

# WHY THE GLOBAL SPATIAL OPPOSITION AGAINST “WESTERN” SOCIAL SCIENCES IS NOT AN OPPOSITION, BUT A VARIATION OF WHAT IT BELIEVES TO OPPOSE

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## I. SPACE AND KNOWLEDGE

Stating that any knowledge is created by a thinker *somewhere* and that any object of thinking is *somewhere* would be banal. If the *where* of theorizing was not *the contemporary epistemological* concern in global social science theorizing, it would be a childish banality to mention this: There are phenomena which are here but not there. Any thinker from here or there reflects about the phenomenon, presents the theory the thinker created and shares this with other thinkers from here and there. End of story.<sup>1</sup>

## II. SPATIOLOGICAL THEORIZING

In the modern globalised version of the social sciences the *where* of thinking is not at all banal, but the object, the resource and the driving force of social thought.

..the proposition that thought is related to places is central to my project provincializing Europe.<sup>2</sup>

In the modern, postcolonial globalised social science approach to social thought *where*

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  - 2 D. Chakrabarty. *Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000) xiii.

one thinks decides about *what* one thinks and therefore global thought under the regime of social sciences knows above all a distinction between spaces of knowledge, namely the one between inter-national and national and many other dichotomic couples of knowledge spaces.

In the postcolonial social science thinking, the banality, the where, is not just the spatial aspect of the object of any thinking as it is time, but is considered as a cognitive force creating thought that affects the contents of thought, and, thus, decides what we think about any phenomenon. Space, the where of things and the where of the thinker, politically constructed spaces of the social, more simply, nation states, have been transformed into cognitive actors through which social thought voices the thought of places, of nation states socials.

In contemporary global social thought under the approach of postcolonial social science thinking the “where” of the objects of thinking and the where of the thinking subject craft thought<sup>3</sup> and constitute the uniqueness of spatially constructed objects of thinking, a theoretical perspective, and a spatially constructed way of thinking, through which a spatially distinguished multiplicity of unique thought about a spatially unique socials is created.

To ‘provincialize’ Europe was precisely to find out how and in what sense European ideas that were universal were also, at one and the same time, drawn from very particular intellectual and historical traditions that could not claim any universal validity. It was to ask the question about how thought was related to place. Can thought transcend places of their origin? Or do places leave their imprint on thought in such ways as to call into question the idea of purely abstract categories?<sup>4</sup>

Discussing the most abstract category such as “*to ask the question about how thought was related to place*”, is a question that, though it may not claim any universal validity, one might feel invited to ask the question, to which place, raising such an abstract questions, is “related” to. A question aiming at questioning if thought can be unaffected by place, if “*places leave their imprint on thought*”, is indeed a question that obviously is no question, but a determined answer, and this answer is: No. Raising questions that start from an answer will certainly find

3 While it is the cognitive challenge in scientific thinking to eliminate factors that mislead thinking towards any given biased thought, the postcolonial social science approach to thinking considers any thinking as the necessarily “biased” creation of thought and does though not terminate thinking that is not able to create any objective thought, but insists on objectivity of thought by disclosing the cognitive factors creating the biases of theorizing.

4 D. Chakrabarty, “Pronvincialising...”, op. cit., xiii.

answers, confirming the answer such questions seek to answer. Which place should one ask this pseudo question, to be told by the place that it is place that “imprints” us their answers on our questions?

It must be an irony of social science thinking, that people working throughout their life to creating thought about the social reality, are obsessed by the idea, that social thought must be an impact of the reality on humans mind, “transcending” their thought to the thinkers. Since thinking “transcends” nothing but non-knowing by gaining insights the reality does not disclose and since not even where anything is told us by any place, since even such mere observations must be found out by thinking, it might be wise not trust that the mystic cognitive forces of the place, transcending thought about the relation between place and thought to this postcolonial thinker, but to trust the cognitive forces of human mind and to think about what this thinker has heard from a “where” about how the “where” is related to thinking.

### III. WHAT SPACE KNOWS: “LIKE IT/DON’T LIKE IT?”

So, what are the insights places disclose to thinkers advocating place as a source of thought?

Until I arrived in Australia, I had never seriously entertained the implications of the fact that an abstract and universal idea characteristic of political modernity everywhere – the idea of equality, say, or of democracy or even of the dignity of human being – could look utterly different in different historical contexts. Australia, like India, is a thriving electoral democracy, but Election Day there does not have anything of the atmosphere of festivity that I was used to it in India.<sup>5</sup>

It is always the same one and only argumentative game social science thinking is playing, presenting their theories about the world as a theory voiced by the reality, here named place. The place is saying nothing - and the observations about let’s say, as in this case, “democracy”, is what the social science thinker observes about democracy in India and Australia.

Strictly speaking, stating that “*Election Day there does not have anything of the atmosphere of festivity that I was used to it in India*”, does not even say anything what a scientific thinkers

5 Ibid, xii.

thinks about the difference of the enthusiasm or the routine practicing elections, he only observes, not to mention what elections are. Distinguishing between the ways people in India and Australia see and practice elections in the first place wants to post the message, that without any argument neither about elections and nor about the relations electing people have to elections, that what elections *are* must be different between India and Australia, just because electing people *see* them differently. A remarkable concept of science: Theories about anything<sup>13</sup> are reporting the appreciations of people. Spatiological theorizing as the facebook way of judging, “like it, don’t like it”?

Hence, so the conclusion of the social science thinkers, theories about elections in India and Australia, like any “*abstract and universal ideas*” must fail, because the electing people practice elections with a different view on elections. If this was the case, that is how people see election decides about what elections are, how then does Chakrabarty know, that both things are though the same abstract thing, elections, and not something entirely different, divers things? Like any social sciences do, Chakrabarty only plays with pointing on the reality as a point of reference to prove what his *theory* about the reality is, to make his theory about elections in India taken as being voiced by the reality, and thus, undisputably the Indian view on elections and this is, elections in India are that people like them. It is the pretentiously interpreted reality spatiological thinkers cite as a witness for the objectivity of what only they think about the objects of thought, the prove for the indisputable, objective knowledge voiced via the thinker by the reality, ironically while proving the necessity of a relativism of thought dependent on the space where thought are created.

What is indisputably proved for Chakrabarty, is that place disproves the theory of “*an abstract and universal idea characteristic of political modernity everywhere*”, of a very abstract idea, here elections, an abstract idea he though argues with by saying that they, the abstract ideas, “*look utterly different in different historical contexts*”. Yes, they may look different, but an observation of a difference in the way something is looking does *argue* with something that is essentially the same, very “*abstract and universal ideas*”, elections, which have different ways of practising an abstract same thing in different ways, otherwise he could not compare them as variations of the same elections.

Hence, place tells nothing and what the spatiological thinkers wants to say about place and about elections. Neither does the difference between places prove his theory about place as being voiced by the difference of places, nor do elections tell him anything about how to see them. What is however clear is, that he wants to present his false thought about place as

a cognitive agent as a necessity of thinking, ironically about any place. This is as false as his example, that how seeing elections in India or elsewhere is a view voiced by India. And what is also clear is that he wants to critique the “European” social sciences for seeing their theories as theories that are not only true for Europe, since theories must be everywhere only thought representing views of spaces, less abstractly phrased, views nation states are voicing. To put it in other words. For spatiological thinking, theories are views of places, ever easily identified with nation states, articulating “provincial” thought.

Before looking at what this theory about spatiological thinking is aiming at with is false theory about the relation of place and social thought, I want to prove that the European social sciences are falsely accused to not think spatiologically. They do, their fault for spatiological thinking is to insist that they are scientific knowledge.

## IV. THE “WESTERN” SOCIAL SCIENCES AND SPACE

Accusing the “Western” social sciences for ignoring space as a dimension of theorizing is a very pretentious misunderstanding of the theories created in the West. The fact that, despite of the proclaimed scepticism of social science theories, these theories insist on being – however relativated - scientific knowledge, the advocates of spatiological thinking critique them for insisting being scientific knowledge, when opposing their claim being universal knowledge. Just as Chakrabarty claims for his theory about space that this is knowledge and thus universal knowledge, the theories created in the West, insist on being universal knowledge, which is nothing more and less but saying that their theories are universal theories, theories that can be shared or not by anybody anywhere, just as the advocates of spatiological thinking do, what else, when they argue (sic) for spatiological thinking as an epistemological necessity. And this knowledge created in the “West” is indeed as very spatiologically constructed as the opposition from the spatilological theories claims it should be, if they suggest to provincialise European theories. Just to illustrate this, briefly a few spatiological features of social science theories, created in the accused “West”, should be mentioned:

### B1) Social science thinking is thinking about confined nation state socials

Social sciences thinking presupposes that any social phenomenon could be understood as a nationally confined phenomenon and theorizes about the social as national constructs. To do

this, social sciences above all off-think the world, that is off-think how any social phenomena are made by the world of nation states. Certainly nowhere else thinking in nationally confined units of analysis could be better shown but in how social sciences think internationally, when the compare the country studies, never knowing against which *tertium comparationis* this could be compared.

This item response theory methodology is first applied to assess the differences in happiness across selected European states.<sup>6</sup>

Admittedly, theorizing about the happiness of people is certainly also a quite odd topic for social sciences and has the strong taste of EU-propaganda, comparing happiness across European nation states, nation states, which day by day boast with their policies to deteriorate the life quality of Europeans with ever creative policy agendas making Europe an attractive global business location.

However, it is not the odd topic and the obvious propaganda of this study, but its most typical way of thinking, may this be about the happiness of European humans. It is in fact very typical for social science thinking that the "*happiness across selected European states*" must be a matter of comparing nationally constructed humans and the differences of their happiness a matter of nationally constructed data, "indicating" how they feel as nationals, as citizens of each country. Thinking about national socials by off-thinking any other national socials while theorizing about a group of national social strongly politically and economically bound to each other, is a masterpiece of social science thinking, a masterpiece of ignorance, off-thinking the relations between nation state socials while comparing them, as a method of theorizing.

## B2) Social sciences think about the secluded nation socials through the idealized rationale of nation states

Adorno's reflections about what he circumscribes as "*Auschwitz*" might be an example for a discrete way to theoretically appropriate the individual state science rationales in social science thinking, presented as an issue of a nationally social, secluded from the world's social, and most critically opposing nation state practices with an ideal mission of a nation state:

<sup>6</sup> Rynko, Maja. "On the Measurement of Welfare, Happiness and Inequality", European University Institut, <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/20694>

Die Forderung, daß Auschwitz nicht noch einmal sei, ist die allererste an Erziehung. Sie geht so sehr jeglicher anderen voran, daß ich weder glaube, sie begründen zu müssen noch zu sollen.<sup>7</sup>

Making Auschwitz a matter of education, and making this so determined a matter of education, that any reasoning, why Auschwitz must be seen as a matter of education, would violate the high moral mission education is attributed by this thinker; making Auschwitz a matter of education, does, however, only not need to be "motivated" only for a mind, that considers Ausschwitz as a matter of the – failed - morality of people, the moral responsibility and the moral failure of badly educated Germans, and thus discloses the very critical and very German moral mission, this philosopher considers as the mission the nation state he reflects on as a social science thinker should aim at.

And this is a most critical mission of a most critical social science thinker, that, thanks to his interpretation of Ausschwitz as a moral issue, though somewhere matches with *the very real* post war rationale of German imperial politics until today. By making Auschwitz as matter of moral education, rather than a matter of the cynical rationale of wars – this critique dissolves the cynical rationale of a war not only of the German political elite into a mission of moral education, the German nation state as the German failed - and thus. off-thinks, what only the most violent imperial actions of nation state can do by transforming the rational of war into a failure of his responsibility for educating the values of humans morality. Shifting the debate about Ausschwitz from the debate about the political rationale of the German political elite towards a moral failure of the German nation state and from there of the Germans as such, is to make this issue, firstly a matter of morality and via doing this, secondly a matter of *the* German as a member of this nation state, a subject that is attributed the policy rationale of the nation state as if war was the committed rationale of their citizens, those citizens nation states use for this rationale of an imperial war.

Thus, creating with the confession of being a moral failure, creating *the post war national* "we", a morally shared guiltiness of *the* German, unifying all Germans in sharing a national cleaned German, by committing the German to a moral failure, is the post war concept of the German nation state, which very much helped to build a new German "we", a new German

<sup>7</sup> T. W. Adorno. *Erziehung zur Mündigkeit* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1. Auflage, 1971), 88. (Postulating, that there may be no other *Auschwitz* again, is in the first place one towards Education. This is so much a primary postulation that I believe, I neither need nor should I motivate why.) (own translation MK).

national identity, after the old one, the image of the higher race, was destroyed by losing the war. Very soon after, swearing “Never again war”, this new self-incriminating “we” re-established the new German military forces - for the next war. Confessing a national moral guiltiness of the German, nobody is allowed to question, if he does not want to be suspected to still share the old one, is until today the foundation of the German nation state rationale that opened and opens the world for the post world war global German imperial policy agenda.

Idealizing the mission of the German nation state after World War II as a moral imperative and accusing it of being a moral failure, compared to what the very mission of the nation state supposedly is, is an idea that ennobles this nation state via accusing it failing to match with its genuine mission.

## V. ANTISCIENTISM AGAINST SCIENTIFIC SCEPTICISM

It is the last element of scientificity, kept in the theories created under the epistemological auspices of a scientific scepticism, that disturbs the project to create theories through place, aiming at contributing explicitly nationally constructed knowledge to the global social science thought, representing a particular nation state view, here a view about and through India, the advocates of spatiological thinking present – oddly enough -, not as the political desire for an authentic nationalism, but as an epistemological correction of a false epistemology, arguing against the fundamentals constituting scientific thinking, the categorisation of thought.

No concrete example of an abstract can claim to be an embodiment of the abstract alone.<sup>8</sup>

Since the advocates of spatiological thinking are no politicians, but very social scientists – they present the need to create nationally constructed theories as an epistemological must of scientific theorizing as such, and present, thus, ironically, a very “*abstract and universal idea*” about space, they so much oppose, if it helps them to argue for space as a cognitive instance in theorizing.

What Chakrabarty and all the social science thinkers, advocating the cognitive power of place, want to say is that it is a theoretical mistake to create abstracts ideas that tell us

something about the same thing in different places, may this be with different interpretation of the same. They argue against what abstract categories say as what they denounce as “*tabula rasa*”, discrediting their contentlessness, they know very well, as being meaningless, with the false argument, that a category is not the same as the observed things. With their observation that elections are seen and practiced in different ways in India and Australia, they want to say that the category “election” is meaningless, because it abstracts from what makes a category a category, from their differences they very well know, thus allowing them to insist on their view on elections presented as an objective observation voiced by the place.

A cat, is a category, and these social scientists want to argue, that due to the fact that there are white and black cats, they very well know to distinguish, that the category “cat”, they very well use for their distinction in two kind of cats, is meaningless, because they falsely interpret the abstraction any category makes as extinguishing what both animals essentially share, because they do not share the same color, just as if they want to say that, since anything white was a cat and anything black was a cat, cat is no category both white and black cats share. In other words, spatiological thinkers argue to backdrop scientific thinking behind a thinking, already our language and its categories achieved and, thus, to oppose thinking and to advocate their very category of a place “imprinting” knowledge to the thinker, in order to advocate their theory that thinking must be ever articulating the patriotic views spatiological thinkers want to present as being the objective view of their home land.

The advocates of the place as a cognitive instance argue against what constitutes scientific thinking, if not already the abstractions already languages make, creating abstract judgments, saying something about what different things, may this be in different places, share, such as about elections, and advocate that theories must vary dependent on the place where they are produced, thus, opposing what scientific knowledge essentially is based on, that knows to distinguish between, let’s say, what elections are and how they are perceived and practiced in different locations. It is what makes thinking scientific thinking and even already language does, abstractions from the differences realized as variations of the same, such as elections in India and Australia, the advocates of the place as a cognitive instance want to oppose and overcome, because it is this essential of scientific thinking, they detect as an obstacle for theorizing, that aims at theories representing the particularity of a place, or better the particularity they interpret as what the place is telling, the absurdity of an objective scientific view of a nation state on things as a theory about them: Elections in India are that people like them.

<sup>8</sup> Chakrabarty, op. cit., xii.

Needless to say, a scientist, that is a thinker creating categories by abstracting from non-essential differences, insist that theorizing as voicing the view of the “where”, occurring as nothing less but the world’s nation states, is not only a plea for India they were told by India, and not only any category, they were voiced by their local patriotism, but patriotic knowledge is an epistemological must – and this very universally, everywhere:

If this argument is true for India, then it is true of any other place as well, including, of course, Europe or, broadly, the West.<sup>9</sup>

Categories, once they articulate what postcolonial thinkers were “transcended” by one place, India, postcolonial thinkers know and enjoy what categories indeed are, they just denied to say anything, that they are meaningless abstractions, “tabula rasa”. Unless the category is saying that theorizing is voicing patriotic views about nation states, then categories are not only meaningful, but the advocates of patriotism, passionate fighter against categories and even more against universal categories, detect essentials of science, truth, and are bold enough, to claim that interpreting science as voicing patriotism is a universal truth about social science thinking. This, postcolonial social science theorizing about global social thought in the social sciences, advocating that global social science thinking must be patriotic thinking *across the whole world*, is not an imperialist thought, because it is only the mere epistemological necessity of place.

## VI. SPATIOLOGICAL THINKING VERSUS SCIENTIFIC UNIVERSALISM

Concluding from the mere fact, that there are certainly many things that only exist at a certain place, that knowledge and sharing this knowledge about them must be bound to a being in this location is the final end of a debate the social sciences began with the odd idea of a scientific universalism, an idea, only social science thinking can create.

Only an approach to social thought that decides if knowledge is knowledge or not, not depends on the coherence of its reasoning but depends on the extent to which it is shared by others, an approach that considers knowledge as a reflex of the object of thinking voiced

through the thinkers, can create the idea that if knowledge is a matter of its spatial spread, to arrive at claiming that true knowledge is the same as universal knowledge –and consequently provokes the false critique, that essentially founds the false opposition against – consequently – spatially constructed theories: The opposition against the “Western” theories, the prevailing criticism in contemporary global social thought is the concept of local or indigenized theories.

Only this – false - critique of the concept of a scientific universalism that shares this equalisation that true knowledge is universally shared knowledge, opposes the claim of universal knowledge, creates alternative knowledge and does not ever think about critiquing the faults of the theories it opposes, thus, after all, not disclosing why it opposes these theories, except that this knowledge must be knowledge that represents any other “where”. Only an opposition against social thought that shares the view that knowledge depends on the extent to which it is shared can be trapped by the idea of universal knowledge and opposes the spatial claim of universal knowledge by advocating a multiplicity of spatially, that is nationally constructed prejudices. Hence, this odd opposition opposes this knowledge *and* accepts it and compliments it with other knowledge of the same kind, insisting that both are spatially confined, because they are bound to space, no matter what this knowledge is about, no matter what the knowledge is saying and no matter where this knowledge is perceived.

Global social thought under the regime of social sciences knows a radicalisation of interpreting global social thought as nationally constructed theories and create spatiologically constructed social thought – presenting national prejudices as science and to do so, sacrifices the only merit the social sciences gained through their critique of the classical philosophies, that is, that scientific thinking is aiming a knowledge, deliberated from teleological thinking through any obscure ex ante pre-assumptions.

### Concluding Remarks: Spatiological Thinking, the Final Completion of the Global Reign of the “Western” Social Sciences

With the post war II globalisation of the US model of nation state and the transformation of the colonised world into nation states, making the whole world a world of nation states, social science theorizing was confronted with a paradox, a historical anachronism. Social sciences thinking that is thinking about and through the view of nation state constructs on the social, knowledge created from theorizing about the particular nation state socials in the imperial nation states was the knowledge about the world’ social, across also those nation state socials of the former colonies.

<sup>9</sup> Chakrabarty, op. cit., xii.

It was this global completion of social science as social thought across the universe of nation states that abolished the anachronism of nation state knowledge that represented the nationally constructed knowledge from the imperial nations as knowledge across the whole world’s nation state socials – and it did this universalisation of nationally constructed social thought with and thanks to the nationally constructed social sciences theories in the imperial world that rules the world’s social thought, from there on also social thought in the new nation states. That of all things, the application of the nation state society model to the colonies, the model constructing a society that was responsible for making the colonies what they were, a means of the imperial nation states, would make them political entities on the globe, “independent” from the reign of the imperial nation states, is one of the odd tragic ironies, world history orchestrates. One must have witnessed how this tragedy was made a reality after world war II and the new reign of the US concept of a post-colonial globe of nation states, to believe that perceiving the creation of the new nation states from the former colonies was deliberating them and their people from being the material of the imperial world, was not meant to be bad historical joke. The wars, gaining this kind “independency”, that made them more dependent than before, are telling everything, what this project creating independent states was about: Making the US empire the ruling empire about a world of nation states constructed along their model of nation states.<sup>10</sup>

Consequently, this historic tragedy making the colonies nation states, was repeated in the world of social thought: Once the new states were founded, the new nation states also applied the concept of social sciences to social thought, theorizing about nation states through the idealized rationales of nation states, a view that already guided the very illusion of a nation state serving its people, articulated in the paradoxical appendix of an “independent” nation state, including the institutional settings of Higher Education – and detected a historical anachronism.

As anywhere else in the history of nation states, it was the opposition against the nation state that helped to abolish the anachronism of thinking in nation state views and making the view of the imperial nation states the view of the whole of nation states and thus to finalize

the global reign of the system of social sciences and to make this system of social sciences the global system of social thought.

Not coincidentally, it needs scholars from former colonies, educated in social sciences theorizing in the imperial world, to articulate this historical scientific opera, advocating the need, to complete global social thought as a multiplicity of nationally constructed social science thought, abolishing the paradox of the new nation states, scientifically participating in a world of a multiplicity of nationally constructed knowledges by knowledge about the imperial national socials. Epistemologically, completing social science thought as a multiplicity of nationally constructed knowledges, implied to replace the claim for truth of theories in the social sciences by a multiplicity of contextual, of the many spatiological truths, the pluralism of relative local knowledges.

Hence, the completion of global social thought under social sciences was completed by the erosion of what constitutes them as scientific knowledge, the erosion of their concept of objective knowledge, replaced by a global relativism of spatiologically constructed theories. Theorizing through space, the de-politicized phrase of nation state socials, is the epistemological notion and the notion of a discourse, under which social science theorizing, theorizing about nation state socials through the view of the nation state constructs, was completed as the global way of theorizing including social thought in the new nation states.

Accusing social science to ignore that theorizing is a matter of space is an odd and most pretentious misunderstanding about the social sciences and can only be articulated by very social science thinkers who learned their lesson to think from the social sciences that thinking is thinking about and through national constructs. To misread the universal claim of the validity of scientific knowledge of the “European” knowledge as knowledge that is lacking a spatial dimension, is the pretentious intervention, that aims at claiming under the epistemological notion that knowledge must be dependent on the space in which it is created, the creation of the very nation state way of theorizing and theories in the new “spaces” of the new nation states.

By opposing the notion of “universal” knowledge the opposition against the European science under the notion of “eurocentrism” and alike, social scientists advocating a multiplicity of spatiologically constructed knowledge, a debate also led by thinkers from the very “European” social sciences, opposed the last rationale element of social science theorizing, their insistence on a form of objectivity, and finally abolished what makes social science a form of scientific, objective knowledge.

10 Unlike the concept of nation state before World War II, the main new feature of nation state was, that the nation states were constructed to compete among each other about gaining their power means by benefitting from serving the global capital. The clearest measure putting this concept into practice is and was, that nation states had and have to finance the economic means for their political power via lending money from the global financial market they supervise. Subordinating their national currencies under the judgment of the global financial capital, was, oddly enough, interpreted as a loss of sovereignty, just as if it was not these nation states that sets these rules for the world’s nation states and for the global capital as the global rules for their competition about political and economic power.

Just as if there was any knowledge that was not local and universal, simply meaning that any knowledge is about somewhere and that this knowledge is always everywhere knowledge, the universalisation of theorizing about national socials through the view of "spaces", advocated, to make any knowledge spatiologically constructed knowledge, that is to "provincialize" the European sciences as the sciences in the former colonies and, thus, completed a world's of social thought consisting of a multiplicity of local relativisms.

As a consequence, joining a world of a multiplicity of spatial relativism in the first place detects scientificity, the objectivity of knowledge, as its main obstacle, in the second place therefore opposes and abolishes scientificity for contributing social science thought to the world of a multiplicity of spatially constructed knowledges and, finally ends up where nationally constructed thinking about the world's social, consequently, ends up, in advocating global social thought as imperial thinking, theorizing as the creation of a multiplicity of "spatiologically". i.e. idealized nation state view on the world's social, nationally constructed social thought claiming to be social thought that rules theorizing across the world. .

The impact of introducing the "where" as an epistemological dimension of thoughts since then has flourished worldwide and crafted the main stream opposition against what was from there on called the "Western" sciences, social thought coined with the space they origin from, opposed under the another spatiologically constructed notion, "Euro-centrism" and inspired the creation of patriotic theories under such the notions of "local", "indigenous" or "Southern" theories and the like.

It is obvious, that science in and about the spatiologically constructed knowledge islands is never about knowledge, but about a purposefully constructed politically "biased" patriotism and this is what the universalised social science world has learned from the science colonisers, both from the imperial nation states sciences as from the Historical Materialism,. Who both successfully universalised their dogma of thought as an impact of the reality, the postcolonial thinkers arguing in the name of the former colonised world applied to their theory about the whereas an epistemological dimension of social thought. Critiquing theories they oppose under the notion on "Eurocentrism" as one sided views they therefor propose to "provincialise" allowing them to create their own provincialise theories as a contribution to global social thought consisting of spatiological pre-occupied world views, critiquing any of the "Western" theory other than claiming to complement these downplayed as one "provincial" view on the social with their own provincial view, is the least option that would come to the minds of this opposition, since they know from the colonizers that theories must a matter of any

theory model one choses for theorizing and, thus, they argue, that since theories are anyway an impact of the location where they are created, the social science world must commit itself to all create locally pre-occupied social thought.

Hence, under the auspices of this postcolonial spatiological thinking, indigenous knowledge, once the discriminating notion from European sciences, excluding this knowledge from sciences via defining what scientific knowledge is beyond any argument about what indigenous knowledge said, is now re-discovered as a form of spatiological knowledge, that also does also not want to critique any theories it opposes, but aims at contributing another local unique knowledge island with an exclusive local theory<sup>11</sup>: For this very purpose, creating scientific patriotisms proving that the colonized world already owned spatiologically constructed theories long time before the "Western" sciences invade the world with their "Eurocentric" theories, some social scientists interpret thinkers, preferably from "the West" detect even pre-social science thinkers like Khaldoun, a thinker, thinking about the 14th century, as the first spatiological sociologist, others admire poets like Rizal, insisting that Philippines' people are not lazy, as a local anti-hegemonic theorists, all re-detecting the colonised world as a world that provides authentic local "Southern" theories for today's global battle about the locally pre-occupied theories, all representing the authenticity of a national social view in the battle about patriotic theories, which do no longer claim to understand the world, but to represent an exclusive national view, a scientifically ennobled local patriotism as their contributions to a world of provincialized theories. . .

It was and is this opposition against the theories called, in the logic spatiological theorizing, "Western" theories, that paved the way for universalising the "where," presenting space, mostly politically defined, as a worldwide epistemological dimension of science, thus extending the concept of social science thinking about and through nation state view across the world in a way, the sciences from the imperial world never could, due to their own very political, i.e., nationalized "where" of theorizing, that basically did not care about what is going beyond their biotops.

Since then, thanks to a false opposition against the imposed "Eurocentric" theories and

11 Indigenous knowledge is not a creature of indigenous people, but of the scientific colonisers. The critique indigenous knowledge was autochthonous is a revealing hypocrisy of thinkers who otherwise cultivate contextualized theorizing. The fact that all those indigenisation enterprises are the enterprises of the incriminated academics which serve the latest epistemological fashions of the apparently not only Western "post-structuralists" relativists freaks, does not bother the original holders of this indigenous knowledge: For the disappointment of the indigenous knowledge seekers they don't care about what indigenouness at all means.



justified by the Gurus of post-structuralism social science such as Levi-Strauss and Foucault, thinking finally conquered the world of social thought as a multiplicity of relatively obscure spatialological social thought, only comprehensible for and through the obscureness of being part of a "space" in which it is created. Since then, the world of sciences consists of the global theoretical relative crux of anywhere valid and nowhere sharable theories and an intellectual scenario, in which the traditional obscurantism of religious thinking, once overcome by civic thinking, rises again from the dead.

Thus, it is the false opposition against the universalisation of the theories from the local knowledge island in Europe, which further develop global social thought under the regime of social sciences, finally opposes the scientificity of science for the sake of setting free the creation of all the local obscurantism and, thus help to abolish the only substantial achievement social science thinking has gained through its critique of the classical philosophies – with a consequent interpretation and application of the dogmas of social sciences to global social thought.

It returns to the obscurantism of thinking in which the mystification of some spatial particularism into a type of knowledge can be only shared by those who share the mystic spatial "context", in which it is created. It is this scientifically reactionary opposition against social science thinking that gives birth to the emergence of a new wave of religious social sciences 200 years after the European sciences emerged from an emancipation of the obscurantism of religious thinking.

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