

# THE “ANDRO(I)GYNE” THAT, THERE-FORE, (I) AM A DERRIDEAN COMMENTARY

NORMAN K. SWAZO\*

## ABSTRACT

The concept of androgyny is contested in its meaning and in the hegemonic governance of medico-legal judgments of individuals who identify as androgyne or transsexual. The fact is that the androgyne continues to be misunderstood and marginalized in Western society. The same contestation occurs in South Asia, where the misunderstood *hijra* lives as a social outcast. Although anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, lawyers, etc., describe the androgyne and *hijra*, they also dispense normative claims as to the androgyne and *hijra*'s sociopolitical status. Notwithstanding, those who affirm their personhood as manifestly androgyne/*hijra* are quite capable of *auto-bio-graph-y*—“a writing of self”—as philosopher Jacques Derrida would say. It is essential that such self-affirming *auto-bio-graph-y* be encouraged, thus reducing the confusion of concepts. It is with this goal of conceptual clarification that the formulation ‘*andro(I)gyne*’ is introduced here.

**Keyword:** Androgyny; Derrida; *hijra*; transsexuality; autobiography

\* Director, Office of Research-NSU, Office of the Vice Chancellor, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh  
Department of History and Philosophy, norman.swazo@northsouth.edu

“Perhaps a mind that is purely masculine cannot create any more than a mind that is purely feminine, I thought. But it would be well to test what one meant by man-womanly, and conversely, by woman-manly, by pausing and looking at a book or two.”

Virginia Woolf, *A Room of One's Own*

“Those who advocate radical change must have in mind and provide for others a vision of the new human being and the new society.”

N.T. Bazin and A. Freeman, “The androgynous vision”

## I. TO BE “ANDRO(I)GYNE”

In her *A Room of One's Own*, Virginia Woolf proposes we pause our otherwise busy lives, look at a book or two, and consider a question that resonates at the base of human sexuality—the question ‘what it *means* to be androgyne’, or better (to emphasize the indeterminate *duality-in-unity*): what it means *to be andro(I)gyne*.<sup>1</sup> Tracy Hargreaves (2005) has done precisely this in her *Androgyny in Modern Literature*. As she reminds, Woolf’s novel *Orlando* represents androgyny as an “oscillatory identity.” Hargreaves’ review of representations of androgyny in literature clarifies that “the androgyne’s power to disrupt and disturb hetero-normative relationships” is “a power that seems at once desirable and to be feared.” (Hargreaves 2005, 9).

As a matter of philosophical, biological, anthropological, and psychological “settlement” of the question of identity, “the androgyne (or more generally androgyny) is always bounded by the binary categories it seeks to challenge.” Thus, when asked about “her” identity being *either* man *or* woman, philosopher Beatriz Preciado retorts: “That question reflects an anxious Western obsession [...] with wanting to reduce the truth of sex to a binomial”<sup>2</sup> (“*Esta pregunta refleja una ansiosa obsesión occidental [...] de querer reducir la verdad del sexo a un binomio*”) (Santos, 2014, 127). Preciado rejects the question: Rather than the culturally enforced dogma of sexual dimorphism, what we have are individuals who are “transgender pansexual” (*transgénero pansexual*).

---

1 I use the construction ‘*andro(I)gyne*’ deliberately to distinguish the concept from that of the androgyne as construed in anthropology, sociology, psychology, medicine, law, etc., i.e., as some “abnormality” in human sexuality, more often than not referenced by the antiquated and pejorative concept ‘hermaphrodite’ which, e.g., in one medical encyclopedia, is characterized as “a camouflaging of the true sex by means of malformations.” See Santos, 2014.

2 As cited by Santos, 2005, 127, from Amela (2008).

Hargreaves (2005, 68) takes note of Woolf's attention to "the subject of the androgynous writing mind." This idea links to the Derridean concept of *auto-bio-graph-y*, the *andro(I)gyne* "writing" *their* own most proper (*propre*) "identity". Such writing is a challenge to—even a rebellion against—the "dominant" (i.e., leading, overriding, governing) narratives of human sexual dimorphism.<sup>3</sup> Thus, Hargreaves reminds, Woolf wrote of androgyny as "a form of balanced coexistence, redolent of [Carl] Jung's anima and animus: 'in each of us two powers reside, one male, one female; and in the man's brain the man predominates over the woman, and in the woman's brain the woman predominates over the man' (*A Room*, 88)." That is presumably so for the majority of humans despite a normatively male/masculine or female/feminine disposition.

The *andro(I)gyne* does not have a determinate *psycho-soma-tic* co-existence, however. The dimorphic tension remains embattled in view of a hetero-normatively stipulated prospective "resolution." The *andro(I)gyne* is expected to *choose* either the male or the female "biologically natural" sexuality, to become "gendered" in sexual orientation, social customs, personal mannerisms, etc., according to "social hegemonies" (Hargreaves's term)—even to the point of undergoing a surgical conversion ("transsexual surgery"), authorized by "medico-legal" judgment. Such is the ostensibly practicable and desirable *pharmakon* (about which more in due course) authorized by "techno-bio-politics" to create out of a "transbody" (*transcuerpo*) what (in Preciado's terms is either a "technowoman" (*tecnomujer*) or a "technoman" (*tecnohombre*), the '*techno-*' here a reference to techniques of *chemical/hormonal* adjustment and *surgical* transition, i.e., anatomical "reconstruction" male-to-female or female-to-male.

The *problematique* of embattled co-existence ("diagnosed" as gender dysphoria<sup>4</sup>) is what narrates the *andro(I)gyne* as having a "degenerate subjectivity," their psychologically/medico-legally diagnosed disquiet in need of resolution of a "developmental disorder" of "psychosexual constitution." Failing that, the *andro(I)gyne* is to be "assigned" to the asylum for a manifest "madness" (*mania*). Hargreaves reminds of Jan Morris's *Conundrum*: the conundrum is discernible in one feeling "like a figure in a fable, either 'monstrous or divine.'" What is one to do *about*, or *with*, or *to*, this *manifestly anomalous* "person," who identifies as an "intermediate sex" or a "third sex" or a "third gender," who possesses "a double point of view," *psycho-soma-*

3 One can think *auto-bio-graph-y* also in the phenomenological sense suggested by Henry Rubin who "argues that phenomenology is uniquely suited to the study of trans lives because it privileges the unique perspective of subjects in describing their own subjectivity," i.e., "the subjectivity of the 'I,'" hence the neologism '*andro(I)gyne*' adopted here. See Salamon (2014). Salamon refers to Rubin (1998).

4 See Cooper et al. (2020).

tically incorporating the masculine and the feminine, but rejecting the singularity of each? *To be nonbinary, a duality-in-one*, without transitioning to a “gender” or “embodiment,” guiding others as to the correct pronouns—“they/them/their” rather than “he/his” or “she/her” or even “s/he” *but never* “it”—thus the person who is nonbinary says: “*I am*’ ... *they/them*”—*andro(I)gyne*.<sup>5</sup>

Hargreaves (2005, 40) tells also of Edward Carpenter’s (2018) quasi-clinical comportment in his *The Intermediate Sex*, commenting: “Carpenter’s self-appointed task was to legitimise or authorise what degrees of intermediacy were and were not appropriate, but in the ‘extreme specimens’ (as he clinically describes them) their corruption is marked by the ways femininity and masculinity apparently invade and infect the male and female body, marking the *en travestie* as travesty.” For Carpenter, what matters in such analysis is that one identify the intermediate “who might permissibly ‘pass’ in hetero-normative culture without attracting a second glance.” Note here the sign of an arrogated authority: Carpenter speaks of one who might *permissibly* pass as someone who, consequent to a “double temperament,” may be *either* “a rare and beautiful flower of humanity” *or* “a perverse and tangled ruin.” But, the questions go begging: Why the *heteronomy*, the “law of the other?” Why the *clinical* hegemony, here? Where is the *auto-nomy* of the *andro(I)gyne* who *can* be, perhaps *should* be, *auto-bio-graphical*, *writing* “*their*” *own narrative* as to *who* the *andro(I)gyne* “properly” (*proprement*) *is*?

The “medico-legal” judgment fails to apprehend the self-understanding of the “true”/“authentic” *andro(I)gyne*. Presumably, the true *andro(I)gyne* writes *their* soul into *their* representation, such *auto-bio-graph-y* being “*their affirmation*” before an otherwise dismissive, alienating, and hostile socio-cultural world that judges the *andro(I)gyne* to be (a) in contempt of “Nature” for having “inverted instincts,” and (b) in contempt of human dignity, for behaving beyond socio-culturally sanctioned norms. Such, e.g., is the “writing” of Earl Lind (1919) in *The Autobiography of an Androgyne*.<sup>6</sup> Lind dared to write “his/her/their” autobiography, even though it meant being kept for a long time “under lock and key.” This is not only the lock and key that hides the private written text—the “diary” that narrates years of lived experience—from the eyes of public scrutiny. It is the mental lock and key that “disguises” the *physico-*

---

5 Consider, e.g., the singer Demi Lovato’s preference for “they/them” pronouns, explaining: “I feel that this best represents the fluidity I feel in my gender expression and allows me to feel most authentic and true to the person I both know I am and am still discovering.” Lovato added: “Now I just realize it’s so much more important to live your truth than ever suppress yourself...” See Rumer (2021).

6 “Earl Lind,” “Ralph Werther,” and “Jennie June” are all pseudonyms for this author.

*physio-psycho-logical evidence* that betrays the “abnormality” of intersexuality<sup>7</sup> somewhere between “thorough masculinity” and “thorough femininity.”

Why say ‘autobiography’ here? *Because* (following Derrida, 2008, 77), “All autobiography presents itself as a testimony [...] and vice versa, every testimony presents itself as autobiographical truth: I promise the truth concerning what I, myself, have perceived, seen, heard, felt, lived, thought, etc.” *Except*—deliberately to modify Derrida’s statement—the *andro(I)gyne* says: ‘We promise the truth...’ Indeed, in this *auto-bio-graph-y*, one finds *described, disclosed, exposed*, and even *denigrated* therein what follows from (as Derrida (2008, 83) would say) “the law of nature,” but as “reaction” to both internal and external stimuli, thus what is entirely “natural” issuing from the *andro(I)gyne*’s “law of freedom (response and responsibility).”

This is entirely a matter of the *will* (freedom to *be/not be, to do/not do*) and *judgment* (what is right/wrong, good/bad, but thereby also what is true/false)—what Derrida, (2008, 100) reminding of philosopher Immanuel Kant, calls “auto-prescription and moral autobiography.” Such *auto-bio-graph-y* is, therefore, pertinent to a *description, disclosure, and exposure* that has its unique “truth” (in the philosophical sense of ‘unconcealment’ philosopher Martin Heidegger intends by ‘*alētheia*’) that otherwise would remain concealed, hidden, “under lock and key”—but a truth that can never be fully comprehended by the merely *bio-graphical, anthropo-logical, ethno-graphical, or psycho-analytical*.

“Sexually abnormal by birth,” “Nature’s stepchildren”—such are the usual pejorative and mistaken representations of the *andro(I)gyne*. So much was the *andro(I)gyne* deemed abnormal in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century that the sale of Lind’s book was “restricted” to “the members of the learned professions,” i.e., to “medical and legal fraternities,” according to Alfred Herzog (the book’s editor), who undertook its publication as a “missionary” cause, despite finding the book’s narrative “nauseating.” It is, of course, pertinent to such a medico-legal analysis that this physician would, as it were, self-diagnose and admit to his nausea as the visceral effect of his reading of Lind’s autobiography. Herzog’s cause, however, was not so much to *understand* androgyny but to address the “colossal ignorance of the reasons for homosexual practices on one side, and the pharisaical pulchritude on the other side which although knowing that homosexuality has been practiced uninterruptedly from biblical times up to the present, refuses to study its causes or its devotees [...]” (Lind, 1919).

7 ‘Intersexuality’ is a term used to designate individuals who have “variations in congenital sex anatomy that are considered atypical for females or males.” See D. Dreger and Herndon (2009).

Herzog added, "This book is published in an endeavor to obtain justice and humane treatment for the Androgynes, that class of homosexualists in whom homosexuality is not an acquired vice but in whom it is congenital." Thus, Herzog's concern is not the true *andro(I)gyne* but the homosexual who is *what* "he" is due to "misfortune" (contrasted to those whose homosexuality is due to "vice"): "the congenital homosexualist is really a human being, born with the body of a male, with perhaps some feminine characteristics, but with the soul of a female" (Lind, 1919). Such an individual is presumed to have developed abnormally, whose sexual desires are an "aberration," and whose carnal acts are "willfully bad," "Crimes against Nature," crimes judged "bestial," "unclean" as the lepers of old, individuals denominated "sodomites," therefore historically sentenced to death by being burned alive at the stake or being buried alive.<sup>8</sup> To Herzog's medico-legal mind, influenced by Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic hypothesis that all humans have an innate bisexual constitution and tendency, "Normal development leads [i.e., *should* lead, as a matter of "normal" psychosexual development and governing customs of socialization] from bisexuality to the primacy of the heterosexual instinct" (Lind, 1919, iii, vi). For Herzog, to say a person is an Androgyne is to say that "he" is truly "a male person with female ways."

## II. PHILOSOPHICAL INTERLUDE

"I am she: I am he"—the essence of the androgynous vision." With these words from Adrienne Rich's (1973) "Diving into the Wreck," philosopher Kathryn Pauly Morgan (1982) begins her "conceptual critique" of 'androgyny' and the feminist scholarship that has taken an active stance in support of what has hitherto been a marginalized and ostracized element of contemporary society, but also depreciated historically in diverse cultures.<sup>9</sup> Morgan observes

---

8 Lind (p. 22) writes of "himself" as "an effeminate man," but congenitally "really a woman whom Nature disguised as a man": "I am sexually abnormal," he opines, but intending an "inversion" of his sexuality and not the "moral depravity" of "perversion"—keeping in mind, as Santos (p. 130) reminded, that it was in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries that so-called "perversions" were "catalogued and pathologized." Lind asserts: "Medico-legally sex should be determined by the psychical constitution rather than by the physical form." Speaking morally, legally, Lind therefore asks: "Should any blame be attached to such individuals when they conduct themselves according to their psychical sex?" Answering in view of a theology, he claims (p. 23): "In the eyes of the Supreme Being with whom innate and unreasoning disgust is not a factor, the instincts of the normal man and the invert are on a par morally and aesthetically."

9 Morgan argues (p. 246): "What I try to demonstrate here is that the very idea of androgyny is not a workable one, that it is conceptually tangled and incoherent at a destructively deep level." See also Morgan (1983).

that, at least in North America, the “evidence of acceptance of the principle of androgyny is now widespread.” In settings where patriarchy and religious fundamentalism dominate public discourse, the reality of the *andro(I)gyne* is less appreciated, tolerated to some degree but not being medico-legally “approved,” given the dominance of the sexual dimorphism.

In the context of the twentieth century feminist movement, one may recall science fiction author Ursula K. LeGuin’s (1969/2016) novel, *The Left Hand of Darkness* with its imaging of “genetically engineered” androgynous Gethenians, whose sexuality is ordinarily latent, but such that they cycle more or less randomly in and out of male/female fertility. LeGuin was inspired, she said, by the work of Simone de Beauvoir’s (1973) *The Second Sex*, Betty Friedan’s (1963) *The Feminine Mystique*, and the emerging “new feminism” of the time. In her essay published in 1976, asking “Is Gender Necessary?”<sup>10</sup>—reminding her readers that she is not “a theoretician, a political thinker or activist, or a sociologist” but simply “a fiction writer”—LeGuin (1979) said, the way to do her “thinking” was “to write a novel,”<sup>11</sup> therein to create and pose a “thought-experiment.” Appealing to her Jungian psychological predisposition, LeGuin remarked: “Much had gathered in the unconscious—both personal and collective—which must either be brought up into consciousness or else turn destructive.” LeGuin’s writing is one insightful and salient example of the quasi-normative aesthetic imagination at work on a major issue of contemporary Western sociocultural disquiet. It also discloses a psychological factor of cause-effect in the societal (collective) failure to permit the *andro(I)gyne* a free public presence, in the absence of which (at least in Jungian terms) the destructive features of a suppressed and repressed sexology are likely to be manifested.

Morgan’s choice of the word ‘principle’ in the passage cited above is central to a critical clarification of the concept of androgyny; for, at least on one reading, it refers to one or another

10 LeGuin commented that the novel “is a book about betrayal and fidelity” despite the representation of gender in the atypical Gethenians. LeGuin adds, “One of the essential functions of science fiction, I think, is precisely this kind of question-asking: reversals of a habitual way of thinking, metaphors for what our language has no words for as yet, experiments in imagination.” LeGuin’s courage as an artist is in her *modus operandi*: “I play the game where the rules keep changing.” Also see LeGuin (1989).

11 See Michaud (2009), and Barrow and Barrow (1987). Somewhat critical of LeGuin’s casting of lead protagonists as male despite her commitment to feminism, Barrow and Barrow cite Pamela J. Annas’s criticism that, “What LeGuin has done is to embody in Genly Ai [the narrator of *LHD*] the main problem feminists have had with the concept of androgyny: that it has usually been looked at and defined from a male perspective [...] and as a consequence of LeGuin’s putting Estraven, the main Gethenian character, ‘almost exclusively into roles which we are culturally conditioned to perceive as ‘male’—a prime minister...a political schemer, a fugitive, a prison-breaker, a sledge-hauler,’ Estraven and the other Gethenians appear male to us.” But, as Barrow and Barrow argue, LeGuin is not writing for feminists or women: “LeGuin posits typically biased heterosexual males as her main audience.”

“beginning” (deliberately not to say “the” beginning) that has governed over word, thought, and deed—in the Western “aesthetic” imagination, in the *onto-theo*-logy of “revealed” religions, in philosophical and cultural *anthropo*-logy, in “myths” and “scriptures” subjected to methods of historical-, source-, and text-criticism, in the discourse of “demythologization,” and in modern medical science’s approach to human sexuality (including here medical genetics, endocrinology, and clinical psychology employed to stipulate medically, thus also legally).

Considering early Greek imagination, Morgan (1983, 898) reminds, “The ascription of philosophical importance to sexual dimorphism goes back to the Pythagoreans and Plato.” Thus, “In Books IV and V in *The Republic*, Plato notes the natural differences between males and females but maintains that no discriminatory social and political policies follow from these differences. In the *Laws*, his position changes. There Plato holds a view which is much more like that of the Pythagoreans, viz., that female human nature is of lower metaphysical status than male human nature” (Morgan, 1983, 898). Accordingly, “Following from this difference in metaphysical status are several clearly discriminatory policies designed, among other things, to isolate males and females and stress the dimorphic division of the species” (Morgan, 1983, 898). Hence, as a matter of metaphysics, Plato represents the human species to be “necessarily dimorphic”, women *by nature* the lesser citizens of the *polis* and subject to the master (*despotes*) of the household, only men to go about the business of the city, ruling and being ruled in turn (as Aristotle put it).<sup>12</sup>

This view contrasts with the speech of Aristophanes in Plato’s *Symposium* (189c2-193d5). Plato’s text there reads: “...our original nature [φύσις, *phusis*, origin], was by no means the same as it is now. In the first place, there were three kinds of human beings (ἄνθρώπων, *anthropon*), not merely the two sexes, male and female, as at present: there was a third kind as well, which had equal shares of the other two, and whose name survives though, the thing itself has vanished. For ‘man-woman’ [ἄνδρόγυνος, *androgynos*] was then a unity in form no less than name, composed of both sexes and sharing equally in male and female; whereas now it has come to be merely a name of reproach” (189e). Thus arises the concept, the *philosopheme*, of the hermaphrodite, the *androgynos* that—as a word, following Derrida (2008, 41) here, has its derogatory denotation—begins a “philosophical bestiary” applied to the one type of *anthropos* who is thereafter to be *dominated*, even *excluded* from civil community, for this *androgynos* presents a manifest failure to be “normal,” being dangerously “monstrous,” more animal than human (thus, perhaps *oud’anthrōpon*—a categorical negation), hence “its” proper

---

12 With reference to Aristotle’s position in his political philosophy, see Anfinson (2015).



*relegation* to the bestiary,<sup>13</sup> lest the *androgynos* successfully challenge the human who insists on his and her “secured identity” as the “non-animal,”<sup>14</sup> despite in fact having an identity that remains indeterminate over centuries of philosophical musings.

Commenting on the speech, K. J. Dover (1966, 41) writes: “Aristophanes’ encomium on Eros (*Smp.* 189c2-193d5) is a story with a moral. Once upon a time, all human beings were double creatures, each with two heads, two bodies and eight limbs. Then, by the command of Zeus, each double creature was cut in half, and so humans as we know them came into being. Every one of us ‘seeks his other half’, and this search is Eros.” There is, of course, no explanation as to why the *androgynos* so represented in Plato’s narrative vanished while the story about it (as related by Aristophanes) remains to be recounted by anyone who remembers the times of yore. More likely, however, while the *androgynos* as the “monstrous” doubling of body disappeared, it did not perish as “a thing”—its later manifestation no longer “double-bodied” but rather as only *psychically* a duality-in-one-body *andro+gyne*, thus yet *androgynos*. This “type,” however, has for the most part remained hidden within and suppressed by society; and so, this “phenomenon” (as something that at once shows and conceals itself) simply did not engage the dominant sociocultural discourses of Greek culture, given the perceived “abnormality” of the person whose existence would be considered contrary to the expressed will of Zeus, i.e., what Plato takes to be the divine decree of sexual dimorphism.

Nonetheless, bearing this *philosophical* beginning of Greek antiquity in mind, consider another “beginning” having *religious* provenance: that of the ancient Israelites, given and transmitted over centuries in the biblical book (*Torah*) of *Bereshith/Genesis*. Both orthodox Judaism and orthodox Christianity share this book as divine revelation, thus as holy scripture (writing) that is *therefore* authoritative. In verses 26-27 of the first chapter, it is written that Elohim (God) decided to make “man” (Hebrew (H), *adam*; Greek (G), *anthropos*), according to the “likeness” or “image” (H, *tselem*; G, *eikon*) of Elohim—“in the image of Elohim He created him [H, ‘*otho*’; G, *anthropon*]; male [H, *zakar*; G, *arsen*] and female [H, *n’qebah*; G, *thēly*] He created them [H, *otham*; G, *autous*].”

The use of the pronouns ‘*otho*’ and ‘*otham*’ retains an ambiguity as to whether the creature

13 In his “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” Derrida (p. 41) opines: “One cannot speak—moreover, it has never been done—of the *bêtise* or bestiality of an animal. It would be an anthropomorphic projection of something that remains the preserve of man, as the single assurance, finally, and the single risk of what is ‘proper to man’.”

14 See Anderson (2014). See also, Brisson (2002/1997).

is numerically one or, in some sense, two-in-one.<sup>15</sup> In the usual orthodox reading, Elohim created two individuals, one male (man) and one female (woman), this reading harmonizing the first and second narratives. It is as if the Elohim of the first beginning/narrative perceives the possibility of a metamorphosis when, in the second beginning/narrative, *adam* is no longer singularly *androgynos* (two-in-one) but becomes *ish*, male, from whom another is formed (*morphed*) as *wo-man*, *ishah* (Kepnes, 2004). From then on, in the legends of the ancient Israelites, it is ordained *as a matter of divine intent* that all humans must be either male or female, either man or woman. For an individual to represent “their-self” to be otherwise than this norm is to invite ostracism, persecution, and exile for an unforgivable “unnatural” difference. Some are even to undergo surgical intervention at birth, according to the dictates of *halacha* (rabbinic tradition represented as “oral” law, supplementing the written law, *torah*). Nonetheless, Jewish tradition recognizes there are individuals who are *phenotypically* “ambiguous,” in which case modern Hebrew appropriates the Greek term (*androgynos*).

Medieval rabbinic scholar Moses Maimonides (1994), in his *Mishneh Torah*, “*Hilchot Ishut*,” 2:1, used the word ‘*tumtum*’ to denote those individuals whose genitalia are “hidden,” the individual thus *apparently* (think here ‘phenomenon’ *qua* ‘appearance’) neither male nor female. This concept links with the contemporary Jewish medical-genetic identification of those whose genitalia are ambiguous, thus said to be *androgynos*, but whose “genetic sex” is stipulated on the basis of chromosomal data, whatever the phenotypical presentation. In this case, an individual can be, e.g., *phenotypically* female (having a vagina, but lacking a uterus, hence unable to reproduce); but, due to a Y chromosome (thus “XY” rather than “XX”) and interior (undescended) gonads, this individual is said to be *genetically male*. The categorization becomes *medically-genetically* “clear” yet *socioculturally* “ambiguous.”

Rabbi Alfred Cohen (1999) discusses some medical data in relation to *halacha*, commenting that “there is a great deal of debate among rabbinic authorities about what to do with a person who is a *tumtum*/androgynous,” especially because *halacha* specifies behavior and ritual according to whether one is a man or a woman, not an “intersexed” individual. Cohen presents the sort of question that must be answered by appeal to *halacha*: “Is it permissible to take a child who might be a boy and turn him into a girl (it seems that medically this is often the easier and more practical way to solve the problem of dual or ambiguous

---

15 In Jewish oral tradition, the discussion of those whose sexuality is ambiguous (e.g., Talmudic tractates *Bikkurim* (4:1-5) and *Yevamot* (82a-84a)), provides evidence that the rabbis had diverse opinions as to the phenotypical presentation of such individuals, including allowing for the identification of some as *neither* male *nor* female in the normal sense, hence categorized as *androgynos*.

sexual characteristics). This is a halachic issue since a boy would grow up to have more mitzvot [commandments] to perform than a girl, and therefore Jewish law has to consider whether it is permissible to take this step.” Another example concerns effort to render a *tumtum*/androgynous “normal”: “In order to make the child ‘look normal’, it is sometimes necessary to remove some of the genitalia, thus effectively rendering the child sterile”—even though, in the case of the phenotypically female but chromosomal male, due to lack of a uterus this child as an adult would have remained barren in any case.

With that in mind it is important to recall that ‘*adam*’ is interpreted to be a general term and, in that sense, not gender/sex-specific in the contemporary sense, thus not meaning specifically male/man or female/woman. Rather, to make the specific distinction of gender/sex, one says ‘*ish*’ for ‘man’ and ‘*ishah*’ for ‘woman’, following the second narrative in *Bereshith/Genesis* that describes the *wo*-man as “*me’ysh*,” i.e., taken “out of man.” Hence, on one plausible reading, the created *adam* is neither a differentiated *ish* nor *ishah*. While ‘*adam*’ expresses a singular corporeal entity, ‘*ish*’ and ‘*ishah*’ express a duality, i.e., the *separation* of male and female corporeally, hence the onset of sexual dimorphism. That which was created as *adam* was a singular originary event. In the *first* beginning that *Bereshith/Genesis* reveals, the human is *androgynous*, a unity. It is in the *second* beginning /narrative that “the human” is differentiated sexually as a duality, separating out into that which is male/man, *ish*, and that which is female/woman, *ishah*.

In the first beginning/narrative, *adam* is commanded to be fruitful and multiply, thus to reproduce. That command may be taken *prima facie* to say there is no obvious impediment to *adam*’s ownmost reproductive potential. This *adam* is, one might say, “self-fertile,” i.e., capable of *self-fertilization*, and in that sense this *adam* is truly, fully *androgynous*. This is clearly in contrast to the second beginning/narrative according to which this *ish* has no partner “fit” for *him*; and so, the *ishah* is created *from him*, thus to make a “fitting” partner who is said to be “bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh.” Whereas *adam* has the innate capacity for self-reproduction, *ish*, being *male only*, requires a partner to complement his reproductive potential. *Ish*’s reproductive potential is present only in the other who is *ishah*, who is *female only*. Hence, the first beginning/narrative of *Bereshith/Genesis* discloses the creation of the unitary *androgynous*, *adam*, whereas the second beginning/narrative discloses the creation of man and woman sexually differentiated and phenotypically complementary.

The foregoing suggests, therefore, that there has always been available an alternative reading of these verses in *Bereshith/Genesis*, a reading that *re-vision*s both the nature of the

*divine being* (Elohim) and, consequently, the nature of this *adam* that Elohim creates. For some who are orthodox in their reading of these verses, it may be surprising (or not so surprising, depending on one's psychosexual comportment) that since the 1970s, as Morgan (1982, 245) says, "Radical theologians"—and one must accent the word 'radical' here, in the sense of interrogating the matter "from the roots"—"have debated whether the God of Christianity is androgynous." That is a radical question indeed; for, it goes to the very beginning, to the root of the origin of *human-kind*. But, again, the debate properly engaged would have to include the God/Elohim of the *ancient Israelites* and not just the self-same God/Elohim of Christianity—to be sure, not the Elohim that is the object of devotion of *rabbinic* Judaism.<sup>16</sup> But, plausibly, the author of *Bereshith/Genesis* (who is presumed to have lived among the ancient Israelites) had a different, perhaps more genuinely originary, vision of Elohim, indeed of Elohim *as androgynous* in essence,<sup>17</sup> in which case the first *adam* "mirrors" Elohim by being made *androgynous* in its nature.

For some, the mythical tale of androgyny in Plato's *Symposium* and the Jewish/Christian scripture presents a "monstrous" vision (*qua* interpretation of the text); whereas, others appeal to these narratives as endorsement of what is a "normal" "third sex," a "middlesex," or, in contemporary medico-legal discourse, "intersexuality"—persons who are no longer to be suppressed and repressed because of the governing rationality and sentiments of men *qua* "patriarchs." The group of radical theologians to whom Morgan refers includes Mircea Eliade<sup>18</sup> and, more recently, Mary Daly, among others. To say 'the God of *Christianity* is androgynous' is clearly a radical assertion. But, it is also to presuppose and assert that 'the God of the ancient

---

16 This is arguable, of course. Consider, e.g., the tale Isaac Bashevis Singer presents in his "Androgynous" (*Andruginus*) wherein the Rabbi Motele engages the problem of the rejected androgyne directly in the person named Shevach, with the rabbi eventually taking Shevach as his wife, despite any number of unsettled issues of *halacha* that seemingly counter such an act. See Sherman (1994).

17 This is not to say that it is correct to attach anthropomorphic or anthropopathic features to the divine being, but only to recognize that it is not absolutely determined that Elohim is to be denoted by way of male/masculine references/pronouns, a mode of speech and writing deriving from patriarchy.

18 For an overview, see Idel (2014). For Eliade, referring to the kabbalist's *Zohar*, it is reasonable to consider the androgyne as "the ideal of all the metaphysical and religious traditions." Thus, Idel tells us (p. 9), among Eliade's "major claims" is the view that, "The myth of the androgyne is found in mystical traditions of the monotheistic religions in allegories and symbols." One such tradition is Greco-Christian Gnosticism. Also, "Eliade claims that the androgyne is a symbol for human perfection, and the achievement of this perfection is dependent on returning to the primordial state by transcending sexual polarity." On the side of "some Jewish traditions," it is Eliade's view that "Adam was believed to be bisexual and thus an undetermined being, and the reintegration is predicated upon a return to an Adamic state." See *A History of Religious Ideas*, Vol. I, p. 165. Thus, Eliade asserts (as Idel cites him) that, "the myth of the androgyne, is clearer at the beginning of Judaism, since Adam was conceived as an androgyne."

Israelites is *one and the same* androgynous Elohim'. This debate, however, and importantly *as a matter of fact*, includes contemporary philosophers. In contrast to Plato, "Some philosophers have argued that androgyny represents the highest ideal of human nature"—at least among those expounding a feminist philosophy as a radical challenge to the "androcentric"<sup>19</sup> dominant narratives that privilege the masculine over the feminine and thus sustain patriarchy in the governance of word, thought, and deed.<sup>20</sup>

This assertion of the authority and value of androgyny is a commitment to the proposition that the *andro(I)gyne* is *more truly human*—'more' comparing the *andro(I)gyne* to the presumably "normal" binary, gendered, "male/man" and "female/woman." These philosophers challenge and interrogate the sociocultural marginalization and depreciation of those who, in modern medical/psychological parlance, are intersexed. Consistent with this philosophical affirmation of the human as androgyne, Morgan (1982, 246) informs us, "many social revolutionaries, including many prominent feminists, came to believe that bringing about an androgynous world had the highest moral and political priority, that, without this, full humanity for women and men would be impossible."

Thus, N.T. Bazin and A. Freeman (1974), e.g., insist not only on the validity of the concept of the androgyne in the contemporary world, but also of "render[ing] it more concrete by defining it in terms of our own historical situation." Hence, one chooses deliberately *not* to say 'hermaphrodite' in the appropriation of the concept '*andro(I)gyne*', since the former term is all too readily and often used pejoratively; but also because it, too, has its origin in myth. Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Book IV, tells the tale about Hermaphroditus, so named because he is the son of the Olympian deity Hermes and the goddess Aphrodite, a name/concept that does not adequately represent the unique significance of the true *andro(I)gyne*.

### III. CONSIDERING DERRIDA'S QUESTION

Keeping in mind the foregoing overview, in Derridean fashion—and as a matter of preliminary clarification—one must ask: What does '*there-fore*' mean? What is the provenance of the word? One may respond variously, of course. In English grammar, it is

19 See, e.g., Gross (2009), who claims that feminist thought requires a "paradigm shift," in the sense of a transition "from an androcentric methodology to an androgynous methodology."

20 Morgan refers, e.g., to Bazin and Freeman (1974), Ferguson (1977), and Trebilcot (1977).

a word that functions as an adverb. But, the grammatical classification does not get to the *hermeneutic* point at issue here. In logic, 'therefore' is classified as a word that links premise(s) to the conclusion, i.e., to a proposition the truth or falsity of which depends on what has been premised, what has been stated, "there," "before." That's closer to the hermeneutic point. But, one can still ask: What, then, of the etymology of the word? We are told by English language etymologists that the contemporary 'therefore' follows from Old and Middle English usage, in the sense of "for that, by reason of that," or "in consequence of that."<sup>21</sup> This usage joins 'there' and 'fore', the former pointing to a "place" and the latter to a "time" prior, as in 'be-fore', 'being prior', hence, 'there-fore'. This reference to time and place prior is salient to what follows in the central formula being engaged and interrogated here.

Consider the formula expressed at the outset: 'the *andro(I)gyne* that, *there-fore*, I am'. One asserts: This formula—'the *andro(I)gyne* that, *there-fore*, I am'—is at once *descriptive* in its sentential construction and *normative* in its intentionality. It is, on the face of it, a presupposition, saying in effect: 'Suppose I am *andro(I)gyne*'—understanding immediately that it is not evident *who* is this 'I' and what this construction '*andro(I)gyne*' means even as it refers to an ambiguous 'I'. Those who have read in contemporary French philosophy will readily perceive that the formulation recalls Derrida (2008) who, in his lecture published in 1997 under the title, "The Animal That Therefore I Am," raised the question of "the animal" or "animals," while also mentioning, in passing, both an insight of Nietzsche and the creation narratives in *Bereshith/Genesis*. These references are central to the presupposition that occasions the formulation proposed here, as we shall see in due course.

In that lecture, Derrida reflected on the question of the animal inasmuch as "the animal" is *contra*-distinguished from "the human," the latter conceived *traditionally*—one might even say, conceived *dogmatically*, allowing for a measure of presumed solemnity consistent with what Nietzsche called "the prejudices of philosophers." The contradistinction/differentiation occurs in the Western philosophical tradition such that the human is conceived in Greek antiquity as a "living being capable of speech" (*zoon lógon echón*)—and thus, for Aristotle (*Politics*, Bk 1, 1253a29), distinguished from 'god' (*theos*) and 'beast' (*thirío*) in virtue of that essential trait; or, in what follows in the scholastic and modern period, conceived according to the concept of "rational animal" (*animal rationale*), whether in the Cartesian sense of "thinking thing" (*res cogitans*) or the later Kantian sense of "rational being" (*rationales Wesen/vernünftige Wesen*).

---

21 Online Etymology Dictionary (no date).

Derrida associates these conceptions with that of the human whom he denominates ‘the autobiographical animal’ (*l’animal autobiographique*), i.e., as one who “signs” or “signifies” *itself* (self-identifies, self-asserts, self-affirms, thus *writes its own meaning*, consistent with that *self-understanding*. The human does this by way of the concept, thus to disclose *what* or *who* the human *is*. It is the human who “says”: ‘*I am* a living being capable of speech’, or ‘*I am* a rational animal’, or ‘*I am* a rational being’, thus “signifying” *to* itself and *for* itself thereby *what* or *who* “the human”—*every* human whoever was, is, or will be—“is” *essentially*, i.e., in essence (*essentia*).

That word, ‘essentially’, is fully *indicative*.<sup>22</sup> That is, it *points* in the direction of a fundamental *presupposition* that remains implicit, un-disclosed, but which calls forth an explicit interrogation and formulation of a plausible meaning. How so? Derrida would likely say that these conceptualizations are what they are for having been transmitted—from a different “time” and “place” into the present—as “historico-metaphysical predeterminations.” That is, they have their provenance in a *historical* past, specifically in a past that establishes a *metaphysics* (thus not to limit this to only one metaphysics, but to allow for a plurality), and in that way (or ways) *pre-determining* a subsequent (what follows after, “*therefore*”) self-understanding that governs over thought, word, and deed. It is in this process of conceptualization, of privileging the concept *per se*, that this metaphysics seeks to move *in understanding* from propositions of *zoo*-logy (knowledge of the *zoon*, living being—not to say ‘animal’) to propositions of *anthropo*-logy (knowledge of the *anthropos*, human—not to say ‘man’ or ‘woman’), thus from the living being/animal that is “*not* human” (the “non-human” animal) to the living being/animal that *is* “human” (the “human” animal).

Notably, and importantly, Derrida does not use the word ‘determination’, in which case one must take care to attend to the nuance in the expression ‘*pre-determination*’. That word signifies that there has been an *attempt* at determination, but which attempt has left the human in the epistemological and ontological status of *not* being absolutely determined once and for all time, e.g., of not attaining a potentiality in an actuality such that “essence” and “existence” find their anticipated (teleological) unity. In this case, what is transmitted historically/metaphysically as a *pre-determination* is subject to ongoing contestation in reason, thus signaling an unsettled problem of legitimation (a) in the provenance of the concept and (b) in its subsequent historical/metaphysical formulations. Hence, the conceptualizations

22 To say ‘indicative’ here is to refer to Martin Heidegger’s use of ‘*Anzeige*’, anticipating what is “unsaid” in what is said, thus representing what is said as “as yet” undetermined, but *open* to determination.

‘*zoon lógon echón*’, ‘*animal rationale*’, ‘*rationales Wesen*’/‘*vernünftige Wesen*’ are, one and all, philosophical *pre*-determinations. As such, they yet present us with an unsettled problem of philosophical/metaphysical legitimation. That is, they are by no means to be taken as definitively governing in a determination of *who* or *what* “the human” is.

In the lecture referenced above, Derrida (2008, 3) recognizes this in his reminder of Nietzsche’s insight about the human: “...the man about whom Nietzsche said (I no longer remember where) something to the effect that it was an as yet undetermined animal, an animal lacking in itself.” The text Derrida has in mind is given in Nietzsche’s *Beyond Good and Evil*, Part III, Aphorism 62: “There is among men as in every other animal species an excess of failures, of the sick, degenerating, infirm, who suffer necessarily; the successful cases are, among men too, always the exception-and in view of the fact that man is the as yet undetermined animal, the rare exception” (Nietzsche, 1966, 74). Nietzsche, of course, bemoans the “almost voluntary degeneration and decay of a human being like the Christian European,” critical of “the painful comedy of European Christianity” inasmuch as its concern for “suffering” humanity would, if it could, “turn the human being into a *sublime monstrosity*.” For Nietzsche, the Christian European is all too presumptuous, presuming to know *what* the human *ought* to—thus *morally*) or *must* (thus *necessarily*)—*become*, i.e., presuming to know *how* this being is to be “determined” essentially. (That monstrosity, for Nietzsche, would be the human being *qua* “herd animal.”)

The point in citing Nietzsche is not to engage his perspective *per se*. Rather, it is to take into account the fact that Derrida points to Nietzsche’s critical insight to indicate this *as yet undetermined* human animal is undetermined *in its animality*, *in its rationality*, and *in the unity of the two*—assuming/presuming *there is* a possible unity and that one can *know* what that unity *means*, were the determination to be *actualized* beyond any and all pre-determinations. It is in this sense that Derrida (2008, 3) speaks of the human as “that animal at unease with itself”—an unease that has lasted since “time” immemorial, despite the prejudices of philosophers to assign a determinative “essence.”

Consider, further, Derrida’s reference to the creation narratives. As noted earlier, it may be said (despite “orthodox” objection) that: *The divine plurality, i.e., Elohim, is androgynous*, such that *adam (human) is itself created androgynous*—not “merely” male or “merely” female, but *in itself*, in its unity (as a unit) at once *both male and female*, *the first adam (human) therefore the originary andro(I)gyne*. Following Derrida, one may say: It was *then*, at *this* primordial “time,” that this unique, this singular, this originary *adam (human)* was *fully animal* (going



back to the concept of *zōon*, living being), without this *adam* knowing or declaring itself (self-identifying as) “animal”/“living being,” *if* by ‘animal’ one means (as Derrida (2008, 4-5) puts it) having that “property” that is unique to animals: “what in the last instance distinguished them from man, is their being naked without knowing it”—which is to say more precisely, “Not being naked therefore, not having knowledge of their nudity, in short, without consciousness of good and evil.”

This *adam qua* originary *andro(I)gyne* was “animal”/“living being” in that sense, having no knowledge of its nakedness and having no consciousness of either good or evil or the distinction of the two concepts. This *adam* neither needed nor sought to cover its nakedness, this nakedness a manifested unity in a plurality. And, having no consciousness of good and evil, it *could* not, *would* not, and *did* not conceive its own most proper duality-in-one as either good or evil. At this “time” (*without date*) there is no conceptualization, no *concept*, of “the good” or “the evil.” As originary *andro(I)gyne*, this singular *adam* thus *knows no shame* and *feels no shame* for being naked, for “naturally” manifesting its duality-in-one in and of itself, *as itself*. It would make no sense whatsoever, hence, to say that being *andro(I)gyne* is a condition *either good or evil*, or even a condition *neither good nor evil*. The *idea* of concept and *these concepts in particular* are not yet invented, not yet ascribed to either the “human” animal or the “non-human” animal.

In the same way, at no “time” (*without date*) would it be said that this originary *andro(I)gyne* is “rational” or a “rational animal” or a “rational being.” That “time” (*also without date*) and other times (*with date*) will come later, e.g., in the narrative of the Torah/Bible that both Jew and Christian appropriate as their authoritative scriptures, when it is said that Adam and Eve (thus “named” and “identified” in their differentiated, but partnered, dimorphic sexuality) both *see* themselves naked and *feel* themselves naked, thus becoming “ashamed” of their nakedness—‘shame’ here connoting a condition that is at least “not good,” even if neither Adam nor Eve says this condition of nakedness is something “evil.”

#### IV. A CASE IN POINT: THE PLIGHT OF THE “HIJRAS”

Adnan Hossain (2021, Summary) informs us that, “Hijras serve as the long-running, emblematic figure of South Asian sexual and gender difference. The publically institutionalized position of the hijras across South Asia is a testament to the continued existence of an alternative

subculture that survived criminalization and eradication at different points in colonial and postcolonial history.” To say they hold a publicly institutionalized position is, nonetheless, ambiguous; for, the reality, as Sapna Khatri (2017) reminds us, is that the *hijras* in many ways count as “the 21<sup>st</sup> century untouchables”—in the case of India, “India’s longest lasting social outcasts.” The *hijras* in India and elsewhere in South Asia all seek acceptance for the person “s/he” believes “her/him-self” to be, irrespective of how others perceive them. ‘*Hijra*’ is a term that refers to a group of persons that includes “collectively identifying eunuchs, castrated men, and transgender people” who “are exiled at a young age” and depreciated for their “difference from mainstream heterosexual normativity.” They represent themselves with a general tendency to transvestite practices (“biologically male” or indeed “hermaphrodite” in the pejorative sense, but for the most part “dressing as women”).

In India, they number around two million, most if not all living a “cult-like nomadic lifestyle” consequent to the fact that they “face social intolerance and are treated as outcastes” (Khatri, 2017, 390). The *hijra* is not to be characterized as transsexual in the sense used in the West’s medico-legal discourse, if by ‘transsexual’ one means “people who seek medical intervention to attain the correct embodiment” (Poe, 2011)—although many *hijras* are indeed castrated or surgically converted. Khatri (2017, 399) is careful to understand the term ‘*hijra*’ as “a cultural identifier” rather than as “a biological descriptor,” “hijrahood” having “various and repeated ritual and gender practices” for those who are part of “an institutionalized subculture of feminine-identified male-bodied people...”<sup>23</sup> Problematic, of course, is the fact that while *hijras* are recognized collectively as “a third sex”<sup>24</sup> (Kalra, 2011) in India and as “third gender” in Bangladesh, nonetheless Indian society generally (and wrongly) identifies a *hijra* as “a man that is less than a perfect man” and, basically, a eunuch (intersex) (Khatri, 2017, 399). Thus, the Indian *hijra* community’s desire for social tolerance and cessation of out-casting do not presuppose a correction of embodiment through surgical conversion. What they seek, quite simply, is to be permitted to be themselves; howsoever they may express their personhood, with whatever pronouns of choice. In this sense, the *hijra* represents Indian society’s *andro(I)gyne*, who do not express their behavior in the normative categories of binary sexuality.

Similar to those in India, *hijras* in Bangladesh face social intolerance and alienation, despite legal recognition (Knight, 2016). ‘*Hijra*’ is defined as “an identity category for people

---

23 Khatri citing Hossain (2012, 495).

24 It is to be noted the Indian Supreme Court recognized a “third gender” in a 2014 judgment (*NALSA v. Union of India*, 5 SCC 438, 2014)—see *Supreme Court Recognizes the Right to Determine and Express One’s Gender; Grant Legal Status to Third Gender*.

assigned male at birth who develop a feminine gender identity,” including here transvestite practices (biologically male, dressing as female); ‘intersex’ is defined as “a person with reproductive or sexual anatomy that does not fit the typical definitions of ‘female’ or ‘male’;” and ‘transgender’ is used for the “identity of people whose gender assigned at birth does not conform to their lived gender (the gender that they are most comfortable with expressing or would express given a choice.” Hence, the terms in use are various, readily confused despite legal effort at clarification and socio-anthropological (ethnographic) description.

Problematic in practice, however, is that government officials in Bangladesh have sought to identify “authentic *hijras*” often through demeaning (“as one *hijra* put it, “more humiliating than genuinely empowering”) medical examinations. Such examinations are undertaken to affirm the presence of ambiguous overt or covert genitalia, and to rule out those who are “really men,” hence the continued medico-legal superintendence of a *hijra*’s identity. Of course, the question of cause-effect in social behavior remains at issue. Thus, it is said (Knight, 2016, 5), “Since *hijras* face systematic discrimination and exclusion from society, their traditional means of survival transgress societal norms. As a result, their behavior is seen as ‘uncivil, illegitimate and/or politically unintelligible,’ which only reinforces their marginalization.” Even so, for example, one *hijra* interviewed for government-sponsored employment clarified that, despite the harassment and ignorance they have had to face, s/he and other *hijras* “don’t want to live with humiliation”—“I want to live with my head held high,” she adds (Knight, 2016, 17). It is this self-affirmation with personal dignity that certifies the *hijra*’s authentic sense of identity, whether biologically male, castrated, surgically converted, having ambiguous overt genitalia, or being transvestite in appearance. Each is *andro(I)gyne* in the philosophical sense advanced here, despite the constant insistence of others (government bureaucrats, medical personnel, lawyers, etc.) on a medico-legal validation of that identity.

Some *hijras* may express themselves in writing as a means of self-representation and self-affirmation, though others (sociologists, anthropologists) may “write” about them in the context of sociocultural studies. But, when such studies are read, one is reminded of Derrida’s commentary on Plato’s *Phaedrus*, in his “Plato’s Pharmakon.” Derrida is concerned with whether the *andro(I)gyne* should “write” their *auto-bio-graph-y*: Is one to say that—like the king in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, who is offered the art of writing—the *andro(I)gyne* should refuse, for having no need of writing, thereby retaining and preserving a “sovereign independence” of the *andro(I)gyne* memory (as Derrida might say). Others may write—others such as the *anthropo*-logist, the *ethno*-grapher, the *socio*-logist, the *psycho*-logist, the *medico-legal*

“expert,” etc. Perhaps, each of the foregoing, according to his/her “scientific” method, in their writing, *subverts* that which would be the *hijra’s auto-bio-graph-y*, since the latter is *never truly written, never truly authentic*, but only *re-presented, displaced, even supplanted*, in the ostensibly “objective” knowledge about the *andro(I)gyne* as “subject” of analysis, diagnosis, therapeutics, and sociopolitical-medico-legal disposition.

In short, as Derrida might say, we have a *subversive displacement* of the *andro(I)gyne* in all such writing. Lind’s “autobiography,” we may say, following Derrida, represented “a deployment of living memory, of memory as psychic life in its self-presentation to itself.” Note the statement here: self-presentation *to itself*—which is entirely distinct from the representation to others that the anthropologist, sociologist, psychologist, medico-legal expert, etc., transmits in this or that study or official report. The autobiography, as given by Lind, one might say, is “symptomatic”—it points to a psychic dis-ease (*not* disease), i.e., a dis-ease of the *psyché* that, despite that dis-ease, seeks expression (a pressing outward) in writing because what is given in this writing is an overflow of what the *psyché* cannot, *will not*, contain; for, it is a manifest rebellion against a socially sanctioned suppression and repression of the *andro(I)gyne’s* own most proper (authentic) manner of being.

Through such an autobiography, the *andro(I)gyne* such as Lind declares “him/herself” *to be*, seeks to disclose this androgyny in a writing of “memory” (thus his/her multiyear “diary”). This contrasts, by way of its authenticity of expression, to the writing of the *anthropo-ethnographer* who *re-presents* the *andro(I)gyne* in a quasi-scientific discourse, such that, were the *andro(I)gyne* to “read” this representation s/he *might*, but also *might not*, “know” (recognize) them(selves) in that writing. They *might not* because the *andro(I)gyne’s* self-disclosure is by no means ever the equivalent of the scientific re-presentation. Consider, e.g., Kanta Galani’s (2018) review of A. Revathi’s “The Truth About Me: A Hijra Life Story.” Galani identifies “the intention of the author” quite simply to be “to make this heteronormative society [of India] aware of the fact that the Hijras are also human...” And there, quite simply yet profoundly, this *hijra* speaks for the *andro(I)gyne* to assert what is essential for one and all who affirm their identity thus: *each is authentically a human being*, despite their lack of conformity to the binary heteronormativity of contemporary Indian society.

“As a Hijra,” Revathi writes, “I get pushed to the fringes of society. Yet I have dared to share my innermost life with you—about being hijra and also doing sex work [...] My aim is to introduce to the readers the lives of Hijras, their distinct culture, and their dreams and desires [...] I seek to show that we hijras do have the rights to live in this society” (Galani,

2018, 76). Revathi speaks of “I” here; but, as Galani (2016, 76) reminds, “one gets perplexed when it comes to the choice of pronouns...because in the binary system of language there is no pronoun as such to cater to the need of the so-called third gender or the transgender. This absence of pronoun signifies the fact that the transgender has only an epistemological existence without ontological existence. And this absence of ontological existence is one of the main reasons of their being ostracized and colonized by the heteronormative society.”

Galani points to what is problematic philosophically as the epistemological and ontological are engaged ambiguously, indeterminately, in the *andro(I)gyne*'s self-representation. Revathi was born biologically male, engaged in transvestite practices, while also feeling “a deep unease of belonging to a wrong body.” Which is correct in saying “I”—“I” as “he”? “I” as “she”? *Truly*, who am “I”? Doraiswamy could not but think: “A woman trapped in a man’s body was how I thought of myself. I wondered why God had chosen to inflict this particular torture on me, and why He could not have created me wholly male or wholly female. Why am I a flawed human being, I wondered often and all the time I was obsessed, confused and anxious” (Galani, 2018, 77). Having chosen surgical conversion for correct embodiment, of course, Revathi did not thereby abandon heteronormativity. As Galani (2018, 77) reminds,

This emphasis on the gender-specific dressing pattern suggests how subtly through the binary sense of dressing pattern the heteronormative society actually creates a hegemonic discourse to strengthen its colonizing process over the marginalized third gender community. The third gender as such does not have any specific set of dressing pattern. So during the initial years of his/her (?) life, the transgender people cannot help but oscillate between the male and female dressing pattern and thereby unavoidably conforms themselves within either of the two socially approved gender category. And it is this forceful unavoidable submission of the third gender to the ‘grand narrative’ of heteronormative dress code which speaks volumes about their colonized state.

So, the ontological and epistemological are clearly in play in an indeterminate discourse about and/or by the *andro(I)gyne*, a person who seeks *self*-determination rather than a *heteronomous* superintendence within the given society. In “her” case, Revathi made “her” choice—surgical conversion for a correct embodiment, thus a change from the male birth name ‘Doraiswamy’ to the female name ‘Revathi’—a new identity within the *hijra* community of Delhi. But Ravathi’s *auto-bio-graph-y* presents us with a “travelogue of travails,” of abuse that

followed that conversion, an unwelcome return to her home town of Tamil Nadu, then again a move to Bangalore as Revathi sought respite and refuge from her marginalized and otherwise dominated existence, her self-determination rejected, depreciated, and undermined by the class and caste strictures of Indian society. Most problematic, as Galani correctly identifies the issue for all *hijras*, there is within the *hijra* community itself an onset of “heteronormative gender colonization,” as the hierarchy within this group compels members to a mode of dress that “signifies a homogeneous gender identity” (normatively female). Thus, the quest for true *andro(I)gyny* remains confounded consequent to this hierarchy at the margins of heteronormative South Asian society.

## CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

Most predispositions to the social construction of sexual identity have their origin in religious doctrines, as noted earlier in reference to *Bereshith/Genesis*, the first book of the Torah/Bible. The relation of Elohim to *adam* remained indeterminate until rabbinic tradition insisted on binary sexuality as divinely mandated, consistent with the creation narrative. However, as Jennifer J. Williams (2016) opined, “Nascent creation presents androgyny as the human ideal. Wholeness and perfection of creation can be found in the androgyne: the sexually undifferentiated first human and the androgynous creator God.”<sup>25</sup> This opinion is quite clearly heterodox yet grounded in an interpretation of the transmitted text. While once an acceptable position within early Jewish tradition, this opinion changed in view of the second narrative of creation. “The human needs an *‘ezer kĕnegdô*, a helpmate or compatible partner,” Williams (2016) reminded, in which case binary sexuality was to be understood as naturally normative (despite the fallacy of deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is’). Yet, Williams (2016) added, “Jewish tradition also holds that wholeness of the original human was represented in both sexes together. R. Jeremiah b. Leazar calls Adam a hermaphrodite/androgyne, and R. Samuel b. Nachman argues that Adam has two faces or backs... (Gen. Ran. 8:1; see also Lev. Rab. 14:1)”—thus a duality-in-one.

Such a view should not be surprising to those who are persuaded by orthodoxy in belief and practice. After all, as Charles Kassel (no date) observes, “It has been the teaching of the rarer mystics through the centuries that man not only, but Deity as well, is two-sexed—the

---

25 See Gudbergson (2012), Reisenberger (1993), Tribble (1973), Wojciechowska (2015), Rothenberg (2019).

Fount and Source of all life combining within Himself the masculine and feminine. As an outflowing of this thought was the belief that man—the image of his Divine Parent—was, likewise, in the pristine beauty and purity of his nature, male and female blended together.” Significantly, Kassel (no date) writes, “It is well, perhaps, to observe before aught more is said that the androgynous or bi-sexual whose existence upon the planet in the shadowy ages before recorded time, the mystics teach, was a being wholly other than the hermaphrodite as known to medical science, nor it is the latter term used with the meaning given it by physicians...”

Thus, across cultures East and West, over centuries of discourse on sexual identity and essentialist assumptions about human nature, societies have been faced with the unique phenomenon of the *andro(I)gyne* who remains more or less indeterminate in self-affirmation consequent to sundry modes of systematic exclusion and domination. The philosophical *problematique*, however, is what it is consequent to the ontological and epistemological commitments that refuse to abandon traditional categories privileging the hetero-normativity of “binary sexuality” or “sexual dimorphism.” Consider philosopher Beatriz Preciado’s entirely salient question to her interviewer:

“BP: La sociedad propone unos precipitados de identidad, cada individuo asume uno...y acabas pensando que eso eres tú. Y no.”

“*La Vanguardia*: ¿No? Entonces..., ¿qué soy so?”

“BP: Es una pregunta ociosa y viciosa: pregúntate mejor qué procesos te han llevado a pensar ‘yo so esto.’”

Notice Preciado’s point: Society proposes categories of identity; every individual assumes one; and one finishes thinking *that is what one is*. But, that is not so. Why not? Preciado rejects the legitimacy of the question ‘what am I?’. It is, she says, a hateful and vicious question. Instead, one should better ask what processes have brought one to *think* ‘I am this.’ Asking *that* question moves us along a different path having a long history of ontological and epistemological commitments inextricably linked to religious doctrine or the natural attitude that believes it has apprehended what is essential to human nature and may, therefore, assert its normativity.

Neither religious doctrine nor the natural attitude follows from a principle of necessity. In thinking about the unitary person-body of the *andro(I)gyne* it behooves us to recall philosopher Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological distinction between body as *Körper* and body as *Leib*. As James Aho and Kevin Aho (2008, 1) put it, “*Körper* is a reference to the corporeal body;” whereas “*Leib* concerns how we experience this physical matter in our everyday lives [...] *Leib* is my body in particular, my life here and now, what I am as a volitional, sensing person [...]

*Leib* is the way we typically 'body forth' (*leiben*) into the world, how we comport ourselves for the most part given our history and culture." Said otherwise, "The lived body is a how, not a what. It is a way or a manner by which we concretely engage a particular historical situation" (Aho and Aho, 2008, 33). Thus, as a corrective to the quest for "correct embodiment" with its tendency to a medico-legal judgment that leads to surgical conversion, we can say, the *auto-bio-graph-y* of the *andro(I)gyne* refers more to the sense of *Leib* rather than to *Körper*, in which case the medico-legal focus on the physical body, as well as the psychoanalyst's diagnosis of psychoses or neuroses of the human *psyché*, are inadequate to the proper engagement of the *andro(I)gyne* as person.

Rather, each person lives a "hermeneutic situation" of self-understanding grounded in self-discovery (captured by the German word, *Befindlichkeit*) in a "world" the significance/meaning of which is manifest in being-with-others in sociocultural/sociopolitical engagements. A person who is described by others as transgender is not, in "their" self-understanding, whatever the medico-legal/psychological "diagnosis" customarily describes. On the contrary, inasmuch as every individual seeks to "grasp its [own most proper] meaningfulness" (Aho and Ahho, 2008, 122), it is not the body as *Körper* that matters vis-à-vis this or that bio-sexual of social function. What matters is the way the person interprets the meaningfulness of "his/her/their" lived experience, in the sense of the lived body that is always significant as *Leib*.

Hence, the self-understanding of one who is "transgender" in New York, London, or Paris is by no means to be identified as "the same" as that of one who is *hijra* in India, Bangladesh, or elsewhere in South Asia. The hermeneutic situation of each, his/her/their meaningful *Leib* is different, such that it is a mistake to generalize or assume a transferable normativity from one situation to the other. Hence, it is a mistake to seek to "categorize" the person as "abnormal" or "ill" or "diseased" with reference to medico-legal "norms" of body-phenotype and personhood linked to sexual dimorphism—what Aho and Aho (2008, 133) term "the medicalization of existence." Importantly, the *auto-bio-graph-y* of the authentic *andro(I)gyne* always will aspire to an authentic self-disclosure that thereby dismisses the depreciating and stigmatizing gaze of this or that anonymous Other who either cannot or will not perceive and accept the *normality* and *self-affirmation* of this person *qua* person, i.e., this person's *Leib* irrespective of the person's presentation of *Körper* as described medico-legally.

Consider thus Kara Leung's (2008) reference to Sandy Stone's "The 'Empire' Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto" (1994), as she writes:



Stone, in the fashion of queer theorists, condemns transsexuals [who] choose to become ‘invisible’ and who continue to ‘pass,’ as if the burden of dismantling the heteronormative gender framework is to fall naturally upon transsexuals. To Stone, invisible transsexuals are seen as passive subjects who work to continue the continued dominance of the patriarchal society. She assumes that transsexuals who [remain] invisible or pass do so by choice, not considering the ramifications of class and race, and how they might dictate the choices that one makes. She does not take into account who is able to have the freedom to be a visible transsexual. A white male-to-female transsexual (like Stone) has more freedom to pursue the posttranssexual manifesto, than an Asian from male-to-female transsexual (like myself), who must take into account how she would affect the face of her entire family if she chose to be a visible transsexual.

Stone’s commentary is an indictment of the tendency to generalization and the insistence on a kind of (oxymoronic) “scientific normativity” that is found in medicine, genetics, endocrinology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and law. Each discipline interrogates “the transsexual” as a phenomenon whom they encounter initially as indeterminate “*andro(I)gyne*.” For many employing the methods of these disciplines, the *andro(I)gyne* should be given a determinate identity “he/she/they” lack, but which “society” (which is presumed to know better) can at once determine and enforce. But, we must understand that these disciplines would do so wholly problematically, consequent to their focus on matters of biology, on the body as *Körper*, all the while forgetful of the body as *Leib*, forgetful that the *andro(I)gyne*’s lived experience is always intentional, having its ownmost significance, lived meaning that entails for the self-affirming *andro(I)gyne/hijra* what this person alone can disclose: “who ‘I’ am.” That is, this ‘who’ is disclosed as “authentically” *andro(I)gyne/hijra* and not what sociocultural heteronormativity imposes contrary to due justice, thus, as Derrida would say, without right (*droit*).

## REFERENCES

- Aho, James and Kevin Aho. *Body Matters: A Phenomenology of Sickness, Disease, and Illness*. Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2008.
- Amela, Victor M. 2008. “Entrevista con Beatriz Preciado, filósofa, transgénero y pansexual,” *La Vanguardia* (01 April 2008), [https://www.sigla.org.ar/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=302:preciado&catid=88&Itemid=111](https://www.sigla.org.ar/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=302:preciado&catid=88&Itemid=111), accessed 03 January 2022.
- Anderson, Susan. “Mirrors and Fears: Humans in the Bestiary,” MA Thesis, Arizona State University, [https://keep.lib.asu.edu/\\_flysystem/fedora/c7/114088/Anderson\\_asu\\_0010N\\_13956.pdf](https://keep.lib.asu.edu/_flysystem/fedora/c7/114088/Anderson_asu_0010N_13956.pdf), 2014, accessed 29 December 2021.

- Anfinsen, Roar. "Nature and the Political Ideal of Aristotle" "*La naturaleza y el ideal político de Aristóteles*," *Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía*. Suplemento 20, 2015, 145-161, <https://revistas.uma.es/index.php/contrastes/article/download/2421/2232/>, accessed 21 December 2021.
- Barrow, Craig and Diana Barrow. "'The Left Hand of Darkness': Feminism for Men," *Mosaic: An Interdisciplinary Critical Journal*, 20.1, 1987, 83-96, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23777705>, accessed 13 December 2021.
- Bazin, N.T. and A. Freeman. "The Androgynous Vision," *Women's Studies*, 2:2, 1974, 185-215, online 15 July 2010, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00497878.1974.9978350>, accessed 10 December 2021.
- Brisson, Luc. *Sexual Ambivalence: Androgyny and Hermaphroditism in Graeco-Roman Antiquity*, trans. Janet Lloyd. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002; published as Brisson, Luc. *Le sexe incertain: androgynie et hermaphroditisme dans l'Antiquité gréco-romaine*. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1997.
- Carpenter, Edward. *The Intermediate Sex: A Study of the Transitional Types of Men and Women*. Frankfurt am Main: Outlook Verlag GmbH, 2018; first published in London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1908.
- Cohen, Rabbi Alfred. "Tumtum and Androgynous," *Journal of Halacha & Contemporary Society*, 1999, 38.
- Cooper Kate, Ailsa Russell, William Mandy, Catherine Butler. "The phenomenology of gender dysphoria in adults: A systematic review and meta-synthesis," *Clinical Psychology Review*, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2020.101875>, accessed 05 January 2022.
- de Beauvoir, Simone. *The Second Sex*. New York: Vintage Books, 1973.
- Derrida, Jacques. *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans David Wills. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008.
- Derrida, Jacques. "But as for me, who am I," *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, ed. M-L. Mallet, trans. D. Wells. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008.
- Dover, K. J. "Aristophanes's Speech in Plato's Symposium," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 86, 1966, 41-50, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/628991>, accessed 12 December 2021).
- Dreger, Alice D. and April M. Herndon,. "Progress and Politics in the Intersex Rights Movement: Feminist Theory in Action," *GLQ*, 15.2, 2009, 199-224.
- Ferguson, Ann. "Androgyny as an Ideal for Human Development," in Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick Elliston, and Jane English, ed. *Feminism and Philosophy*. New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams, and Co., 1977, 45-69.
- Friedan, Betty. *The Feminine Mystique*. W.W. Norton, 1963.
- Galani, Kanta. "Being Hijra: A Stigma A Perusal to A. Revathi: The Truth About Me (A Hijra Life Story)," *IMPACT: International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts, and Literature*, 6:11 (November 2018), 75-80.
- Gross, Rita M. "Androcentrism and Androgyny in the Methodology of History of Religions," in Rita Gross, A *Garland of Feminist Reflections: Forty Years of Religious Exploration*, 2009, California Scholarship Online, May 2012, <https://doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520255852.001.0001>, accessed 10 December 2021.
- Gudbergson, Thomas. "God Consists of Both the Male and the Female Genders: A Short Note on Gen. 1:27," *Vetus Testamentum*, 62.3, 2012, 450-453.
- Hargreaves, Tracy. *Androgyny in Modern Literature*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Hossain, Adnan. "Conclusion: Shifting Meaning and the Future of Hijras," in *Beyond Emasculation: Pleasure and Power in the Making of Hijra in Bangladesh*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, 205-209, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/beyond-emasculation/conclusion-shifting-meaning-and-the->

- future-of-hijras/9344921F5174A5D676E882A94F06C475, accessed 28 December 2021.
- Hossain, Adnan. "Beyond Emasculation: Being Muslim and Becoming Hijra in South Asia," *Asian Studies Review*, 36.4, 2012, 495.
- Idel, Moshe. "Mircea Eliade: Androgyne, Totality, and Reintegration," in Gideon Bohak, Ron Margolin, and Ishay Rosen-Zvi, ed. *Myth, Ritual and Mysticism: Studies in Honor of Professor Ithamar Gruenwald*. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2014.
- Kalra, Gurvinder. "Hijras: The Unique Transgender Culture of India," *International Journal of Culture & Mental Health*, 5.2, 2011, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17542863.2011.570915>.
- Kassel, Charles. No date. "Androgynous Man in Myth and Tradition," [https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=20&q=Genesis+Adam+androgyne&hl=en&as\\_sdt=0,5&httpsredir=1&article=1794&context=ocj](https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=20&q=Genesis+Adam+androgyne&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&httpsredir=1&article=1794&context=ocj), accessed 12 December 2021.
- Keppnes, Steven. "Adam/Eve: From Rabbinic to Scriptural Anthropology," *Journal of Scriptural Reasoning*, 4.2, 2004, <https://jsr.shanti.virginia.edu/back-issues/vol-4-no-2-october-2004-the-image-of-god/adameve-from-rabbinic-to-scriptural-anthropology/>, accessed 12 December 2021),
- Khatri, Sapna. "Hijras: The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Untouchables," *Washington University Global Studies Law Review*, 16.2, 2017, 387-410, [https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law\\_globalstudies/vol16/iss2/10](https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss2/10), accessed 10 October 2022.
- Knight, Kyle. "I Want to Live With My Head Held High: Abuses in Bangladesh's Legal Recognition of Hijras" *Human Rights Watch*, 2016, [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report\\_pdf/bangladesh1216\\_web.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/bangladesh1216_web.pdf), accessed 10 October 2022.
- LeGuin, Ursula K. *Dancing at the Edge of the World: Thoughts on Words, Women, Places*. New York: Grove Press, 1989.
- LeGuin, Ursula K. "Is Gender Necessary?" *The Language of the Night: Essays on Fantasy and Science Fiction*, ed. Susan Wood. New York: Perigee Books, 1979.
- LeGuin, Ursula K. *The Left Hand of Darkness*. Penguin Books, 1969/2016.
- Leung, Kara. "Phenomenological and essentialist approaches to trans studies" (15 April 2008), <https://everything2.com/title/Phenomenological+and+essentialist+approaches+in+trans+studies>, accessed 11 January 2022.
- Lind, Earl. *Autobiography of an Androgyne*, ed. Alfred W. Herzog. New York: *The Medico-Legal Journal*, 1919, [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Autobiography\\_of\\_an\\_Androgyne](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Autobiography_of_an_Androgyne) accessed 16 December 2021.
- Maimonides, Moses. *Mishneh Torah: Hilchot Ishut The Laws of Marriage*, trans. Rabbi Eliyahu Touger. New York/Jerusalem: Moznaim Publishing, 1994.
- Michaud, Jon. "A Safe Trip into Androgyny," *The New Yorker* (21 July 2009), <https://www.newyorker.com/books/book-club/a-safe-trip-into-androgyny>, accessed 13 December 2021.
- Morgan, Kathryn Pauly. "Androgyny: A Conceptual Critique," *Social Theory and Practice*, 8.3, 1982, 245-283, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23556551>, accessed 10 December 2021.
- Morgan, Kathryn Pauly. "Modern Biology, Sexuality, and Human Nature," *Der 16. Weltkongress für Philosophie*, 2, Sektions-Vorträge I—Résumés des sections I, 1983, 898-904, <https://doi.org/10.5840/wcp1619832272>, accessed 10 December 2021.
- NALSA v. Union of India*, 5 SCC 438, 2014—*Supreme Court Recognizes the Right to Determine and Express One's Gender; Grant Legal Status to Third Gender*, Lawyers Collective, <http://www.lawyerscollective.org/updates/>

- supreme-court-recognises-the-right-to-determine-and-express-ones-gender-grants-legal-status-to-third-gender.html.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.
- Online Etymology Dictionary, "therefore (adv.)," <https://www.etymonline.com/word/therefore>, accessed 06 September 2022.
- Poe, Danielle. "Can Luce Irigaray's Notion of Sexual Difference Be Applied to Transsexual and Transgender Narratives?" *Philosophy Faculty Publications*, Paper 13, 2011, [http://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl\\_fac\\_pub/13](http://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl_fac_pub/13), accessed 26 December 2021.
- Reisenberger, Azila Talit. "The Creation of Adam as Hermaphrodite—and Its Implications for Feminist Theology," *Judaism*, 42.4, 1993, 447-452.
- Rich, Adrienne. *Diving Into the Wreck: Poems 1971-72*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1973.
- Rothenberg, Naftali. "Chapter Three: In the Midrash; Androgynous Adam," in *The Wisdom of Love*. Academic Studies Press, 2009, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781618110985-006>, accessed 11 October 2022.
- Rubin, Henry S. "Phenomenology as Method in Trans Studies," *GLQ*, 4.2, 1998, 263-281, <https://doi.org/10.1215/10642684-4-2-263>, accessed 11 January 2022.
- Rumer, Anna. "Demi Lovato Comes Out as Non-Binary, Announces Pronoun Change," *Popculture* (19 May 2021), <https://popculture.com/celebrity/news/demi-lovato-comes-out-non-binary-announces-pronoun-change/>, accessed 28 December 2021.
- Salamon, Gayle. "Phenomenology," *Transgender Studies Quarterly*, 1.1-2, 2014, 153-155, <https://doi.org/10.1215/23289252-2399884>, accessed 11 January 2022.
- Santos, Ana Lúcia. "Beyond Binarism? Intersex as an Epistemological and Political Challenge," *RCCS Annual Review (Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais)*, 6, 2014, 123-140, trans. Karen Bennett, <http://journals.openedition.org/rccsar/558>, accessed 02 January 2022.
- Sherman, Joseph. "What's Jews? Isaac Bashevis Singer's *Androgyne*," *Prooftexts*, 14.2, 1994, 167-188, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20689390>, accessed 21 December 2021.
- Trebilcot, Joyce. "Two Forms of Androgynism," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 8, 1977.
- Tribble, Phyllis. "Eve and Adam: Genesis 2-3 Reread," *Andover Newton Quarterly*, 13.4, 1973, 251-258.
- Williams, Jennifer J. "Androgyny/hermaphroditism: Hebrew Bible," *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Gender Studies: Oxford Biblical Studies Online*, ed. Julia M. O'Brien. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, <http://www.oxfordbiblicalstudies.com/article/opr/t998/e21>, [https://digitalcommons.linfield.edu/relsfac\\_pubs/4](https://digitalcommons.linfield.edu/relsfac_pubs/4), accessed 12 December 2021.
- Wojciechowska, Kalina. "The First Human and the Perfect Human As an Androgynous Character," Presentation at Queer Ways of Theology International Conference, Austrian Cultural Centre, Warsaw, 2015, 27-41.