship must be supplemented by relationships of *habitus* between civil society and individual taste.

resembles the relationship between domestic and international politics mentioned in clause 3. Regarding 'developmental theory' (cf. Woo-Cumings, *The Developmental State*, op.cit.), which has been emphasized as the economic factor in Asian economic development, the consideration for coercive developmental policies of states need to be arranged within the context of economic positioning under the capitalist world order. Furthermore, factors such as the following must be considered as well: states' relationships with civil society, recruitment of bureaucracy, and the cultural environment that enables state to persuade its policies to citizens. In other words, the state-driven leadership and consent of citizens is dialectically necessary for triggering economic growth; however, this aspect has been largely neglected by existing political theory of the state until the present.


14 This concept is borrowed from Pierre Bourdieu. cf. *La Distinction*, Minuit, 1979 .

15 This concept is borrowed from Pierre Bourdieu. cf. *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique*, Droz, 1972.

16 However, as in the case of South Korea, where the influence of international politics especially immense, the power structures of three axes are highly correlated to external decisions. Thus in portraying Korean state as the combination of three fields (institution of power, civil society, and individuals), the external influence of politics, economy, and culture must be meticulously examined.

III. SEARCH FOR A NEW MODEL: THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF "CULTURAL STATE"

Based on questions posed above, the following tasks must be resolved in order to achieve a new model of state identity. First is the theoretical investigation of the relationship between international politics and the state. This refers to the need for explanation of international variables' cultural influx to domestic politics. Secondly, description of the relationship between the state and civil society is also needed. We must examine how the ability and the role of the state affect the civil society, as well as how the political forces within the civil society affect the state. Thirdly, individualization process is discussed within the relationship between civil society and individuals. The focus is on determining that specific processes in the formation of identity of individuals occur within interrelations of private and public sectors. Such phenomenon in a graphic form is represented in Figure 1.



1. International Politics and the State: the Significance of Culture in International Politics

To this date, the academic discussion of the state has placed mainstream importance to military or economic influences in state building of third world nations. However, the role of invisible, i.e., cultural, variables on domestic politics becomes increasingly more important than the role of visible, i.e., military or economic, variables. For example, effects such as transmission of symbolisms by intellectual ideas or impact of cultural content on consumer tastes are among the most notable. Hence, a new model must be established in order to analyze this type of invisible influences. Henceforth, I would like to label this process in which the inflow of invisible cultural factors to domestic politics as *internalization of external variables*. The important fact, however, is that although this phenomenon of cultural influx forces inequality as much as militaristic or economic factors, such trend is not easily noticed by analytic viewpoint.

In line with such context, Meyer's thesis¹⁷ deserves especial acknowledgement in its apt cultural analysis of world politics and illumination of inequalities existent in international politics. According to his analysis, the fact that there exists some sort of order within the world among nation-states—even without an apparent central state that can impose authority over other nations—legitimizes that the cultural value system already has been embedded within international politics. Under this point of view, the political order of the modern world is not an assembly of free agents called nation-states. It can only be a conglomerate of agreements and alliances rooted in authoritative values or a unit of culture born by declaration. Under this context, today's American hegemony is based on cultural value system created by nation-state system since Westphalia.

For instance, the system and the unit of modern world order was created by discourses such as the intellectual approach towards international politics, the formation of legal and systematic values among nations, and the declaration of treaties and alliances by international organizations that impose its implementation. The sovereignty of nation-states is not only acknowledged based on these declarations and academic discussions, but these international organizations are also working for the collective good. In this way, we are experiencing international politics through the discourses of experts.

Meyer's such points overlook the following pattern, however. Supposing that the political

and economic world order exists within a bilateral and mutual agreement of cultural value systems, the stances of "self" and "other" here seem to be on equal bases. However, in the actual practice of international politics, the positions of bilateral relationships under international contracts, such as alliances, treaties, or declarations, or of various forms of political order that international organizations like UN, IMF, or WTO impose, are almost never neutral or strictly in accordance with law. Conversely, the cultural value system of international politics and the pervasive world order exactly reflects the inequality among the nations, which bases its roots in differences of military, politics, and economy. By formality, these organizations or international contracts advocate legal neutrality, but ideological distortions occur in most cases. Moreover, we must criticize the pathological problems of domestic politics in Third World countries that perpetuate from the model of strong nation and economic development created in the West.

With such framework in mind, the position of culture within international politics as the following: "*Culture, within international politics, dominates the political society of each state and designs the lifestyle of civil societies; although this rises from the discourse of experts in global politics, even under the formal premise of bilateral contract, the perpetuation of highly unequal series of relationships develops into a form of symbolic dominance.*" Particularly in the case of South Korea, the impact of cultural influence from international relations is immense in explanation of the state's characteristics and functions. Especially imperative is to analyze the effect of symbolic dominance.

To study this "symbolic dominance," I suggest two main areas as the objects of analyses. The first is related to transfer of knowledge and the other deals with international diffusion of consumer tastes.

First of all, in discussion of the South Korean state's characteristics, it seems useful to illuminate the relationship between state-building process and its dependency on academics. Examples such as the following highlights some of these points: the process of state building was based on American support during the Rhee Syng Man¹⁸ regime in the 1950's; economic development was driven by the modernization theory of Park Chung Hee¹⁹ in 60's through 70's; the era of neo-liberalism pervades from 80's until now. If we closely examine the ideological background of those who were in power, academic bases of those in bureaucracy, and the

18 The first president of South Korea received his Ph.D in Princeton University.

19 The president of South Korea during 1960's and 70's. Maintaining close economic relationship with the U.S., he fostered policies of high economic growth.

17 Meyer, John W, "The Changing Cultural Content of Nation-state; A World Society Perspective", G. Steinmetz, ed., *State/Culture*, Cornell University Press, 1999.

specific development policies and propaganda to civil society by these governing forces, the fundamental dynamics that brought about change in state identity will become clear. In particular, the global proliferation of democracy and market economy since the 1980's may set the convention in developed nations, international organizations, and academic societies. It seems appropriate, then, to account for international factors that enable the formation of such conventions and to identify the process of their incorporation into domestic politics.²⁰

The second task is to determine how the diffusion of international life style through consumer tastes affects domestic politics. If the transfer of knowledge occurs through structures such as universities or research institutes, the shifts in international life styles tend to occur through individuals' private lives.²¹ In fact, in the field of (international) political science, consumer tastes within the private arena have been excluded from the range of analytical subjects.²² But as the

title of Barber's work, *Jihad vs. McWorld*,²³ implies, the impact that global spread of American culture (food, movie, and music) has on individual, private tastes and political value systems of public sector must be acknowledged. Therefore, it is imperative to overcome the separation of private and public sectors, as well as to identify their interrelationships.

2. The State and Civil Society: Their Relationship of Homology

One of the frontrunners that highlighted the relationship of the state and civil society is the democratization theory in South Korean political science. Since the late 1980's, as the theory of civil society gained popularity, numerous South Korean scholars have attempted to explain the relationship of the state and civil society. Building on this framework, they also sought new possibilities of democratization. These theoretical interests were directly reflected to dimensions of actual social movements in the 90's, during which the theory of civil society reached its peak. However, although social movements and the theory of civil society have established themselves firmly in the reform of South Korean society through more than a decade of continuous activities, there is now less faith in their achievements than their limitations.²⁴

Accordingly, this demands fundamental reexamination of the relationship between the state and civil society. Under this context, we must avoid the binary mindset that regards the state as an authoritative institution of power against which civil society is the democratic and resistant force. By recognizing this problem, the model that suggests the role of political society as a middle ground between the institution of power and civil society still holds effect. Nonetheless, today's political atmosphere in South Korea does indicate the increasing gap between political society and the executive branch of the government. Hence, to establish the relationship between the state and civil society, we must capture underlying implications that clearly reflect power struggles between the two spheres, instead of simply distinguishing differences between them. Figure 2 displays specific characteristics that define the relationship

20 In relation to transfer of knowledge, studies on the effect of internationally circulated knowledge on foreign or economic policies have been published. cf. Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. O., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Cornell University Press, 1993. However, these studies directly links political ideas and foreign policies in a causal relationship, in an attempt to find the degree of effects of ideas on foreign policy or state action. This brought significant changes to the existent realist paradigm, which was mostly based on the hypothesis of profit-seeking, efficiency-maximizing tendency of rational actors. But it is still limited in the description of the process of importing American-led knowledge or ideas by third world countries. Furthermore, the traditional models of economic development, democracy, human rights that are imposed in the international arena appear just as ideological conventions, but their negative consequences have not been fully taken into account. In the actual implementation in third world countries, such concepts may have effects of symbolic abuse, which impact their state identity significantly and change the institution of state power. Thus overcoming such limitations and attending closely to such negative impacts are two of the important tasks of this study. Regarding development and change in identity of South American states, precedent study of this type has been done by Dezalay (Dezalay, Y., *Marchands de Droits: La Restructuration de l'Ordre Juridique International par les Multinationales du Droit*, Fayard, 1992; "Multinationales de l'Expertise et Deprissement de l'Etat", Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 96/97, Mars, 1993; *The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States*, University of Chicago Press, 2002.)

21 For example, the software of cultural industries such as movies, video games, and music has a huge impact. Moreover, the westernizing trends of individual consumer tastes, along with the increasing proliferation of fast-food chains, must be stressed as a topic of research.


22 There have been some recent attempts to explain the dynamics of international politics in terms of cultural factors, especially in the U.S. However, this is more so focused on cultural industries than lifestyle, thus can be considered a theory of political economy. A prominent example is the study of "Siliwood", which refers to the merge of Hollywood, and Silicon Valley (Hozic, A. A., "Uncle Sam Goes to Siliwood: Of Landscapes, Spielberg and Hegemony", *Review of International Political Economy* 6, 3 (1999); J. Curran, *Media and Cultural Theory*, Routledge, 2006). The emergence of Siliwood signifies the new paradigm of movie industry in the era of IT. Simultaneously, it also introduces the new American technological innovation model as a merge between Hollywood and a military-industrial complex. Also, Siliwood portrays a new American hegemony which arises and functions beyond military and economic to cultural level. In my point of view, it seems limited to explain the effects of cultural industry on individuals' daily lives in South Korea and other Third World countries. To reduce these limitations, we must analyze in micro terms the global diffuse, ion

of consumer networks that are formed by individual tastes of lifestyle and management of bodies. (cf. Bayart, J.F., *Le Gouvernement du Monde: Une Critique Politique de la Globalization*, Fayard, 2004; Featherstone, S., *Postcolonial Culture*, University Press of Mississippi, 2005).

23 Benjamin Barber. *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003).

24 Highly authoritarian in nature and unlike other Western societies, South Korean society inherently allows institution of power to penetrate deeply within civil society, making public debate systematically difficult to operate. Thus, civil society in South Korea tends to begin as resistant groups against the authoritative state, and need to overcome many obstacles for its decision-making process to enter political society.

between the state and civil society in South Korea.



First, the difference of political capability within civil society also reflects in political society. As Bob Jessop already has mentioned,²⁵ the state replicates the relationship of power within civil society, and the question at stake is discovering exactly how the economic basis of difference in civil society affects political sphere. For this purpose, it is useful to separate political sphere into political society and executive branch of the government. It is also useful to note that process of their formation do not exactly parallel.

Second, parallelism in economic production leads to the difference of social forces in civil society, which mirrors class disparities. However, the symbolic inequality of competence in recognition and expression of political issues cannot be explained by economic difference. In other words, relying on class relations in explaining complicated collision of interests in civil society faces certain limitations. Thus, we may hypothesize discursive domain as a new form of civil society. This discursive domain may be a reflection of economic and social capital in civil society, although not a duplicate of the real world. **Discursive domain** is a place regulated by “**discursive capital + cultural capital**,” an immaterial place that cannot be completely

25 Jessop, Bob, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, Ch.9, (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990).

controlled by power of capital. When viewed under such implications, **civil society** can be divided into “**material domain (civil society 1) + discursive domain (civil society 2).**” Here, the difference of symbolic competence includes the dimension of cultural dominance, which creates and circulates political discourse that politically persuades individuals. The conflict within material domain in South Korea subsequently forms the conflict between capital and labor; this is the main struggle that generates mainstream politics in Korea. On the other hand, discursive domain provides an arena for conflicts among symbolic forms of interests, in which the main economic struggle continually transfigures into various forms.²⁶

Third, in order to understand the logic of cultural dominance in the discursive arena, we must acknowledge the fact that economic power relationships within civil society go through a certain process of transposition. This is what theory of the state and civil society has overlooked. The relationship of state and civil society mostly derives or transforms from frameworks or superstructure metaphors of Marx. Such identification of politics disables adequate explanation of the strategic dissimilarities among political actors, which differ by political issues. Therefore, the approach towards politics must understand it as a process of representation, recognition, and realization of the interest of individuals within civil society. However, it must also be noted that when individuals recognize their interests, representative logic of coercion concurrently operates. In other words, rather than recognizing their own interests, individual political actors are infused with political representations from platforms of party politics, information from the press, or debate on television. Under such a structure, the relationship between the experts who create these discourse and images and individual political actors who accept them cannot, in any way, be equal or neutral. In sum, identical content of discourse weighs differently not only in terms of political mobilization, but also by societal position of individual political actors.

Fourth, the mechanism in which economic tensions within civil society reflects onto

26 The current conflict among classes would be the economic collision between capital and labor around Neo Liberalism, but we can find different transpositions of this in discursive domain. For example, the national development strategy for peace in Northeast Asia or Nuclear Crisis between North and South Korea do not necessarily have direct relations to conflicts of real interests. However, such points of contention within discursive domain have transferred economic conflicts and have resulted in shifting of judgments in political conflicts. In fact, these effects of symbolic transposition are present even in regionalism or the NIMBY phenomenon. In classical view of political science, it was general to place economic interests within civil society together with formation and expression of individual political values. But in socio-psychological point of view, constitution of political identity and its expression do not necessarily reflect material interest. Actually, a quite complex, discursive (symbolic) level of interests are involved in this process. This is what I consider as one of the political characteristics of contemporary South Korean society.

institution of power, e.g., party politics, legislative branch, and the mechanism in which conflicts within discursive arena transfer to institution of power such as executive authority do not always correspond to one another. Just as civil society is divided into material arena and discursive arena, the institution of power can also be separated into political society and executive authority. Within political configuration in South Korea, executive authority forms a certain power structure in regards to political and progressive mobilization. Such political configuration between executive authority and political society not only forms in terms of institution of power, but also reveals the dynamics between material sector and discursive sector within civil society. As economic interests transform according to the logic of symbolic representation, it reflects dynamics within civil society to institution of power; this relationship can be defined as a homological relationship.²⁷

Utilizing above concepts, I will explain the mechanism and characteristics of South Korean civil society. First, economic and societal resources determine dynamics between various social groups within civil society. Here, societal resources refer to the traditional class relationship in production sector. For example, the capitalist class acquires more favorable social position in physical mobilization than labor class; this further determines the degree in which the voice to enforce their economic interest is strengthened. However, in Korean politics of reality, the area that cannot be explained by simple logic of economic power is increasing. For instance, when laborers or farmers, who are in the working class, express their political stance, they often identify with visions and values of the capitalist class. To explain this phenomenon, the dynamics of civil society requires a new cultural axis beyond economic axis. This supports the necessity of discursive domain in theory. Here, "cultural axis" relates to political representation, closely related to operations of political visions or images created and distributed by political experts or intellectuals.

On the other hand, the result of struggles within civil society may reflect not only on the regime (executive branch), but also on political society. Since National Assembly elections represent the result of conflicts within political society, political society most closely reflects the power structure of civil society. Hence, the disparity in progressiveness of executive branch and political society (political parties, national assembly) occurs because the ways in which individuals express their political desires and struggles within civil society result are different from each other.

In Western political configuration, dynamics of domestic politics or conflict between capital and labor determines such confrontation between progressives and conservatives. In the case of South Korea, people are greatly affected in their standpoint or attitude by intellectuals or bureaucrats who seem considerably distant from social struggles. Although it is uncommon for bureaucratic experts or university professors to directly express their political opinions, their influence on actual processes of drafting, publicizing, and deciding on government policies is extremely powerful. Moreover, though establishment and execution of policies by bureaucrats and intellectuals may seem objective and scientific, we must acknowledge the influence of intellectual importation from abroad. As considerable numbers of high governmental officials and university professors in Korea study abroad, foreign intellectual bias remains in their policymaking process. These influences are camouflaged under the name of scientific universalism and rationality. This is the process of internalization in which foreign variables are imported into domestic politics.

3. Civil Society and Individuals: the relationship of habitus


To renew the relationship between civil society and individuals from the cultural viewpoint, it is useful to begin by criticizing the class concept. Although it has realistic limitations, the unit of classes is still effective in explaining tendencies of individual actors within civil society. Thus, examination of its theoretical effectiveness and limitations may reveal new characteristics of modern society.²⁸ This approach is also very useful in this chapter, which proposes to renew the relationship of civil society and individuals in Korean society. First, I will examine the issues regarding traditional concept of classes. Second, based on the former, I will discuss theoretical tasks of the relationship between civil society and individuals through cultural viewpoint.

First, I will explain the discordance between consciousness and behavior of individuals

²⁷ Bourdieu, P. "Représentation Politique: Elements pour une Théorie du Champ Politique", *Actes de la Recherche en Science Sociale*, N. 36-37, 1981.

²⁸ However, the formation of mass consumption society in 1960's is behind disillusionment toward practicality of class concept. The rise of mass consumption society rendered meaningless the class conflict based on production relationships, while introducing a new pattern of conflict based on consumption. In South Korea, signs of this mass consumption society were visible since around 1990. Thus the confusion of reality and theory is hotly debated around class conflict, newly in the name of "crisis of identity". cf Dunn, R., *Identity Crises: a Social Critique of Postmodernity*, University of Minnesota Press, 1998; Dubet, F. and Martuccelli, D., *Dans Quelle Societe Vivons-nous?* Seuil, 1998; Touraine, A., *Un Nouveau Paradigme*, Fayard, 2005; and Kim, Wang Bae, *San'eop Sahuuii Nodonggwa Kyegeupui Jaesaengsan: Ilsang Saenghwal Segyeui Bulpyungdeungui Daehan Sungchal*, Hanwul Akademi, 2001. [Labor and Reproduction of Industrial Society: Examination on inequality of Everyday Life, Hanwul Academy, 2001.]

that belong to class. Second, I will examine how we acknowledge the effect of socio-cultural factors, which have been overlooked in comparison to economic factors, on formation of class identity. Thirdly, I will discuss we recognize the relationship between human consciousness and human behavior. Deriving from such issues, three following theoretical tasks can be raised in order to understand individual behavioral patterns within civil society under the modern capitalist system: the possibility of unification between the public (production) sector and private (reproduction) sector; the combination of macro and micro factors in order to explain human behavioral patterns; and two forms of power (power of state, power of society) that are involved in the formation of individual identities. The theoretical effort to accomplish these tasks is portrayed through Figure 3.



1. The separation of production sector (objective class) and private sector (subjective class) was a necessary premise for modern political science. However, such theoretical ground started to be questioned circa emergence of postmodernism.²⁹ Nonetheless, concerns

29 Although historically disregarded, French postmodern philosophers such as Foucault, Baudrillard, and Bourdieu have emphasized private sector of daily life as an important area of analysis. The results of these studies have restructured modern political science, denying separation of public and private sector. Such studies have attacked theories of scholars such as Arendt and Habermas, who assert for politics of public discourse.

such as explaining the relationship between public and private sector, as well as configuring analytical framework for individual behaviors still remain unexplained. I therefore suggest the following: it must not simply remain at negating the separation between the two sectors; their interrelationship must be more vigorously questioned. At the same time, we must explain the formation of political individual's behavioral patterns, while also clarifying its difference from other class models.

Thus, it is crucial to determine how to merge class concept of production relations with personal experiences of private sector.³⁰ The scholarly efforts to accept private sector into class concept started from the awareness that individual form from daily lives. The success of such efforts depends on how private experiences are formulated into an analytical model and manipulated as variables. As of now, the linguistic model is an academically recognized example of such a model. However, the epistemological base of this linguistic model can be traced back to 1960's Barthian structuralism, which is quite limited by its lack of individuals' dynamics.³¹

2. Thus, for a greater conceptual elasticity, the use of the word "identity" seems rather pertinent in this case. If the concept of identity is acknowledged, individual behavioral patterns are not only understood as a result of society, but the internal formation (psychology) can be also recognized. Here, Piaget's work on developmental process holds various theoretical implications.

In his work *The Moral Judgment of the Child*,³² Piaget asserts that as humans develop their intelligence, they perform a specific process of recognition against societal regulations. As a result, the human consciousness matures to the level that accepts external force and consents to it independently. This in turn becomes the basis of the moral education theory, which argues that education in school can create moral individuals. On the other hand, later scholars such as Percheron³³ absorb Piaget's individualization process as a socialization process of individuals into civil society. According to Percheron, individuals experience two

30 For examples of private experience, topics such as education, consumption, housing, entertainment, and leisure are discussed and there are attempts to form them into variables.

31 Here, the focus has shifted from Marx's political economy theory to linguistic structuralism in order to combine private experience into production relationships; however, the background of methodology still remains within structural framework. (cf. Barthes, R. *Mythologies*, Seuil, 1957.) Thus a new type of methodology is required to increase practicality of cultural class concept, which emphasizes consumption or daily life.

32 J. Piaget. *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York : Free Press, 1965).

33 A. Percheron. *L'univers Politique des Enfants* (FNSP, Colin, 1974).

phases during the socialization process. First is "assimilation" phase, at which individuals attempt to change societal forces or regulation according to own desire. In the second phase of "accommodation," individuals struggle to transform themselves in accordance with society.³⁴

In sociological terms, the synthesis between assimilation and accommodation occurs as "interiorization of external factors" and "exteriorization of internal factors." It is then inevitable to elaborate on which societal factors are internalized within individuals, and by which chance they surface externally from individuals. Perhaps the fact that this question has not been fully answered is at the heart of profuse debates on class concept. However, in my views, the academic pursuit toward socialization of individuals is closer to a socio-philosophical question than a methodological one. In addition, the main focus in this question is that choice of individuals is closely related to external enforcement, in other words, to the effect of power.

3. Althusser examined the formation of individuals within power relationships in depth; his essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"³⁵ is absolutely essential in the study of formation of individual identity. However, his limitation is that he confines societal tool in formation of individual to ideological apparatus of state, as well as individual reaction to this as being merely passive. This provides explanation for interiorization of external factors, but not as sufficiently for exteriorization of internal factors. Although Althusser discusses the effect of power and formation of individual identity, his limitations derive from the biased view in which individual is subjugated by social power.

In order to overcome these limitations, we must pay attention to the process of diversification in identity formation, and to the fact that it is ultimately intertwined with invisible forms of societal power. The effects of social power govern the area of numerous tastes that individuals experience in private sector, and this is beyond the visible scope of the state power. In other words, there exists a "symbolic power" that controls individual tastes

and forges a value system. Although individuals are regulated by the state power, they are also under the capitalist consumer mechanism that reinforces a form of state power. Again, individual tastes that are established in private sector are closely related to political decisions,³⁶ as well as to formation of individual identity. Thus diversification of individual formation starts from life world, and there operates the effect of covert symbolic power that cannot be explained by institutional power. Therefore we must determine the specific route in which social power (e.g., cultural or symbolic power) pervades in life world. Theoretical legacy of Bourdieu provides many theoretical answers to such questions.

By relating formation of individual identity to the effect of social power, Bourdieu's insight firmly coincides with the direction of this chapter.³⁷ However, it is necessary to take a step further to acknowledge that this social power originates from a worldwide production system. I would like to call this concept "globalizing structure of taste," which rises beyond Bourdieu's level of analysis. I attempt to pursue this inquiry by relying on Negri's *Empire*.³⁸ As he states in *Empire*, the worldwide production mechanism of financial capital practically groups all laborers of the world under one labor system. As production patterns are generalized in a global scope, a type of economic structure forms where only particular forms of desire are satisfied in civil society of each country. Successively, this system regulates individuals' aesthetic tastes and values in consumption arena, reinforcing cultural hegemony of a particular class.³⁹ In this viewpoint, in the time of Negri's "empire,"

36 Although an empirical experiment must take place, we can imagine the following few examples. Of people who usually eat at fast food restaurants (born by American consumer capitalism) and those who frequent traditional Korean restaurants, which group would display a higher percentage of resistance toward American hegemony? Also, of people who grew up watching Disney's animations and Hollywood movies and people who watched traditional Korean theatre, who would more likely criticize the U.S. invasion of Iraq? The contrast between fast food restaurants v. Korean restaurants, and Hollywood movies v. Korean theatre emphasizes the high dominance of today's societal (symbolic) power in South Korea by foreign influence.

37 The fact that he focused on individual identity and relationship attributes credit to Bourdieu's *habitus* for identifying the process of individual formation. However, he still cannot escape from structuralism by using category of class to explain individual taste. For example, those who attain bourgeois status in society have bourgeois' taste, whereas those in lower classes have *habitus* of lower classes. But this is only possible through the existence of a structural power that decides bourgeois/low class tastes, independent of emotional or psychological factors.

38 A. Negri. And M. Hardt. *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); Hong, Seong Min, "Jeongcheseonggwa Kukjejeongchi", *Kukje Jeongchi Nonchong*, Vol 42. 1, 2002. "Identity and International Politics", *Journal of Korean International Politics*, 42: 1 (2002).

39 For instance, for products related to electronics such as cellular phone or computer games, faster rotation period of products is crucial for surplus accumulation in the profit maximization strategy of neo-liberalism. Thus creating surplus in IT industry involves extensive advertisement toward IT consumers, which provokes spontaneity and temporality of consumer culture. The worldwide spread of popular music or scenes from

34 Therefore an individual's identity from society has various forms. In other words, class as an identity based on economy is only one form of numerous processes of identity. Then, what are the social factors that induce transformation of identity? Percheron provides examples by relating to multiple conditions. First is linguistic expression from political structure. Second is from social structure, such as father's occupation and living standards. Third is from internal factors, e.g., psychological conditions during childhood. If this discussion is broadly interpreted as an individualization process with adults as its political actors, the above mentioned political and social structures can be considered as the external factors; the automatic recognition of these is regarded as "assimilation." In this sense, the structural viewpoint of human beings only deals with "assimilation." Then, "accommodation" as an internal process must be combined with this structural viewpoint in order to complete a new analysis of individualization.

35 Althusser, L. "Ideologie et Apparatus Ideologique d'Etat", in *Pour Marx* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1966).

sectors of production and consumption are dissolving their boundaries, and individual identities are affected from both in its formulation.

CONCLUSION

In this essay, in order to explain South Korea's state identity, I discussed separately the relationships between the state/civil society and between civil society/formation of individual. However, such separations only occur theoretically; in practice, they are always interlinked with each other. It is nonetheless convenient for our purposes of running empirical studies and organizing their results. Moreover, in formation and implementation of governmental policies, it will also be useful to consider components of Korean society separately.

On the other hand, as the subtitle of this essay—*Theoretical Attempt for State Identity of Korea*—conveys, this essay is meant to serve as an introduction. In other words, additional efforts to discover the state identity of Korea must take place through further studies. Although such a pursuit requires analysis of extremely complex factors, perhaps due to the influence of American academia, most political theories in Korea have approached this task with economic points of view. Thus, the concept of "developmental state"⁴⁰ has played a key role in characterizing Korean identity. However, in the current global economy, developmental policies from the Park Chung Hee regime are not sufficient for Korea to achieve another spectacular economic growth. New types of policies and visions fit for future circumstances must be produced. This essay is a theoretical effort to fulfill such an objective.

The state identity of Korea is determined by numerous elements. Historical conditions, influence of international politics, class conflicts in domestic society, and changes of individual identities, etc. Such factors create infinite combinations according to temporal and spatial conditions. I intend to emphasize specifically that Korean state identity is exposed to external factors in international relations (especially, the U.S.), to a much higher degree than most other states. To repeat, state identity is something that changes according to time and space rather than stagnates in one form. This cannot be captured by a single theory; theories and models only serve to explain state identity in one way. Thus it is crucial for specific empirical studies to follow. For instance, the following effects must be examined with empirical research; in

the level of state/civil society, how scholars with degrees from the United States are employed as high-position bureaucratic officials in Korea, what kind of policies they implement, as well as what their effects are on the state identity. Also, in the level of civil society/individual, we must research how popular culture imported from the U.S. has affected individual tastes in Korea (private domain), and as a result, which political values are chosen by individual and are widespread in civil society (public domain). Such empirical studies, while remaining within the theoretical framework of this essay, will serve to verify Korea's state identity at a more specific level.

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movies can be explained in these terms.

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